



Governance is the process of eff ective coordination whereby an organization or a system guides itself when 
resources, power, and information are widely distributed. 
Studying governance means probing the patt ern of rights 
and obligations that underpins organizations and social 
systems; understanding how they coordinate their parallel 
activities and maintain their coherence; exploring the 
sources of dysfunction; and suggesting ways to redesign 
organizations whose governance is in need of repair.
The Series welcomes a range of contributions—from 
conceptual and theoretical refl ections, ethnographic and 
case studies, and proceedings of conferences and symposia, 
to works of a very practical nature—that deal with problems 
or issues on the governance front. The Series publishes 
works both in French and in English.
The Governance Series is part of the publications division 
of the Program on Governance and Public Management 
at the School of Political Studies. Nine volumes have 
previously been published within this series. The Program 
on Governance and Public Management also publishes 
electronic journals: the quarterly www.optimumonline.ca 
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Nicholas Brown and Linda Cardinal
In 1996 Seyla Benhabib introduced a collection of essays on the 
theme of “democracy and diff erence” with the following proposition 
(Benhabib 1996, 4–5):
the institutions and culture of liberal democracies are suffi  ciently 
complex, supple and decentred so as to allow the expression of 
diff erence without fracturing the identity of the body politic or 
subverting existing forms of political sovereignty.
Benhabib was writing in the context of a “post-Communist world,” 
with reference to debates characterizing the broadly conceived, 
seemingly suffi  ciently unifi ed and substantially uncontested model 
of “western democracies.” Within a few years, however, the forces 
of globalization were creating a diff erent world, one in which the 
unprecedented mobility of people, trade, and money was fostering 
what Benhabib in 2003 termed a “disaggregated” citizenship. The 
European Union (EU), in this context, provided the most germane 
model for adjudicating the alternative prospects of “permanent 
alienage” or “cosmopolitan citizenship” within a bloc of simplifi ed 
currency, migration, and trade relations. Through such a model 
new forms of citizenship were in sight, encompassing “multiple 
allegiances across nation-state borders.” Yet how might such an 
outcome be guaranteed, now that we are so concerned with securing 
those same borders? What would it mean in practice?
This collection of essays is placed exactly on the unfolding and 
unsteady trajectory of this synthesis of citizenship, the nation state, 
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and economic and political change. As suggested by Helen Irving in 
this book, debates on citizenship abound, yet these debates are so 
important to our understanding of the body politic and its capacity to 
manage diversity that there is always room for renewed discussions 
on issues of belonging, rights, and self-government. It might even 
be subversive to talk about citizenship coming from societies that 
are so caught up with consumerism, individualism. While we might 
praise the liberal democratic project in its current European forms, 
it is crucial, as Pocock argues in his most recent collection of essays 
(2005), that European models do not lose a sense of continuity with 
the past. In contrast to the cosmopolitan ideal, he advocates the 
need to maintain autonomous political structures in order to bett er 
equip individuals and societies with the tools that are necessary for 
addressing diversity.
PRACTICES OF CITIZENSHIP
All the contributors to this book seek to address this ongoing tension 
between autonomy and plurality, as well as the national and the 
postnational, in discussing pressing issues of diversity as they are 
defi ned and managed by governmental and non-governmental 
actors in contemporary multicultural, multiethnic, and multinational 
societies. They tackle these questions from the perspective of three 
specifi c societies rather than by reference to general models or 
projects—three societies that have distinct points of purchase on 
questions of political possibility and innovation. Australia, Canada, 
and the Republic of Ireland are each in distinct ways exposed 
to the dynamics associated with the politics of diff erence and the 
forces of globalization. Each country has its own particular matrix 
of elements representing such change: migration, social diversity, 
customary patt erns of policy and political legitimacy, varying 
geopolitical and geo-economic possibilities. Each society, then, 
brings its own opportunities, vulnerabilities, and resistances to meet 
these challenges. All three, through their similarities and diff erences, 
suggest matt ers worthy of consideration when considering the 
processes of adaptation to the “democratic moment” of the late 1980s, 
the evolution of regionalized supranational communities (Europe, 
the Asia-Pacifi c, North America) and agreements through the 1990s, 
and the testing of models of “liberal democracy” more generally. If 
there is the possibility of choosing between the divergent paths of 
“alienage” or “cosmopolitanism,” how is that choice being signalled 
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and debated in these societies, each generating demands for the 
recognition and accommodation of ethnic, cultural, and religious 
diversity, and facing injunctions to forgo accustomed national 
borders in the name of economic integration and cultural openness?
These issues set the themes for a symposium on practices of 
citizenship and the management of diversity held at University 
College Dublin in April 2004. All the speakers were directed to 
consider such issues with reference to questions of applied policy. This 
book consists of eight essays arising from that symposium, dealing 
with topics ranging from minority language policy, immigration 
reform, and the welfare rights of subnational groups to urban 
planning and the framing of political discourse in specifi c national 
contexts. In dealing with these topics these essays also encompass 
general factors—including population mobility, multinational and 
“globalized” economies, the recourse to international agendas 
and norms, technological transformation, electoral populism, 
and challenges to representation and constitutional reform—that 
contribute to the current importance of these issues. And further, as 
Paul Gillespie’s concluding chapter notes, these essays of necessity 
engage with many of the central, pressing conceptual questions 
in contemporary social analysis. Moving beyond a perspective in 
which diversity is celebrated for its rich addition to the social fabric 
of such societies as Australia, Canada, and Ireland, the book instead 
emphasizes the need to discuss in depth how these societies engage 
in more practical terms with this new context.
In convening this symposium our perception was that discussions 
of diversity, when framed in terms of identity politics and the 
recognition of diff erence, oft en do not fully address the extent to 
which identity and diff erence are themselves implicated in policy 
processes, and even, as Wendy Brown (1995) argues, created by 
such processes. Alain-G. Gagnon and Raff aele Iacovino contend in 
their chapter in this book that “the question of diversity itself must 
be disaggregated to refl ect … distinct political and social projects.” 
Similarly, Helen Irving insists that concepts of citizenship, as they 
have fl ourished in recent critical theory, are too oft en assumed to 
bestow inherent qualities, att ributes, and entitlements, whereas in 
practice the rights att ached to citizenship are more contingent than 
inevitable. How, then, might we account for such processes and for 
their contingencies?
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MANAGING DIVERSITY
As suggested here by Caroline Andrew, the expression “managing 
diversity” might not be the most elegant phrase to convey our concern 
for a bett er understanding of the ways in which our three societies 
organize plurality and address the demands of their many groups or 
nations. Nevertheless, we use it explicitly because of its implication 
of a governance perspective. To talk about the management of 
diversity is to do more than use a new buzzword in the vocabulary 
of the social sciences. It means that we need to focus on those 
mechanisms put in place to coordinate the development of policies in 
themselves responding to the demands for recognition and seeking 
to expand the boundaries of the political. These mechanisms range 
from referendums, consultations, processes of decentralization, 
federalism, and power-sharing to more mainstream state-oriented 
policies of recognition. In all these cases what is at stake is not only 
the symbolic recognition of group or individual identities but, to 
use the terminology of Gilles Paquet (1999), the equally important 
process of distribution of power, resources, and information.
Managing diversity also implies a process of social learning in 
order to improve these mechanisms of coordination. We thus move 
beyond narrow processes of policy-making in which the central state 
is the hegemonic actor. It also means noting the ways in which, as 
Andrew cautions, not “all actors—social, economic and political—
have equal amounts of power, resources and/or information; this is a 
question to be empirically verifi ed in particular contexts.”
Using the expression “managing diversity” also serves to remind 
us that citizenship might have become too rights-centred and not 
suffi  ciently concerned with self-government and the sharing of 
power in both national and postnational contexts. Thus, any reference 
to a “governance perspective” should not serve to abolish the need 
for politics. On the contrary, the more groups are involved in the 
management of diversity, the more they can use their experiences 
and redefi ne their political roles in broader terms. Those who 
condemn groups for being too much engaged in lobbying activities 
or for having narrow interests should revise their perspective in 
order to take a bett er look at the way in which the management 




Using Australian, Canadian, and Irish examples, we have sought 
to highlight these issues and, with the advantage of sometimes 
contrasting, sometimes intersecting accounts, to promote comparative 
and interdisciplinary dialogue on the ways in which diversity is 
comprehended in practice. In drawing these papers together for 
publication we have encouraged the authors to refl ect further on 
their common or contrasting concerns, to explore overarching themes 
such as citizenship, diversity, nationalism, and postnationalism, and 
to question the extent to which such themes are creative, or at least 
exploitable, elements within the political processes, rather than just 
external drivers or tools of analysis and critique. Such refl ection has 
also enabled each author to place his or her work in a wider context 
of debate. These three national variations on “western democracy” 
interrogate as well as illustrate the concerns of scholars such as 
Benhabib with “contesting the boundaries of the political.” As Jean 
L. Cohen (1999, 256) encourages those seeking to understand the 
nature of current challenges to the democratic state, we need to att end 
to factors of “ethical-political and collective identity” that are oft en 
specifi c to societies and cannot be subsumed within abstracted or 
universalized principles and models. History, political cultures, and 
institutions matt er in trying to understand practices of citizenship 
and the management of diversity. Even though we are dealing with 
three similar societies, the particular makeup of each of them informs 
the debate on diversity and makes each unique in responding to it. 
This does not mean that we cannot generalize from these particular 
cases. We are, aft er all, discussing three western democracies with 
similar understandings of citizenship, diversity, and nationalism or 
postnationalism. Nevertheless, we argue, it is important to provide 
the reader with a deeper sense of how each of these societies deals 
with its ongoing tensions between autonomy and plurality.
Why Australia, Canada, and Ireland? We fi rst provide a short 
answer, then a more detailed explanation. Each is a divided society, 
dealing with colonial legacies; recent experiences shaped by large-
scale population mobility; associated tensions over assimilation 
or multiculturalism/multinationalism; the challenges of regional 
integration arising from shift ing economic agendas; practices of 
reconciliation refl ecting political responses to minority groups’ 
access to images of identity and injury; varying perspectives on self-
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consciously modern nation-building projects; and the capacity to 
articulate a role or place in the domain of international citizenship 
and “functional affi  nity” (in the language of Australia’s White Paper 
on Foreign Aff airs and Trade, 2003), which has gained increasing 
prominence over the past ten years. Consider the Republic of 
Ireland, implementing the Good Friday Agreement or riding the 
“Celtic Tiger”; Canada, with recurring threats of secession and 
the negotiations over the North American Free Trade Agreement; 
Australia, with its ambivalent engagement with the Asia–Pacifi c 
region and the anger and disillusionment of an “anxious middle” 
constituency squeezed by decades of “reform.” The pressures that 
lie behind these features in the political and social landscape of each 
society are far from unique, but as they are worked through in their 
specifi c contexts, they are thrown into sharp relief in ways that repay 
comparative discussion.
NATIONAL AND POSTNATIONAL CONTEXTS: THE 
REPUBLIC OF IRELAND
As Richard Kearney has argued in many academic and political 
forums, “postnationalism” is not merely a descrip-tion of the political, 
cultural, and economic trends facing the Republic of Ireland. Given 
the combined pressures and opportunities of European integration 
and the concerted recent moves to end the “Irish problem” for the 
sake of the “Irish people,” postnationalism is also, and perhaps more 
powerfully, an imaginative resource. The concept off ers a way of 
posing questions about what might be sought through “rethinking 
… inherited models of sovereignty, nation state and nationalism” 
and acknowledging a “totality of relations” extending both into 
the past and into the future (Kearney 1997, 11). Postnationalism 
off ers an alternative to the mutually “unworkable” prospects for 
either a united Ireland or a United Kingdom, given the challenge 
of reconciling national legitimacy with national identity on the one 
hand, and, on the other, the evolution of a “European confi guration,” 
which might favour “modes of self-determination … that are more 
eff ective and accommodating than the purely ‘national’” (Kearney 
1997, 11).
Ireland has always brought a particular complexity and poignancy 
to ways of conceptualizing the nation: is the nation essentially 
a state, a territory, an ethnicity, or a culture, even if that culture is 
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defi ned as a diaspora? As Kearney suggests, Ireland might now 
have the power to confi rm the prospects of a “federal ‘Europe of 
regions’ characterized by a progressive transfer of power down 
to regions from the ‘nation state’ as much by a transfer of power 
upwards through economic and monetary, and political union” 
(Kearney 1997, 77). Clearly, Ireland provides a powerful example of 
the contemporary management of diversity. The republic’s sudden 
affl  uence and “international vocation,” stimulated in large part by 
the EU, has brought with it the cultural diversity that characterizes 
contemporary Dublin streets (at least in some districts), but also 
widespread social strain, even a perceived challenge to national 
integrity. In 1996 the Irish government asserted, “We see ourselves 
increasingly as Europeans,” yet by 2004, as Iseult Honohan’s 
chapter discusses, the nation contested a referendum over whether 
to restrict the conditions under which citizenship was available 
in a society quickly transformed from one of emigration to one of 
immigration. The Twenty-seventh Amendment to the Constitution, 
ending citizenship as an automatic entitlement of any child born in 
the Republic, was endorsed by nearly 80 percent of those voting. It 
was not so much a challenge to the “cosmopolitan citizenship” of the 
EU as a move in conformity with the desire of most “old” members 
of the EU to maintain some control over migration and claims to 
national citizenship.
Equally, the role of the Irish state in preserving or promoting an 
almost defi antly monocultural national identity has encompassed 
an oft en dialectical engagement with the agents of diversity. Luke 
Gibbons, for example, has argued that “it is oft en the integration of 
Ireland into the new international order,” especially as represented 
in the changing forms and media of communication, “which has 
activated some of the most conservative forces in Irish society” 
(Gibbons 1996, 4). The coming of television, for example, gave 
power to campaigns against divorce and abortion reform through 
the imported modes of religious evangelism. Conversely, it has been 
the homegrown programmes on Irish television, drawing on self-
consciously traditionalized rural sett ings or a celebrated oral culture, 
that, while adopting forms such as the talk show or the serial, have 
proved capable of posing the greatest challenge to areas of taboo in 
Irish society. Niamh Hourigan’s chapter, dealing with the agendas, 
tactics, and internal politics of minority-language broadcasting, 
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deals directly with such dialectics, contrasting Irish, Welsh, and 
Scots Gaelic examples. Such services, inevitably evoking the defence 
of an identity defi ned by a national or even pre-national heritage, 
also search for constituencies in themselves shaped by diversity in 
lifestyle choice, even an alternative perspective on social issues. As 
Hourigan notes, this programming choice has been actively pursued 
by the commissioners of the Irish language channel TG4. If, as Gibbons 
argues, “Irish culture experienced modernity before its time,” given 
that disintegration and fragmentation were already so deeply parts 
of its colonial history, then there might be a more “porous and open-
ended” dimension to its engagement with the forces of globalization 
and postnationalism: a creative postcolonial meshing of the local 
and the international (Gibbons 1996, 6). This, too, might be part of 
Ireland’s relevance to the management of diversity.
NATIONAL AND POSTNATIONAL CONTEXTS: 
CANADA
While diversity in Canada, in contrast, is an established and 
explicit national symbol, in practice it remains an issue polarized 
between those who approach diversity within the framework of 
individual rights and those who promote them from a collective 
point of view. For almost twenty years Canadian political theorists 
and philosophers, such as Joseph Carens, Will Kymlicka, Michel 
Seymour, Charles Taylor, and James Tully, have been internationally 
recognized as leading contributors to the public debate on citizenship 
and diversity. A wealth of books on diversity and citizenship has 
developed around them, refl ecting a depth of intellectual engagement 
with this aspect of the “national” project and with formulating ways 
in which it might be refi ned and extended. Kymlicka, for example, 
has writt en that Canada is best described as a “multination state,” 
in which three distinct groups—the indigenous, the Francophone, 
and the Anglophone—can each claim an essentially national identity 
defi ned by historical continuity, a complete regime of institutional 
representation, and a distinct language or languages (Kymlicka 
1996, 153–55). However, Kenneth McRoberts (2001) has warned 
political theorists that Canadian politicians do not view the country 
as a multinational society but, much more, as a multicultural one. 
We could also add that they see demands for recognition of Quebec’s 
distinctiveness in linguistic terms and not in national terms. 
Furthermore, McRoberts argues, it is federalism that has made it 
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possible to accommodate Quebec’s rights to self-determination, not 
its recognition as a nation within another nation. While one might 
reply that Canada does recognize the existence of First Nations, it 
does so in symbolic rather than in concrete terms. As Andrée Lajoie 
(2004) shows, so far neither the Canadian federal state nor the courts 
have responded positively to any demands from First Nations that 
question national sovereignty. Canada’s multicultural makeup 
may lead to the conclusion that it is, aft er all, a postnational state, 
but in their chapter in this book Gagnon and Iacovino argue, with 
particular reference to Quebec, that the more areas of diff erence are 
articulated within strictly civic or liberal terms, the more they risk 
being removed from the “sociocultural roots” that give them their 
meaning. When confronted with their relationship with the United 
States, Canadians seem to understand this situation a bit bett er, but 
most of them remain wary of any specifi c recognition of Quebec as a 
“distinct society” for fear of breaking up the country.
Equally, as Caroline Andrew argues, the increasing ethnic 
diversity of Canadian society, encompassing especially immigrant 
minorities, oft en with marked urban concentrations in sett lement, 
makes claims that fall outside the historic identities of the established 
national groups. This new, and oft en very visible, dimension of the 
“Canadian political experiment” goes beyond Canada’s professed 
multiculturalism or multinationalism. In the re- or despatializing/
territorializing forces that are an integral part of globalization, the 
city becomes the most meaningful space for the experience of identity, 
the search for inclusion, and the expression of citizenship. It is this 
space that Andrew surveys in Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal. 
These, however, are now the emblematic cities of cosmopolitanism, 
presenting an urban theatre so characterized by disruption, diaspora, 
hybridity, and fl uidity as to defy the meaningful imprint of a 
national culture. Yet, with specifi c reference to the provision of social 
services, Andrew notes in her case studies the “moment of rupture” 
when city governments, responding to the challenge of representing 
their own diverse communities and accommodating “scales of 
identity” that best correspond to the impact of globalization, must 
clearly diff erentiate themselves from other levels of government. 
Underneath the self-conscious diversity of the Canadian national 
project, then, there are issues that are perhaps becoming less resolved 
as debate embraces postnational modes.
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NATIONAL AND POSTNATIONAL CONTEXTS: 
AUSTRALIA
As David Headon notes in his chapter in this book, the Australian 
perspective on managing diversity can be sharply symbolized in 
a recent shift  in ruling political rhetoric. Over the past ten years 
Australian leaders have eff ectively played upon a polarization 
between “mainstream” and “cosmopolitan” agendas, particularly in 
relation to topics such as indigenous welfare, engagement with the 
Asia–Pacifi c region and “political correctness” in general. This is not 
simply an expression of party-political fortunes. During the general 
election campaign in 2004, Mark Latham, then leader of the Australian 
Labor Party, contrasted the “tourists,” with their abstract lifestyles 
and politics, to a true Australian constituency among “residents,” 
who recoiled from “big picture” issues of social reform, favouring 
instead sober aspiration and family values. The ground has been 
eff ectively captured since 1996 by the Liberal prime minister, John 
Howard, whose commitment to defending “the national interest,” 
even to the extent of contemplating unilateral military intervention 
against suspected terrorist cells within nations in Southeast Asia, 
or systematically turning back ships of “asylum-seekers,” has 
eff ectively captured a constituency portrayed as overexposed to 
threats spanning from the labour market deregulation demanded 
by multinational corporations to unwonted United Nations scrutiny 
of human rights breaches among the Aboriginal population and in 
refugee detention centres. Headon surveys the ways in which this 
new political rhetoric of “values” has shaped a “culture war,” which 
is being fought across a wide range of issues and which leaves few 
speaking positions untouched. What lies behind such a concerted 
Australian reaction to diversity and all it represents?
The Australian social model of the “social laboratory” att ributed to 
innovative policy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
has always been premised on the containment of diversity, whether 
in protecting living standards against the threat of “cheap labour” or 
administering assimilationist policies in relation to both Aboriginal 
Australians and non-British immigrants, especially as these policies 
were formalized in the 1950s. The embrace of multiculturalism in the 
1970s, the move away from economic protection in the 1980s, and 
increasing att ention to reconciliation with Aboriginal peoples in the 
early 1990s pressed at these boundaries of tolerance but eventually 
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met a striking lack of elasticity. Recent work by Ghassan Hage (1998) 
and Allaine Cerwonka (2004) off ers a provocative perspective on 
these issues.
Cerwonka notes Australia’s peculiar exposure to the “interna-
tionalizing of nations” that has occurred over recent decades, 
and particularly the imperative to integrate with the economic 
transformation of East Asia. These pressures were not unique to 
Australia, but whereas Ireland and Canada might have been able to 
reconceptualize their positions in the international landscape (from 
being in “the West” to being part of a regional community) without 
having to challenge basic hierarchies underpinning underlying 
schemes and images of nation, Australia has had no equivalent access 
(Cerwonka 2004, 229). To be “part of Asia” as a sphere of inevitably 
expanding western or “modern” cultural and strategic hegemony 
from the 1950s to the 1970s was one thing, but to be subsumed in 
Asia as a sphere of economic ascendancy from the 1980s is another. 
When the populist political leader Pauline Hanson briefl y captured a 
sense of national insecurity, during the late 1990s, it was by promising 
to radically review the rate and composition of immigration, to 
abolish the multiculturalism introduced in the 1970s, to control the 
“industries” that proliferated around the provision of welfare and 
services to minority groups, especially Aboriginal Australians, and 
to end Australia’s exposure to external threats.
Hage has identifi ed similar pressures in the dominance in 
Australia of what he terms “white multiculturalism,” the denial 
that the increasing incorporation of ethnic and Indigenous 
diversity within the “national space” must inevitably challenge the 
centrality of an essential white, European, English-speaking culture. 
Extending Kymlicka’s reservations about the ambiguities inherent in 
multiculturalism as a social or policy objective in Canada, Hage sees 
the concept as actively att empting to suppress the real recognition 
of diversity in Australia. As a result “those white people who 
experience the loss” of a sense of cultural centrality are left  “with no 
mainstream political language with which to express it” beyond the 
kind of “pathological political language” that Hanson deployed, or 
the “tolerance” that she provoked many to espouse in condemning 
her extremism while still remaining locked within the structures that 
produced it. As Hage argues, “There is a need for rethinking a new 
cultural politics capable of recognizing and dealing realistically with 
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this cultural sense of loss,” and of accepting diversity, not as a feature 
of the national culture, but as a force that must recast it in signifi cant 
ways (Hage 1998, 22 and 26). In his refl ective, suggestive chapter 
in this book, Alastair Davidson reminds us that while some of the 
drivers of this diversity are not new, their pace is accelerating, their 
agents are crossing customary categories in sociological analysis, 
and the moral imagination needed to grasp their signifi cance is 
still in need of cultivation. Australia might now be one of the most 
ethnically diverse societies on the globe, but it is one whose national 
project remains deeply founded on assimilationist precepts. Where 
lies the path ahead for such a society?
QUO VADIS?
Neither this summary of the issues relevant to the contemporary 
status of diversity nor the focus of each chapter is intended to be a 
comprehensive or complete account. The chapters do not necessarily 
represent the most pressing faces of diversity in their respective 
nations, but they do each identify a distinct sphere in which the 
challenges are posed, defi ned, and met in ways that refl ect on the 
political resources of that society and its place in the larger dynamics 
of contemporary social change. Diversity is not a cause or an end 
in itself. It is both an input into policy and a product of policy. It is 
not a self-suffi  cient concept but one that exists at the intersection of 
major determinants of social change. It is an idea, as Gillespie insists, 
that challenges us to imagine its possibilities rather than to measure 
its achievement. Each chapter here identifi es such determinants 
and charts their impact while also imagining other options and 
potentialities. Some, such as Headon or Hourigan, off er specifi c 
case studies. Others, such as Honohan or Irving, develop more 
theoretically informed analyses of issues of democratic legitimacy 
or the contexts and meanings of citizenship. Taken together, these 
chapters present a broad but intersecting survey of the experience 
of diversity. In them all, implicitly but sometimes very explicitly, 
as in Irving’s chapter, there is a direct challenge to contemporary 
modes of analysis. As with Irving’s close reading of the relationships 
between the status of citizenship and the possession of rights, the 
evidence might come from a particular national example, but the 
argument engages critically, as, for example, in Davidson’s chapter, 
or in complementary ways, as with Gagnon and Iacovino, with other 
perspectives in this collection. We are not off ering, then, a resolved 
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manifesto, but an open exploration of an increasingly complex topic 
in need of more empirical discussion, which could also help to renew 
ongoing normative and theoretical discussions.
In the order of the chapters, Alastair Davidson introduces us, in 
a refl ective mode, to the range of global, cultural, economic, and 
moral factors that shape one of the main factors underpinning 
contemporary diversity: the simple fact of an unprecedented 
mobility of people, for whatever reason, whether fate or fortune, 
displacement or opportunity. While this reality might prompt 
the advocacy of universal citizenship, Helen Irving argues that 
to have any power and to be more than symbolism, citizenship 
must refl ect the commitment of states to enact and defend rights, 
and thus prompts refl ection on what kinds of provisions are 
appropriate to comprehend diversity, using Australian and other 
examples. Iseult Honohan then explores such provisions in applied 
contexts, with particular interest in the recent debate over the form 
of Irish citizenship. The Canadian perspective is then presented 
by Alain Gagnon and Raff aele Iacovino, and by Caroline Andrew, 
who examine the regulation and identifi cation of diversity within 
multinational and city-based policy processes. Returning to Ireland, 
Niamh Hourigan focuses on att empts to recognize diversity within 
the provision of a particular service: broadcasting. If the tenor of each 
of these chapters has been to note the increasing pressure to recognize 
diversity, David Headon refl ects from an Australian perspective on 
the force of political reaction that has equally sought to contain it. By 
way of conclusion, Paul Gillespie refl ects on the themes emerging in 
each chapter, off ering a synthesis that is germane not only to each 
nation but also to the more pervasive condition of needing to form a 
fresh vocabulary to comprehend the world in which we are already 
living.
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CHAPTER 1
NATIONAL IDENTITY AND GLOBAL 
MIGRATION: LISTENING TO THE “PARIAHS”
Alastair Davidson
Returning to Dublin in 2004 aft er fi ft y years away, I expected that 
when I walked past Bewley’s Oriental Café the smell of coff ee would 
evoke an almost Proustian recollection in me. As a child I lived for a 
time just near the Bagot Street Bridge. My Irish mother had brought 
her two sons “home.” “Spud” Murphy, who taught us “the Irish” 
at school, used to greet me with “A hogan dhu an gael?” (“Do you 
speak Gaelic?”) and then, since he knew I came from Fĳ i, would 
add, half in jest, “You eejit, Fĳ i, don’t they even teach you the Gaelic 
down there?” As a child brought up on the myths and legends of 
Cúchulainn, Róisín Dubh, John Mitchel, and the evil Black and Tans, 
I resolved to avoid such mortifi cation by learning Irish quickly. 
Snippets of the poems still come to me: “Do eirig me a madhan …” (“I 
get up in the morning …”).
This struggle to assimilate, to belong, was soon thwarted. It was 
not that identifying by speaking “the Irish” was a partial, nostalgic, 
and romantic choice of a way to belong but that, like millions 
of others before us, my brother, my mother, and I soon left  again 
“across the water” in search of a bett er life. Since then we have lived 
in many countries, new versions of the wanderers in Greek, Jewish, 
and other ancient literatures. My late brother became culturally an 
Englishman, I moved on to Australia, and my mother wandered the 
world, to come to rest at ninety-eight years of age in the hills outside 
Melbourne.
In 1952 we were still among the millions of forced migrants of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries who left  the “old country” for 
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new peripheries. Like the myriad Irish men and women who had 
preceded us, when we left  it was time for lament, above all for my 
mother, who still has a Paul Henry on her wall and who reminds us 
that John Mitchel, the leader of Young Ireland who was transported 
to Tasmania in 1849, was our ancestor. Now his face stares out from 
the mantelpiece of my home in the Morvan, deep in la France profonde. 
The millions who migrated in earlier centuries and from other far 
distant places also lamented. When I left  Fĳ i they sang “Isa Lei” (“Isa, 
you are my only treasure”). When I left  New Zealand they sang “Po 
kare kare ana” (“E hine e, Hoki Mai ra,” “My girl, return to me”). In 
the nineteenth century, when they left  for the Australian colonies, 
they sang about “leaving old England forever.” The voyage that they 
and we made aft er leaving was long: fi ve weeks from Dún Laoghaire 
even in 1952. All that was home was being left  for destinations that 
must sometimes have seemed like the gates of hell. I was reminded 
of this when I visited William Smith O’Brien’s cott age at Port Arthur 
in Tasmania and gazed at the pictures on the walls and the names 
of the men who had stayed there or been transported for political 
crimes, including Canadians who had joined in the rising of 1837.
Long aft er they arrived in their new “homes” these migrants 
kept their languages and their customs, and they were torn 
between “Home” and home. This was a theme of Australian 
literature well into the twentieth century. It has also been captured 
beautifully in Alistair McLeod’s haunting stories of Scots in the 
freezing fi shing villages of Canada’s east coast. The stories of 
migrants are myriad. Some decided to make the best of it, others 
to go Home, perhaps never to fi nd it again, for Home has a way 
of disappearing into memory as customs and places change with 
time. I have seen a woman’s lett ers that gradually changed from 
Gaelic into English over twenty years as her own Australian 
world changed. Her feelings are re-evoked in a recent collection by 
Denise Burns, who is trying to unite her two affi  nities, Australia and 
Ireland: “I realize I am working on it when I have dreams of North 
Queensland green frogs playing the bodhran” (Havenhand and 
McGregor 2003, 61).
In 1952, when my mother, my brother, and I left  Ireland, we 
lamented as our forebears had for centuries. We knew that we had 
lost worlds in space and time. Those worlds would remain as no 
more than memories and deceits. Yet by 1982 the same was not true 
for migrants. Aft er the 1980s their experience has been radically 
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changed by globalization, the process of creating a truly global 
market in capital, goods, and labour through the use of new digital 
technologies. Before it became obvious in the 1990s that the nation 
state had more capacity to survive than many had expected, the 
thrust of the process was summed up in the titles of two best-sellers 
by Kenichi Ohmae: The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the 
Interlinking Economy and The End of the Nation-State and the Rise of 
Regional Economies. Despite the survival of nation states in a new form, 
globalized digital technologies have created a world as truly new as 
it became when Columbus fi rst sighted the Americas. Globalization 
has completely changed the sense of time and space that tore us from 
our past and our roots in earlier times. No longer is the primary 
point of reference for our economics and social development, for 
capital and goods, the nation state. The destinies of the latt er are 
decided by the fl ows of global capital and goods, and woe betide a 
state that ignores those imperatives. Labour follows those fl ows and 
is regulated by their requirements, being invited in or expelled as 
required by political actors, including the power brokers of nation 
states (see, for example, Human Rights Watch 2002). The best writers 
who used to argue that the nation state played a primary role in the 
global world of migration, such as Christian Joppke, cannot gainsay 
what everyday practice reveals today: global migration as a driver 
towards universalization (see Joppke 1999 and 2005). This reality 
is summed up in the words of Australia’s leading scholar of such 
movement (Hugo 2002, 79):
It is important to realize that in the early postwar era almost 
all Australians operated within labour markets bounded by a 
state so that they could see the capital city of the state as the 
centre of gravity of that labour market. Increasingly, those 
labour markets were extended to encompass the nation with 
the centre being in Sydney and, to a lesser extent, Melbourne. 
However, in the globalizing world of the last decade the 
boundaries of labour markets have extended further so that 
many look to global cities such as London and New York as 
the centre of gravity of their labour market.
My four children are now in Australia, but a couple of years ago 
two were working in New Zealand, another was in East Timor, and 
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another was checking out prospects in New York, and plans are again 
being made to work overseas. They are good evidence for Professor 
Hugo’s assertion.
Scholars of globalization—of the lightning-fast movement of labour 
around the world and the emergence everywhere of multiethnic and 
multicultural societies as a result—have rightly noted that never 
before in recorded history has there been so much migration. It is 
important to indicate the dimensions of that migration. First, let 
us admit that most human beings still stay at home. They grow up 
there and they feel that they “belong.” They are Irish or Australian or 
Canadian. Even if, as individuals, they migrate, it is in the expectation 
that they will either return home or simply change allegiance to 
a new home. They will either assimilate or create a new syncretic 
culture.
Statistics give us only half the picture of what is happening. They 
are ever changing and gain meaning only as a long series. They also 
depend for their usefulness on defi nitions, on answers to questions 
on departure cards such as, are you departing “permanently” or 
“long term” (meaning, in the Australian case, for longer than twelve 
months)? They require interpretation to help us to understand our 
problem. For example, most of the people who made the one billion 
overseas trips recorded in 2001 by travel agencies would fall into the 
group of those who “belong.” If these trips were made on the basis 
of one to each person, that would mean that one fi ft h of the world’s 
population went overseas, but probably most are multiple trips 
made by much smaller numbers of businesspeople. Australia had 
a population of 20 million in 2001. Three and a half millions made 
overseas trips that year. Clearly most came home, or the country 
would be even more sparsely populated than it is. This is much less 
true, however, of the 150 million or more people who migrate every 
year inside huge territorial states such as China and Indonesia, or 
the further 100 million who leave legally for permanent destinations 
overseas every year, or the 22 million refugees and similar individuals 
who have no place to go. These fi gures still leave out an incalculable 
number of illegal migrants (see UNRISD, and Castles and Miller 
1993).
In the nineteenth century people were transported from Europe 
and then from South Asia, Vietnam, or China to serve as labourers in 
vast diasporas. Nothing has really changed in that regard. Human 
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beings are still forced to migrate by globalizing pressures, although 
today we separate defi nitionally, and with litt le justifi cation, economic 
migrants from refugees and other categories (see Laferrière 1996). As 
Sami Nair (1997, 73) notes,
We have entered a period of a huge displacement of population. 
I use the word “displacement” deliberately, for when the 
populations of entire regions leave this is not because they want 
to leave, but because they are obliged to by the situation. In 
fact, what is called globalization, the extending of the economy 
to the globe, goes together with uprooting of entire peoples, 
abandoned by the fl ight of productive structures, left  to the 
blind forces of the world market. Even rich countries undergo 
these changes fully.
Nair also notes that now the migration is from peripheries to centres, 
if those terms have any more meaning; that the fl ow is much more 
rapid; and that the sort of labour to which migrants are put is quite 
diff erent. Once destined to be agricultural labourers or factory fodder, 
today most go to take service jobs or highly skilled employment, 
both of which have been created by the global digital revolution 
(see Sassen 1998). Recently, even more unusual developments can 
be observed around the world, and particularly in Australia and 
Canada. We might wonder whether these developments are working 
in reverse for the Republic of Ireland, which was once characterized 
by net emigration but is now host to thousands of immigrants. It 
is striking that in the past ten years or so one million Australians 
have left  to fi nd work overseas, an increase of 146 percent between 
1992 and 2002, turning Australia from a destination for migrants to 
a transit station with as many emigrants as immigrants. You may 
wonder how many “still call Australia home.” While they are still 
on their second way station they probably do, and then they think of 
it, as Italians and Chinese of an earlier generation did, as the place 
they want to be buried in. The jury, however, is still out for the real 
wanderers who have lived in three or more countries. One third 
of those who have left  say that they are not sure whether they will 
return to Australia and 20 percent of males say that they will not 
(Hugo 2002, 79, 88). Unwitt ingly supporting the notion of the transit 
station is a Victorian survey that showed that more than 80 percent 
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of such emigrants intended to return to Australia, and one-quarter 
said that they would do so within two years (Williams 2003).
These migrating masses, including the Australians, certainly 
head to El Norte or l’Amérique, as their forebears did, to get a job 
in the global markets as opportunities are destroyed at home. 
However, they also increasingly expect to move on to new places 
of employment or return to base much more rapidly and frequently 
than they did (see Ong 1999, and Hewison and Young 2006). Families 
live in diff erent states and commute by plane, as, for example, Hong 
Kong’s “astronauts” shutt le each weekend to and from Australia and 
the United States. They are polyglot and multiethnic, and frequently 
hold two or more passports. Their children change from idiom 
to idiom depending which branch of the family they are visiting. 
A “semi-English,” the lingua franca of a new global workforce, is 
now spoken, David Crystal (1996) tells us, by one-fi ft h of the world’s 
population. The overall result is the “ethnoscape” described by 
Appadurai (1990, 297) and exemplifi ed by O’Connell Street in Dublin. 
This makes global migration qualitatively diff erent in character 
from earlier migrations. People who live in this way belong in many 
places and in one at the same time. They may experience striking 
generational clashes, as exemplifi ed in Clara Law’s fi lm about the 
Chinese diaspora, Floating Life (1996), but their world is small when 
compared to the world separated by vast distances in space and time 
that I grew up in. The notion of a global neighbourhood is no mere 
metaphor for them.
The global migrant of today is oft en described in the literature 
as being “in between” or “in transition” (Blanc, Basch, and Schiller 
1995). I use the image of the airport transit lounge, a place of quick 
and superfi cial familiarity, where most travellers are going to 
or from home, but 10 percent are just going. If they are refugees, 
they oft en do not know whence or whither, as the immense forces 
of globalization hurl them forward in a quest for survival. This 
travelling mass cannot have their common identity defi ned by their 
origins, or, like some latt er-day Pilgrim Fathers, or Zionists, or the 
“builders of Britain in the southern seas,” by their projects. They are 
related to the others only by their present condition as members of a 
mobile workforce, with many places of abode or none. The common 
humanity seen in the quick smile and nod in that transit lounge 
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comes from their common fl uid situation of being, their anonymity 
or lack of discernible status or identity. Hannah Arendt, herself a 
refugee without a destination, saw them as “Heimatlos” and drew 
our att ention to the idea that we should learn our modern morality 
and ethics from the pariahs of the world, as they are the symptomatic 
group of the modern age. She added, “I am more than ever of the 
opinion that a decent human existence is possible today only on the 
fringes of society, where one then runs the risk of starving or being 
stoned to death” (Arendt 1992, 29). She wrote mostly of Jews and 
other displaced persons in the aft ermath of the Second World War, 
but today the Heimatlos are between two and fi ve times as numerous, 
and of all races, ethnicities, and religions.
What globalization has produced is a new world, which has been 
added on to an old majority world of nation states that undeniably 
still exists and continues to try to plug up increasingly porous borders. 
It is certainly still a smaller world, but it is a world in which millions 
live. The French call it their vécu. It is by reference to this world of 
“ethnoscapes” that its denizens establish how they see themselves 
and their hierarchies of values. I wish to focus for a moment on the 
reality of a totally new world, as it is so important to the themes 
of this book. It has brought a changed sense of time and space for 
millions of migrants, many more than in the whole of previous 
history. It is this that marks off  the experience of the migrant today 
from those in past eras. In 2004 a plane brought me from Melbourne 
to Dublin in twenty-four hours, for one-fi ft h of what it cost fi ft y 
years ago. I remain in constant telephone contact with all those who 
are dear and not so dear to me. Above all there is the miracle of the 
Internet, which means that for work purposes I am there and here at 
the same time. If in 1952 my family was perhaps a litt le unusual as 
we had already lived in fi ve countries, today, when I have lived in 
ten, I am no longer unusual. Push me hard and I would not be able to 
say where “Home” really is, and I certainly did not think of singing a 
lament when I left  Melbourne: I can be back there in no time. I carry 
two passports, an Australian one and an Irish one.
The migrant of today may and can live in many places almost at 
once. Not enough is being writt en about the eff ect of these changed 
rhythms, or the way they create a new world emotionally. One Anglo-
Bangladeshi young woman said, “They say that home is where the 
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heart is, but I do not know where my heart is” (Eade 1997, 159). I do 
not know either. Nor, I will suggest, do millions of others.
I suggest that this new worldview “from below,” or “of the 
sparrows,” is almost totally ignored by those “who belong.” I believe 
that it is inatt ention to their lived world and its feelings that will 
doom to failure the policies being adopted by “host” communities 
around the globe in what has been called the “new nationalism.” 
Empowerment for human beings based exclusively on having a 
single national identity is no longer appropriate to the world. Dual 
nationality is allowed by increasing numbers of states. There are just 
too many people for whom the notion of a single national identity 
lacks validity or for whom categorization as exceptions appears 
increasingly nonsensical. Our task is to make that clear to people 
who do not agree.
Since Aristotle proclaimed that a person without citizenship was 
like Homer’s madman, without hearth or home and rightly excluded, 
the Heimatlos have been seen as deeply threatening to those who 
“belong” to a community united by its common past and values. 
In the world of the city state, the polis, a person was defi ned and 
found identity in where he or she came from, through a “heritage.” 
Thucydides (1968, 116) puts into the mouth of Pericles a speech that 
set the tone for what was expected:
I shall begin by speaking about our ancestors, since it is only 
right and proper … to pay them the honour of recalling what 
they did. In this land of ours there have always been the same 
people living from generation to generation up till now, and 
they, by their courage and their virtues, have handed it on to 
us, a free country.
Newcomers could be allowed to join, to belong, only by leaving 
behind their past and adopting the heritage of their place of 
destination, which became their new home. In the world of nation 
states that emerged from the sixteenth century onwards the demand 
was that an outsider, the Other, who wanted some rights—that is, 
an identity—had to join the national family by naturalizing, or by 
repudiating the heritage of his or her parentage. Even Australia, a 
country desperate for immigrants that made it ever easier between 
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1967 and 1994 for migrants to obtain nationality and citizenship, still 
demands knowledge of English, albeit rudimentary, a short period of 
continuous residence, and an oath of allegiance implying readiness 
to fi ght for Australia in a war. In each demand we see the underlying 
claim to loyalty to a putative national culture, to the Australian 
heritage, the Anzac tradition (see Davidson 2003).
In a world of Homes, where everyone was identifi ed by what 
national family they belonged to, or where they came from, it was 
not surprising that when a person left  one Home for another, that 
person had to give up or transfer some of the loyalties she had to her 
forebears in order to be assimilated and to be acceptable. While this 
was a hard and sometimes cruel choice, it was manageable while 
the numbers of new arrivals were few. Again not surprisingly, new 
countries such as Canada or Australia, whose populations were 
built on immigration, were the fi rst to face the reality that having 
too many newcomers makes a rapid and radical transfer of loyalties 
impractical.
I will again use Australia to illustrate this assertion. It is obvious 
that even by the end of the nineteenth century the sense of a heritage 
or patrimony that demanded loyalty was weak in Australia. This was 
true when compared with the great open republics of France and 
the United States, or oppressed nations even in the mid-twentieth 
century. Nevertheless, in breeding that curious hybrid the Anglo-
Celt, so aptly discussed by Michael Hogan (1987), there was at least 
some sense that the “crimson thread” that united us all was loyalty 
to Britain and British traditions. There was also a fi erce commitment 
to defence of the national borders from the supposed hordes of 
peoples of other races who might immigrate and threaten that British 
heritage. There are cannons designed to repel the Russian menace 
from the south coast of Australia rusting just before my window as 
I write this.
Australian subjects of Her Majesty defi ned themselves by their 
whiteness until 1967. This meant that even Russians really played less 
of a role in the national imagination than Asians did. Yet Australia 
was built on immigration, and from 1945 the government made it 
easier and easier to immigrate and to obtain citizenship. By 1990 
Chinese and Vietnamese were only just behind Britons and New 
Zealanders among new arrivals and citizens. Australia demanded 
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no more than that one half of a married couple speak rudimentary 
English and that they had resided for two years before they were 
invited, indeed at times practically begged, to swear the oath of 
allegiance.
The newcomers rapidly took on a multiethnic complexion aft er 
1945 and today there are members of at least 150 ethnicities living 
in Australia. Faced with this plurality of voices, the Anglo-Celt 
majority conceded the right of the fi rst generation to assimilate at 
their own pace, for that was what the vaunted multicultural policy 
amounted to. Their children, having been brought up in Australia, 
necessarily shared in its patrimony. Eventually, there were so many 
ethnics using their own idioms that even school curriculums were 
changed in the 1980s, as education for cross-cultural communication 
became an object. Again, this can be seen as a compromise by the 
majority. While learning foreign languages in order to understand 
other cultures is really futile when there are 150 of them, it did make 
clear that it was not disloyal to speak another language. Australians 
today are light years away from the 1950s, when Italians were told on 
buses to speak English and the inhospitable att itudes of the Anglo-
Celts seemed “un-Christian” to the hapless cafone (see Bosi 1973). 
Today, because the children of parents from non-English-speaking 
backgrounds (known as “NESB” in Australia) speak English as well 
as their mother tongues, Australia can rightly boast that it is one of 
the most polyglot countries in the world.
Despite these compromises with a world of great numbers of 
migrants by a majority with litt le heritage of its own, the federal 
state, and most older Australians, still assumed that the process was 
one of shift ing loyalties from an old Home to a new Home. This 
was revealed in the adamant refusal, expressly stated in the fi rst 
National Agenda on Multiculturalism of 1989, to negotiate about 
the patrimony of British legal and political traditions. Australians 
learned to eat souvlaki, but not to trade in the Magna Carta for 
Aristotle.
The policy that newcomers are switching homes and allegiances, 
and that this is fair and just, basically worked until the migration 
of globalization started and a new world of millions of Heimatlos, 
people for whom a single place of belonging meant litt le or nothing, 
became a reality. This has brought Australia and most other nation 
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states face to face with the real problem of the beginning of the 
twenty-fi rst century: that there are two diff erent contexts within 
which individuals live today, and each establishes quite diff erent 
worlds of meaning and hierarchies of value for those who live within 
them. Where there is more than one such world there can be only 
mutual incomprehension and a dialogue of the deaf. Long before 
Lyotard reminded us of this in his work on le diff érend, Bartolomé de 
Las Casas had been obliged to recognize the incommensurability of 
languages when considering the peoples living in the New World 
of the Americas. He argued that, just as Europeans esteemed these 
peoples of the Indies barbarous, so they considered Europeans 
barbarous because they could not understand them (Las Casas 1992). 
This realization that there could be no communication between 
people from diff erent worlds about what is important and valuable, 
since only some practices and ethics have meaning for them in their 
context, was, however, made poignant by what Lyotard added. 
Where two such worlds meet and cannot understand each other, 
much less agree, it is the one that controls the contextual language 
that imposes its rules and its discourse, adjudicating when there 
is no rule of judgement applicable to both arguments: “A case of 
diff érend between two parties takes place when the ‘regulation’ of the 
confl ict that opposes them is done in the idiom of one of the parties 
while the wrong suff ered by the other is not signifi ed in that idiom” 
(Lyotard 1983, 9).
The two worlds, that of those who belong and that of the pariah, 
breed diff erent understandings, not only about what matt ers and 
what we should be loyal to but also about what loyalty is. Writing 
about France, Sophie Duchesne (1997) has characterized these 
with regard to strangers and “non-citizens” as the “heritage” and 
the “scruples” approach. The fi rst is broadly that adopted by the 
majority of people who grow up within one nation state. For them 
the highest value is loyalty to one’s forefathers and to the patrimony, 
no matt er how fl awed, that they have passed on. For them outsiders, 
such as the millions of newcomers who form the labour force of 
globalization, cannot feel the same about that past, since it was not 
their forefathers who made that world. Those who “belong” see the 
immigrants as guests, obliged to abide by the loyalties of the “host” 
country. This is reiterated ad nauseam in the literature and epitomized 
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in the German word Gastarbeiter (literally, “guest worker”).
The demand that new migrants commit themselves to a new 
exclusive history has no meaning for those whose loyalties are not to 
any past, and certainly not to a singular one.
Against the “Periclean” view of what makes humans loyal, 
Duchesne has perceived an alternative emerging , the “scruples” 
view, which defi nes loyalty not in terms of where people have come 
from but in terms of who they are making their future with. In pop 
language: “It ain’t where you’re from; it’s where you’re at.” This view 
privileges space, and the relative indeterminacy and diff erence of 
people, over time and history. Those with “scruples” do not develop 
ethics of loyalty to others in the same predicament in terms of a 
common patrimony or where they come from. Arendt writes that 
the symptomatic pariah groups of our time develop a warmth of 
human relationships and can breed a kindliness and goodness, of 
which human beings are otherwise scarcely capable, because the 
worlds of belonging that kept them apart have literally disappeared 
(Arendt 1968). The loyalty to their heritage of those who “belong” is 
experienced by the pariahs as injustice and cruelty. Precisely what 
makes them Heimatlos also means that they cannot quickly fi nd 
another Home. Pushed out by economic and political pressures, 
the suff ering millions cannot queue in orderly fashion to get into 
safe havens, and they cannot fi t in with the national priorities of 
these places. They come, and will come, legally or illegally. Oft en 
they have no precise place in mind but keep moving forward until 
they can stop. Today they know from bitt er experience that they can 
expect litt le charity from the places in which they seek refuge. They 
are witnesses to the lack of charity of nationals att ached to histories 
other than theirs. Tragic confi rmation that this experience of the 
“wandering Jew” is now general for pariahs comes from the lett ers 
of so-called illegal aliens incarcerated in camps in remote places 
in Australia. A not untypical lett er (quoted in Burnside 2003, 137) 
runs,
You have writt en that you came from England to Australia. 
How did you leave such a good country and live in this country 
whose president is the enemy of humanity? Sorry you love it 
too much. But I can never forget what Australia did with me 
and rest of Tampa.
National Identity and Global Migration 29
Like Kafk a’s K, they do not want charity from the Castle. They want 
rights and, since they belong nowhere, they want rights before they 
pledge loyalty to someone else’s incomprehensible and emotionally 
meaningless history (see Davidson 1996)
Here we come to the dialogue of the deaf. It would be wrong simply 
to accuse the defenders of a heritage of being “out of date,” or cruelly 
unaware of the changes imposed by globalization, or hypocritically 
willing to enjoy the benefi ts of globalization without assuming its 
burdens. A generation that has grown up as “nationals” can argue, 
rightly, that the highest virtue is loyalty to those who struggled to 
create a particular patrimony worthy of defence against change, 
and believe that newcomers must agree before being empowered. 
Coming from the pariahs, I cannot like nationalist views, but I would 
be foolish to think that my views make any sense to those living in 
their world, and vice versa. It is no consolation if in an academic 
conceit I tell myself that all nations are myths, built, as Ernest Renan 
told us, on forced amnesia about repressed minorities, and that both 
sides of politics have deliberately fostered a new nationalism during 
the past twenty years in Australia. It is futile to note that in schools 
in New South Wales the curriculum makes computer studies, 
civics, and Anzac history compulsory, in an unholy union of global 
technology and Periclean att itudes against the outsider, or that the 
federal civics programme is a total distortion of national history, in 
claiming that Australia is simply the best, fairest, freest, and most 
democratic of states, and therefore all young Australians should 
learn to defend it. Even if Home, as one single, exclusive place, is 
a completely irrelevant value for millions of migrants, it is not for 
the majority of Australians, Canadians, and Irish. The polls show 
overwhelming popular support for government policies of exclusion 
of global migrants except on national terms, even where there are 
blatant breaches of international law, as has been the case with 
Australian federal policy since the early 1990s.
The forced migrant knows that national majorities support the 
policies of their governments about who and what is a threat and 
should be excluded (Burnside 2003, 137). Another lett er from a 
migrant detention centre reveals that they know that within a Home 
the scruples approach also exists: “I was thinking that all Australians 
are heartless. But I am now realizing that there are people outside 
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who really care and think about me” (Burnside 2003, 140). Among the 
young and those who have travelled or themselves are torn between 
Home and Home, the primary value is not loyalty to an exclusive set 
of forefathers or history but loyalty to all human beings. The polls 
show that they are a decided minority in most advanced countries, 
but as the global job market drives young people overseas their 
numbers can be expected to increase. Meanwhile, their readiness to 
endorse the clamour of the pariahs for universal rights makes it easy 
for the heritage group to depict them as disloyal to the nation.
We hear the clamour for rights from the Heimatlos and their 
supporters. Since rights are agonistic and legalistic, and arise from 
confl ict, they generate winners and losers. They must threaten what 
the community putatively wants and weaken national identities. As 
the new nationalists refuse their international obligation to concede 
the priority of universal rights over those of any community, groups 
that demand their observance appear disloyal to the national 
heritage. Indeed, since universal rights by defi nition imply a critique 
of the claims of any community over individuals, the “scruples” 
group is necessarily critical of the priority given to the nation and 
national identity. Today, however, following the logic of le diff érend, 
the insistence that the highest values privilege individual rights is 
trumped practically everywhere by appeals to loyalty to a national 
patrimony. The reasons why the excluded want rights, and why they 
criticize charity, or, in Australia, the vaunted national “fair go,” go 
unheard.
Even the views of the richest and most powerful of the new 
migrants go unheard or unheeded by the dominant national group 
who dispose such things according to the priorities of their world. 
The following lines come from the woman who set up the Southern 
Cross Association to represent the 860,000 Australian expatriates and 
led a successful campaign to defend them against loss of citizenship 
rights under section 17 of the Australian Nationality and Citizenship 
Act of 1948 (Havenhand 2003, 19–20).
Expats are also punished … by the failure of Australian 
governments to properly consider the impact of laws and 
policies, or, in some cases, the lack thereof, on Australians 
living abroad. Some of this may simply be because our voices 
have never been heard in any organized fashion before.
National Identity and Global Migration 31
We need to listen to such unheard voices as they express values for 
conviviality that arise from their powerlessness in a world where 
only those who belong nationally have any rights. As Alain Brossat 
(1994, 30) wrote, the lived question for pariahs is this:
How does one keep civilization as a home, justice as one’s 
horizon, communication as a vital everyday ambition in the 
very whirlwind that keeps you from Zuhause, from your 
elementary rights, your language and your community? How 
does one remain a civilized human being at heart through such 
brutalities and radical discontinuities?
If we wish to bridge the gap between the two worlds, we should 
listen att entively to the answers of the pariahs and their supporters 
about what is important for a virtuous human being in a globalized 
world.
The excluded pariah, buff eted by the misfortunes of his world, has 
known since Sophocles wrote about Oedipus that, as the outsider, 
he is doomed to be the object of the aggressive defensiveness of the 
warrior citizen. Constantine Cavafy, the child of a multiethnic society, 
wrote a poignant poem about the misplaced fear of the barbarians 
at the gate who are not there at all, yet that fear is what those who 
defend a patrimony feed on even today. Witness this lett er: “Your 
government is always introducing us to your people that we are 
criminal or terrorist or something else” (Burnside 2003, 139). In 
relation to the nation state the pariahs want universal rights, but from 
those who “belong” they yearn for “care and thought.” This could be 
misunderstood (and sometimes is) as a call to learn about them and 
why they come. It is this, but it is more. The surplus is to care without 
being able to understand them, who they “really” are, without fi rst 
att ributing an identity and a status to them. The view “from below” 
of the sparrows is far from that of the Olympian eagle concerned with 
raison d’état. Las Casas fi rst saw the need for unreserved acceptance 
precisely because it was impossible to understand the world of the 
Indians, with whom there was no common language (see Davidson 
2003 and Warner 1999).
Globalization’s pariahs also know the virtues of rejecting Aristotle. 
They want others to live according to the value of mildness. Where 
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the Periclean view, which is still the highest virtue of the nation state, 
was masculine in its cult of the warrior citizen who will die for his 
heritage, mildness has been described as a “feminine” virtue (Bobbio 
1995, 36–37). I have summed it up elsewhere as “holding to our belief 
about the good in the face of rival and disputing views, and yet not 
imposing our own view when we have the desire, the anger or the 
power to do so. It is thus an ethical att itude, not a legal right with a 
corollary duty” (Davidson 1997, 2).
The plea of the pariah in the face of le diff érend is for us all to 
suspend judgement, to live together and to convert by example. 
The virtues of trust, tolerance, and love move to the top of their 
hierarchies. It is therefore a demand for a return to something like 
religious ethics, not so far from the claim to universal rights, a claim 
asserting a recognition of the human being —Emmanuel Levinas 
(1969) would call it “the face before us” —shorn of any att ribute. 
What are universal human rights but an insistence on respect for 
individual dignity shorn of social distinction, a respect that is never 
to be subordinated to any claimed common good? If the “common 
good” is given pre-eminence, it can quickly turn into oppression by 
the majority.
The pariahs’ claim for rights and the privileging of these virtues 
is really circular. The ideas of Las Casas were quickly transformed 
by the fathers of international law, Francisco Suárez and Francisco 
de Vitoria, into a defence of free movement around the globe and 
intimations of a theory of world citizenship.
The lesson is for all humane beings is this. If we live in a world of 
the absolute Other, peopled by individuals whose histories have not 
been ours but with whom we must live in peace and harmony, we 
will have to accept each other much more at face value, without any 
att empt to explain things by reference to a history or culture behind 
the face we see. The sparrows have a very short historical memory.
I end with a reminder for those who still wish to see the world 
only from the point of view of those who belong. It comes from yet 
another wise “wandering Jew” writing about citizenship: “Man is 
not a tree and humanity is not a forest” (Levinas 1969).
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CHAPTER 2
CITIZENSHIP, STATEHOOD, AND ALLEGIANCE
Helen Irving
The concept of citizenship has undergone a phenomenal transforma-
tion in the past twenty years. Notwithstanding T. H. Marshall’s (1950) 
postwar analysis of the social and economic inequalities resulting 
from capitalism and obstructing full citizenship, the term was 
predominantly employed in defence of conservative and conformist 
values until the 1980s. For complex reasons beyond the scope of 
this chapter, citizenship took off  in the 1980s as the concept of the 
left  (see Kymlicka and Norman 1994, 104). As Bryan Turner (1990, 
190) writes, “In the crisis of the 1980s critical theorists … returned 
to the questions of distributive justice, individual rights and notions 
of equality as the basis for social reconstruction and social reform.” 
The language of citizenship served as a vehicle for this project. Over 
the decades that followed the concept of citizenship expanded, 
lending itself to an extraordinarily diverse, almost promiscuous 
variety of uses, supporting virtually every claim for progressive 
or alternative policies. The language of citizenship was used 
predominantly in a normative rather than a formal sense. Marshall 
was “rediscovered” and his defi nition of citizenship as requiring 
substantive social equality, rather than “mere” formal rights, assisted 
a further development of the normative approach. Adjectival or 
taxonomic citizenships appeared: “industrial,” “feminist,” “urban,” 
“ecological,” “corporate,” “biological,” and many more. There must 
be few, if any, western political theorists who have not at some stage 
discussed the concept and even fewer who have declined to fi nd 
value in it.
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While it would be impossible to identify a simple “family 
resemblance” among all uses of the concept there is a common or 
core claim uniting them: that citizenship inheres in persons and is a 
quality or att ribute that generates relational att ributes and specifi c 
forms of behaviour. It describes something valuable and valued, 
something almost transcendent, not merely about the individual 
but about the relationship of individuals to each other. It indicates 
a set of att achments or commitments to others, whether political 
or moral or both. Rights or entitlements, it is assumed, frame such 
att achments or commitments and are, indeed, inherent to the quality 
of being a citizen.
Given the currency of the term and its high standing, not to mention 
the mountains of literature, dedicated journals, and entire research 
centres on the subject, it may seem foolhardy even to contemplate 
a challenge to these assumptions. This, nevertheless, is the purpose 
of this chapter. I want to go even further, indeed, and challenge the 
language of citizenship, even the very use of the term “citizen,” in 
much of the literature.
I begin with a simple proposition. Citizenship is simply a legal 
category, a matt er of law. It does not, in and of itself, carry any 
particular individual qualities or att ributes, or, with one arguable 
exception, give rise to any particular entitlements. The argument 
for this proposition progresses through several steps. First, I shall 
att empt to demonstrate, both empirically and normatively, that 
there is no intrinsic relationship between citizenship and rights, and 
that the att achment of rights to citizenship is neither inevitable nor 
necessary, but contingent. Second, for similar reasons there is no 
inevitable relationship between citizenship and duties. Furthermore, 
the consequences of att empting to create or insist upon such a 
relationship, in respect of both rights and duties, are undesirable. 
Among the core reasons for detaching citizenship from such claims, 
I argue, is the fact that the language of citizenship is a language of 
exclusion. Rights and duties should have a wider application than 
their att achment to, or discursive association with, citizenship 
suggests. We should talk about rights and duties without inviting 
the conclusion that these are a matt er for citizens alone. I move on to 
argue, thirdly, and notwithstanding this conclusion, that citizenship 
as a legal status still has value, both practical and normative. Its value 
does not lie, however, in an alternative “global” scheme, as some 
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theorists critical of the exclusive character of citizenship regulated or 
conceived in national terms want to suggest. Its value, indeed, must 
be understood against the reality that citizenship is a matt er for the 
law of nation states.
None of this, however, is to say that the qualities att ributed to 
citizenship or the benefi ts att ached to claims for citizenship in the 
existing literature are in themselves undesirable. Rights, duties, 
responsibilities, membership of communities and the concerns of 
justice are among the many claims or virtues that have been included 
in the discourse of citizenship, and are all worth pursuing. However, 
an alternative framework is needed for considering such claims, one 
that both acknowledges the fact of citizenship as a form of law and 
avoids the problems of att empting to conceptualize it as more than 
a matt er of law. The fi nal part of the chapter considers what this 
alternative might be, with a focus in particular on the institutions of 
civil society. It concludes with something that might seem paradoxical: 
a defence of citizenship. This conclusion explores the oft en-elided 
concepts of identity, belonging, loyalty, and allegiance, and it argues 
that, in respect of citizenship, these must be understood separately. 
Citizenship is a form of “negative” allegiance, not an identity or 
aff ective state of belonging. Its value lies in its contribution to the 
stability and functioning of the nation state, not primarily to the life 
or relations of the individual.
CITIZENSHIP AND THE LAW
Advocates of “citizenship” rarely discuss the legal dimensions of the 
concept, and some fail even to acknowledge that there is an area of 
public law in which the term is defi ned, with legal consequences. 
Lawyers, of course, think of the concept in legal terms and speak of 
the realm of “citizenship law,” but they rarely take part in discussions 
about citizenship beyond its legal meaning. As Linda Bosniak (2000, 
965) notes,
Something of a division of labour in the normative citizenship 
literature has developed, according to which threshold 
questions regarding both access to, and the signifi cance of, 
formal national citizenship status are treated as distinct from 
questions about the nature and quality of citizenship as 
practised within the political community.
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Elsewhere, Bosniak (2002, 1299) describes a “professional divide that 
now separates scholars of rights citizenship and status citizenship.” 
I would add a further subdivision of “status citizenship,” between 
those seeking or identifying citizenship in terms of constitutional 
status and those whose focus is primarily on statutory or technical 
defi nitions of citizenship. The former is broader and reaches into 
questions about membership of the constitutional community and 
its relationship to the state.
There may be multiple reasons for the failure of citizenship 
theorists to consider the law. Many, perhaps most, theorists are not 
lawyers. Many may regard the law as a subset of, or a consequence 
of, the wider social discourse of citizenship and therefore caught 
up indirectly in the primary discourse. Alternatively, some may 
think that the law is of litt le or no relevance to other ways of talking 
about citizenship. For example, in introducing a research project on 
“Community, Immigration and the Construction of Citizenship,” 
Caroline Nagel writes,
Central to many of the negotiations over citizenship are 
questions of who can be a citizen and under what conditions an 
individual should be granted citizenship. These questions may 
involve legal matt ers such as those involved in naturalization 
procedures, but they oft en speak to more ideological and 
emotional questions of integration, incorporation and 
membership in a political community. In short, citizenship rests 
not simply on a set of legal institutions, but also on a sense of 
membership rooted in notions of shared identity and common 
purpose that are recognized individually and collectively.
If it were the case that theorists were merely using the term 
“citizenship” by analogy or as a manner of speaking, this prioritizing 
of the non-legal—indeed, this tendentious defi nition of citizenship 
as essentially non- or extra-legal—might not matt er much, but 
the problem is that most of the literature on citizenship envisages 
some sort of real-world consequences or practical outcomes for the 
models they promote. Claims for citizenship rights, or demands for 
the performance of citizenship duties, invite, indeed require, public 
intervention, enforcement, and sanctions if they are to have any 
purchase. Once such consequences follow, the world of law cannot be 
avoided. As soon as we talk, in particular, about the rights att ached 
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to citizenship we invariably conjure up questions about causes of 
action, access to courts, legal standing, and enforceability.
In order to appreciate that this is problematic, or at best 
unsatisfactory, let us imagine, by analogy, a whole realm of theory in 
which the concepts of crime or criminals were central to the analysis, 
but which took no account of the fact that crime is defi ned by law. 
It might well be possible to develop an essentially moral theory of 
crime, asserting, for example, that it is a “crime” for the rich not to 
donate a proportion of their wealth to help the poor, but this peculiar 
use of the term would need to be made clear at the outset, and its 
separation from legal discourse would have to be acknowledged. 
The fact that the term was being used as an analogy, to make a point 
about a particular type of otherwise legal conduct, would need to 
be declared. Any writings on the “rights of criminals,” or on “urban 
crime,” “industrial crime,” “corporate crime,” or other such topics, 
that failed to mention the legal defi nition or the legal processing and 
treatment of criminals would seem thin, lacking in substance and 
application. Imagine, alternatively, a body of theory on the subject 
of Christianity or Christians that failed to consider the religious 
doctrine with the same name. Some people might well say that a 
certain type of behaviour was “un-Christian,” in the sense that it was 
uncharitable or intolerant, but to develop a theory of un-Christian 
behaviour without acknowledging the religious doctrine from 
which this claim is derived would be to miss something essential. 
Furthermore, any claims for the “rights of Christians,” or for “global 
Christianity” or the like, would have considerable diffi  culty, to say 
the least, in maintaining a universal or non-discriminatory and 
doctrinally neutral character.
These examples, I argue, are similar to the discourse of citizenship 
without law.
However else one might use the term, the reality is that there are 
laws of citizenship and legal defi nitions of “citizen.” Citizenship, 
furthermore, is defi ned by the law of individual states. It is a 
category that describes a legal relationship between an individual 
and a state.
Our fi rst step in challenging the characterisation of citizenship as a 
non-legal concept is to consider the relationship between citizenship 
and rights. The purpose here is to explore whether such a thing as a 
“citizen’s right” or a right of citizenship exists.
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CITIZENSHIP AND RIGHTS
It is possible to speak about rights and believe in rights without 
mentioning the law, but whenever we go further than this and 
imagine asserting or enforcing such rights, at least in the public 
sphere, we run up against a concrete reality. Whatever their source or 
origin, rights are allocated by law. It is all very well to claim a right, 
but such a claim will not go far unless there are legal mechanisms 
to support it, and the law recognizes only certain sorts of claims 
and thus certain sorts of rights. Many people are surprised to learn 
that, although rights are oft en granted to persons who are legal 
citizens, the grant of rights does not automatically follow from the 
fact of citizenship. Historically, few useful examples exist where 
membership of a political community is indistinguishable from 
both the title of “citizen” and the possession of legal rights. The 
relationship between citizenship and rights is normally contingent 
and probably has never been absolute.
The fact that the law “covers the fi eld” of citizenship is a relatively 
recent development. Theories of citizenship frequently refer back 
to, or draw inspiration from, eras when its legal character was 
less fi xed or less signifi cant than in the early twenty-fi rst century. 
Well into the twentieth century, at least in some countries, to talk 
of a “citizen” was to refer to something more than, or other than, a 
person with the legal status of citizen. In the British empire the term 
was used either normatively, to describe exemplary members of the 
community, or to refer to the legal status of persons in republics such 
as the United States, or sometimes merely to refer to persons who 
were not politicians (see Irving 1999, chapter 9). Individuals in the 
empire were “subjects,” as a matt er of common law, until 1914, and 
their subject status was inalienable and unwaivable. However, from 
the advent of the First World War onwards, citizenship law began 
to solidify in the international community. For those who did not 
travel outside the country of their birth, or who were not entitled to 
or did not take part in the political process, what followed from legal 
citizenship or subject status was probably rarely an issue. Bit by bit 
as the twentieth century advanced, however, the restrictive nature 
and legal consequences of being a citizen or a subject increased.
Although we might use the term normatively, or descriptively, or 
to convey something other than legal status, we cannot escape the 
fact that citizenship is now defi ned by law.
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THE RIGHTS RECORD
For those unfamiliar with the historical record, the association 
between rights and citizenship might seem obvious or even natural. 
A large amount of the literature on citizenship assumes such an 
association and seeks to extend it or deepen it. Yet history does 
not reveal an inseparable association between being a citizen and 
enjoying rights.
In the ancient world, perhaps, to be a citizen, as a consequence 
of having the character and att ributes that defi ned a citizen, was to 
enjoy certain rights and to owe certain duties. Yet the law of persons 
under which citizenship fell also included the legal frameworks 
for slaves, for women, and for children within a defi ned territory, 
and these were subdivided into further categories—freed slaves, 
married women, illegitimate children, and so on—as well as types 
and categories of citizen themselves. Rights and entitlements varied 
accordingly. The att ributes that defi ned the citizen att racted the 
rights, rather than citizenship itself. One might fi nd other examples 
where being the bearer of certain rights, as a consequence of having 
certain other qualities—being free, being a man, being fi t for military 
service, and so on—was what allowed one to be called a citizen, but 
that is a diff erent matt er from saying that rights were derived from, 
or should be derived from, the particular state of personhood known 
as citizenship.
In the modern world we fi nd that a range of “rights” that one might 
assume to come with citizenship have been, and in many cases still 
are, available in practice only to particular classes of citizens. That 
is to say, rights are not available automatically and without other 
qualifi cation to all persons who are legal citizens. The conferral of 
citizenship and the enjoyment of rights are almost always set down 
in diff erent legal instruments. Even what might be imagined as the 
most obvious of citizenship “rights” are not acquired automatically 
but rather acquired, or retained, subject to further qualifi cations.
Let us consider what those rights might be. As we consider each 
case, we need to ask several questions. Would it be possible to say that 
all citizens, without disqualifi cation, should be entitled to exercise 
such “rights”? If not, why not? Secondly, are there no cases where 
disqualifi cation or deprivation of a particular right is reasonable 
and non-arbitrary? If the answer is yes—that is, if we believe that all 
citizens, without further qualifi cation, should be entitled to exercise 
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certain rights, for example to vote or to seek election to the national 
legislature—we need then to consider some further questions. 
Should legal citizens alone be entitled to exercise these rights? Are 
there no cases where it would be appropriate for non-citizens to do 
these things as well?
In addressing these issues I draw many of my examples, though 
not all of them, from Australia, but there is no reason to believe that 
its citizenship history is unusual. Indeed, Australia’s political history 
records the early adoption of democratic laws and institutions, with 
a reputation, alongside New Zealand, as one of the world’s social and 
political “laboratories.” Rather than lagging behind in the conferral 
of rights on citizens, it is likely, on historical grounds, to be in the 
vanguard.
When Australia’s Constitution was being draft ed, in the 1890s, the 
framers, popularly elected members of a federal convention whose 
primary concern was policy-making rather than legal draft ing, 
att empted to agree upon a defi nition of “citizenship” for inclusion 
in the Constitution. They spent several weeks on and off , beginning, 
as we probably would today, with the idea that citizenship should 
be defi ned by rights. The fi rst to be nominated was the obvious one: 
the right to vote. This, some of the framers thought, might perhaps 
be the single identifi able att ribute of citizenship. However, it was 
quickly pointed out that there were many individuals whom they 
would want to count as “citizens” but who could not vote. To defi ne 
a citizen as a person who could vote was to disqualify many who 
were both legal “citizens” (or British subjects) and possibly also 
“good” citizens. The founders had in mind women in particular, 
whom it would have been unthinkable to defi ne as “non-citizens,” 
even though at that time women could neither vote nor seek election 
in any of the Australian colonies apart from South Australia. 
Similarly, women could not vote in federal elections in the United 
States until 1920, despite their constitutional guarantee of citizenship 
by birth following the ratifi cation of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
1868. Despite a proud historical record of “popular” democracy in 
Switzerland, Swiss women had to wait until 1971 before acquiring 
the right to vote.
Other arbitrary disqualifi cations have been enforced in democratic 
countries. Australia and Canada, among other such countries, 
disallowed indigenous or “coloured” citizens from voting well 
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aft er they had extended the vote to women. Disenfranchisement 
for political reasons also occurred, for example, in Australia, where, 
during the First World War and for a period aft erwards, the right 
to vote was denied to members of any “unlawful association,” 
defi ned under the Crimes Act 1914 as “any body of persons … which 
encourages the overthrow of the Constitution of the Commonwealth 
by revolution or sabotage, overthrow by force of violence of the 
government of Australia or of any other civilized country, or the 
destruction or injury of Commonwealth property.”
It might seem that all this is now past history, but in the twenty-
fi rst century, even in the most advanced democracies, the right to 
vote is routinely denied to large classes of citizens. All contemporary 
democracies exclude minors, being those who have not reached the 
legal age of adulthood, and also those who are, to use the expression 
found in the Australian Electoral Act, mentally “incapable of 
understanding the signifi cance” of voting. Some countries permit 
citizens who live overseas to continue to vote, while others disqualify 
them either as soon as they leave or aft er a certain period of residence 
abroad. Prisoners and those convicted of treason are disbarred from 
voting in many countries, sometimes for life.
It is notable that both Linda Bosniak and Alexander Aleinikoff , 
who are among the few theorists who recognize the historical 
disjunction between rights and legal citizenship, are both lawyers. 
Aleinikoff  (2002, 172) has noted that although political rights such as 
voting are now seen as central to citizenship, “[n]othing necessarily 
makes possession of the franchise a test of [national] membership.” 
To defi ne a citizen as someone who has the right to vote, or to assert 
that this is a right of citizenship, is to ignore this history and to leave 
out substantial classes of otherwise legal citizens from the defi nition. 
It is also to overlook the fact that in some countries non-citizens are 
entitled to vote. The right to vote is, thus, far from being a citizens’ 
right as such.
What of the right to seek political offi  ce? This right is oft en available 
only to legal citizens, but it is also commonly att ached to the right to 
vote, and in such cases it is therefore unavailable to disenfranchised 
citizen. In addition, in some countries, perhaps many, citizens with 
dual nationality are ineligible for most, if not all, public offi  ces. In 
Australia persons who are employed in an “offi  ce of profi t under 
the Crown” (that is, public or civil servants) and undischarged 
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bankrupts are also constitutionally ineligible. Seeking election is 
thus not an intrinsic right of citizenship. It is, in many cases, a “right” 
only of sane, adult, non-incarcerated citizens, and sometimes only 
of privately employed or unemployed, solvent citizens who do not 
have dual nationality.
What of jury duty, in those countries where it exists? In Australia, 
as in many other countries, only citizens are entitled or required to 
serve on juries. Yet many citizens are disqualifi ed from serving, or 
are not required to serve, for a range of reasons. Historically, women 
and “coloured” persons could not sit on juries until the twentieth 
century. These days other disqualifi cations apply. For example, 
in New South Wales citizens are ineligible to perform jury duty 
if, among other things, they are qualifi ed as legal practitioners, 
whether or not they are actually practising. Under the Juries Act of 
South Australia, among others, the spouses of judges, of justices of 
the peace, and of members of the police force are ineligible. These 
are merely a few of the many disqualifi cations in democratic rule-of-
law jurisdictions around the world.
Contrary to what may commonly be believed, the holding of a 
passport is not a “right.” Its issue is a matt er of executive discretion 
in many democratic countries, and perhaps in all, and consequently 
a matt er for legal dispute. In the United States, for example, political 
grounds for denying a passport have been the subject of constitutional 
challenge on more than one occasion. In Kent v Dulles 357 U.S. 116 
(1958) the Supreme Court ruled that the State Department’s denial 
of a passport to members of the Communist Party, on the ground 
that their travel was contrary to the national interest, was unlawful. 
Although the grounds for fi nding in favour of the plaintiff  were non-
constitutional, the Court recognized the right to travel as a liberty 
protected by the Fift h Amendment. In subsequent cases the Supreme 
Court has affi  rmed this decision but held that the right to travel is not 
absolute and that restrictions can be legitimate. Executive discretion 
to withhold a passport in order to restrict travel is, nevertheless, 
more constitutionally limited in the United States than in comparable 
countries.
Withholding passports from convicted criminals or suspects, in 
order to stop them fl eeing the jurisdiction, is a common practice. 
In addition, in Australia, as elsewhere, the denial of passports for 
both political and “moral” reasons has also been authorized. For 
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example, under the Australian Passports Act passports could be 
denied to single girls wanting to travel overseas to marry against 
their parents’ wishes or intending to accompany a man abroad, to 
persons wishing to travel without a spouse’s consent, and to persons 
of “weak mentality.” Under the current version of the act the minister 
for immigration may (and does) refuse to issue a passport where the 
applicant is thought likely to engage in “conduct prejudicial to the 
security of Australia or of a foreign country.”
It might be objected that the deprivation or denial of such “rights” 
is not arbitrary and that rational or at least coherent policies lie 
behind these exceptions. The general rule, it might be pointed 
out, still holds: under normal circumstances citizens can enjoy 
certain rights as an automatic entitlement of citizenship, unless 
there are reasonable grounds for the contrary. In response we may 
acknowledge that some disqualifi cations can readily be defended. 
Children, for example, cannot be expected to exercise the level of 
responsibility appropriate to voting for political representatives, 
although, apparently, persons aged between eighteen and twenty-
one were unable to choose in a responsible manner for the bett er 
part of the twentieth century, or longer, but overnight became able 
to do so when the age of political maturity was adjusted around the 
1970s, in many countries. However, other disentitlements are less 
obviously rational or non-arbitrary.
It might be expected that citizens have the right to protection or 
diplomatic representation from their country of citizenship when 
overseas. However, as was recently demonstrated in the United 
Kingdom in the case of R. (Abassi) v Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Aff airs, 2003, 3, AC 297, with regard to persons 
held at Guantánamo Bay, citizens, at least in some countries, have 
no legal “right” to require their government to make diplomatic 
representations on their behalf. For example, as far as the United 
Kingdom is concerned, the courts have cited the Australian case 
of Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Aff airs v Teoh, (1995) 183 
CLR 273, among other cases, to rule that citizens have merely a 
“legitimate expectation” that the relevant decision-maker will give 
consideration to a request for representation.
In the past certain countries have stripped their own citizens of 
citizenship for taking out a second nationality, and some may do 
so still. Until 2002 the Australian Citizenship Act stated that any 
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Australian citizen who “by some voluntary and formal act, other 
than marriage, acquires the nationality or citizenship of a country 
other than Australia, shall thereupon cease to be an Australian 
citizen.” Well into the twentieth century, the law of the United States 
and other countries required that women lost their birth citizenship 
upon marriage to an alien, even if this rendered them stateless. As 
Linda K. Kerber (2005, 735) has pointed out, the majority of cases 
of individual statelessness in the United States between the two 
world wars “involved women and arose from marriage”: even the 
daughter of Ulysses S. Grant lost her U.S. citizenship upon marriage 
to an Englishman and “it took a special Act of Congress to reinstate 
her citizenship when she was widowed” (see also Volpp 2005 for a 
powerful discussion of the intersection of race and gender in the loss 
of citizenship by marriage).
Apart from the injury to personal selfh ood, such citizens lost what 
might be considered the most fundamental right of citizenship: 
the right to live in one’s country. This is not merely a matt er of the 
perverse policies of individual countries. In international law, to 
hold citizenship does not in itself generate a right of residence. As 
was held in the leading judgement of the International Court of 
Justice, the Nott ebohm Case (Liechtenstein v Guatemala [1955] ICJ 
Reports 4), a meaningful or genuine connection between a country 
and a legal citizen is required for citizenship to be the source of the 
“right” of residence. This idea of a meaningful or “true” relationship 
between a person and the country of which they claim citizenship as 
a foundation of citizenship law can also be seen in the “important 
governmental objectives” recognized by the Supreme Court of the 
United States, and held to be served by a provision in the Immigration 
and Naturalization Act at issue in Nguyen v INS 533 U.S. 53 
(2001). U.S. law automatically grants citizenship to the ex-nuptial 
foreign-born children of U.S. citizen mothers, but imposes certain 
requirements, including a time “guillotine,” on the registration of 
ex-nuptial foreign-born children of U.S. citizen fathers.
Even where there has been a clear and genuine connection, 
there are many cases where, for no reasons to do with character, 
behaviour, or other personal att ributes, people have simply lost their 
former citizenship because of political changes and international 
realignments. Millions of individuals born in parts of the British 
empire lost their status as British subjects, and with it their “right” to 
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live and work in Britain, eff ectively overnight, with the coming into 
force of legislation in Britain’s former dominions reducing their dual 
citizenship status (being simultaneously a British subject and a citizen 
of another country) to a single citizenship. Furthermore, those living 
in Australia and born before 1949, when Australian citizenship law, 
and dual citizenship/subject status, came into operation, lost their 
original or primary status of British subject, not merely their second 
or acquired citizenship. There are numerous similar examples in 
history. Nor is this something of relevance only to countries where 
citizenship is granted by statute rather than by a provision of an 
entrenched constitution. A constitutional guarantee of acquisition of 
citizenship by birth should not be mistaken for a guarantee of the 
retention of citizenship by birth. Note, for example, Article (18): 3rd 
(a) of the world’s newest constitution—the Iraqi Constitution of 2005: 
“It shall be forbidden to withdraw the Iraqi citizenship from an Iraqi 
by birth for any reason.” Assuming that this constitution continues in 
operation, it will be interesting to see how this will work in practice. 
The Iraqi Constitution also bases citizenship on the “nationality” of 
either the mother or the father, so that not all persons born in Iraq are 
entitled to citizenship by birth.
Despite this, the right to live in the country of one’s primary 
nationality and, with it, the right to be protected against deportation 
probably come closest to being historically non-contingent citizen’s 
“rights.” In some countries it is constitutionally guaranteed, as, 
for example, in section 6(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (part of the Canada Act 1982). These rights are, of course, 
also shared by aliens who hold permanent residency visas, but for 
legal citizens they remain more recognizably fundamental, less 
qualifi ed, and less reasonably or non-arbitrarily reducible than any 
other purported “rights.” Normatively, a very strong case can be 
made that these rights, and perhaps these alone, should be treated 
as inalienable. For reasons explored below, it is also in the interest 
of the state itself that a right of residence should be automatically 
conferred upon all legal citizens.
The examples above probably exhaust the types of substantive 
rights that might be thought to come with citizenship. However, 
perhaps when we speak of “citizens’ rights” we also mean, or mean 
instead, rights associated with the legal process, such as habeas 
corpus, the right to remain silent, the presumption of innocence, 
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and the like. Yet it cannot possibly be intended, at least by those 
who promote rights, that due process and the rule of law should 
extend only to citizens. To the extent that these rights are described 
as “citizens’ rights,” this is loose talk. Every person who is charged 
with an off ence and processed by the law is surely entitled to such 
rights. Indeed, I can fi nd no example of a democratic state where 
these basic procedural “rights” are in practice guaranteed only 
to citizens and denied to aliens, even where, in practice, diff erent 
considerations apply to aliens held in detention who are applying 
for judicial review of executive decisions about their legal status or 
right of abode.
In sum, if we were constructing a defi nition of “citizenship,” 
we would not progress very much further in att empting to build 
it around rights than the Australian Constitution’s framers did in 
the 1890s. If we said that “a citizen is a person who has the right to 
vote or to hold a passport,” for example, we would have to qualify 
this defi nition by adding, “unless, that is, he or she is otherwise 
disqualifi ed or excluded from exercising such a right.” Then we 
would have a defi nition that did not, in fact, fi t all those to whom 
the term being defi ned might be att ached. We might simply say, “A 
citizen is a person who holds citizenship under the law and who 
is, unless otherwise disqualifi ed, entitled to exercise the rights and 
privileges available under law to citizens.” This, while accurate, is 
a circular defi nition and does not in itself assist our understanding 
of the “character” of citizenship or the ways in which rights are, or 
should be, protected, or their distribution justifi ed.
Citizenship has, in many cases, been required before a legal 
entitlement has been available, but it is safe to say that it has rarely, 
perhaps never, been treated as the source of entitlement in itself. In 
the oft en-cited examples from the ancient world the entitlement arose 
from the att ributes that qualifi ed a man to be a citizen in the fi rst 
place. It may have been necessary, but it has not been suffi  cient. If a 
“right” is something to which one is legally entitled, without having 
to fulfi l extra requirements or demonstrate additional qualifi cations 
or qualities in addition to the primary qualifi cation, then one would 
be hard pressed to fi nd any example of a “citizen’s right,” that is, to 
fi nd any right that derives directly, without intermediary steps, from 
being a citizen.
Those who maintain that citizenship and rights should be 
inextricably or at least closely connected, or that citizenship should 
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be defi ned by rights, need to consider each of the rights discussed 
above. With the exception, perhaps, of the right to live in one’s 
country, should every citizen be entitled to enjoy them all? Should 
citizens alone be entitled to enjoy them? Should governments 
have no discretion to grant or withhold any of them? Are there no 
circumstances in which it is reasonable to deny a “right” to a legal 
citizen?
THE NORMATIVE RESPONSE
We might respond that, regardless of what the historical record 
reveals, it is simply unacceptable for some citizens not to enjoy the 
rights we mean when we talk about “citizenship rights,” in the same 
way that it was unacceptable for female citizens or coloured citizens 
to be denied rights in the past. Perhaps all citizens should enjoy all 
the rights of citizenship, and perhaps this is what theorists intend in 
asserting that there are citizenship rights.
However, in responding normatively along such lines we run 
into a problem. Even if we identifi ed rights in respect of which no 
reasonable argument could be made for their denial to any citizen 
or class of citizens, we would need to ask a further question: are 
there any rights that should be available to every citizen, without 
exception, that should not be available to any other person who is 
within the same jurisdiction but is not a legal citizen? Are there any 
rights that should be inalienable from all citizens but available only 
to citizens?
My point, so far, is this: in using the language of citizenship we 
are using the language of law, whether we like it or not. In talking 
of citizens’ rights we are making, essentially, two claims. One is that 
there are certain rights that are essential to, even inalienable from, 
citizenship. This is empirically inaccurate, but it is also normatively 
problematic. There are, I shall argue, no cases where a right that 
should never be denied to a citizen should also never be available to 
a non-citizen within the same jurisdiction. How we determine who 
should enjoy rights is, in other words, not to be sett led by asking the 
question: who is a citizen?
If we do not intend to confi ne rights to legal citizens, but are 
employing the term “citizen” in a diff erent sense, to capture or 
describe an existential state or a sense of belonging to a particular 
community, we need to consider what we regard the borders of the 
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community to be. As soon as we begin to make claims that the sense 
of belonging brings with it some sort of rights or duties, then we are 
once again faced with needing to answer the question: how should 
those rights be protected or enforced? Is the term “citizen,” which 
has a legal, and exclusive, meaning in practice, and which crosses 
subnational borders, appropriate?
In using the language of citizenship rights, even if we think we 
are merely speaking normatively and not legally, are we prepared 
eff ectively to rule aliens and stateless persons out of our class of 
rights-holders? Do we really accept that the disentitlement of non-
citizens or aliens from rights is non-arbitrary, in the same way that 
disentitlement of certain citizens or classes of citizen from some 
rights (children and voting, for example) is non-arbitrary?
Most probably it is not the intention on the part of the advocates of 
citizens’ rights to suggest that aliens should not enjoy rights, but this 
is, I argue, one commonly overlooked eff ect of linking citizenship 
and rights.
SUBSIDIARITY OF RIGHTS
None of this is to suggest that claims for “rights” are worthless. There 
are certain rights and freedoms, such as equality under the law, due 
process, freedom from arbitrary authority or arbitrary detention, 
dignity, freedom of conscience, freedom from servitude, and the like, 
that one would fi nd it impossible to consider as anything other than 
inalienable. In such cases there can be no non-arbitrary reason for 
their denial to any person. These, however, are universal or human 
rights, and are not, or should not be, confi ned to a particular category 
or class of persons or enjoyed only by citizens. If we take relevant 
international rights instruments, such as the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, seriously, then we may agree that there is a range 
of rights inhering in, and arising from, a human being’s personhood. 
Yet this is to conceptualize rights along other lines, that is, it is to 
think of rights without an association with citizenship, indeed, to 
make a claim for rights that deliberately transcends claims based on 
citizenship.
Although international law does make distinctions between 
the rights enjoyed by nationals and those enjoyed by non-
nationals (Rubinstein 2002, 179), fundamental rights as set out in 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the 
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International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
are meant to apply to non-citizens as well as legal citizens in any 
country. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Individuals who are 
Not Nationals of the Country in which They Live (1985) is framed 
around the notion of the equality of aliens and citizens in regard 
to legal and civil rights. As this instrument recognizes, non-citizens 
need these protections just as much as citizens do. Indeed, in some 
respects the helpless, the stateless, the exiled, and the alien need the 
protection of rights and freedoms even more than legal citizens, who 
have access, at least in principle if not by right, to representatives, 
both political and diplomatic.
Who, then, should enjoy rights? How should these be allocated? 
Universal rights are, of course, universal. In the case of non-universal 
rights, I want to argue, rather than tying rights to citizenship 
particular rights should be allocated on a non-arbitrary basis. People 
who are members of a political community, who pay taxes, and who 
are directly aff ected in their lives and livelihoods by the policies of 
a government should have the right to take part in choosing the 
government, or in seeking offi  ce, whether or not they have formal 
citizenship status. Aleinikoff  suggests the term “denizens” for such 
people. All persons subject to the law should be protected by the rule 
of law, including, pre-eminently, the principle of equality before the 
law. Basic social rights, such as access to health services, should be 
available to all who need health care. Education should be available 
to all children, even, as the U.S. Supreme Court held in the landmark 
judgement Plyler v Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), “undocumented” 
children, that is, children who are unable to demonstrate that they 
are either legal citizens or legal non-citizen residents.
I have given the term “subsidiarity” of rights to this principle of 
allocating rights according to the appropriate and non-arbitrary 
relationship between the particular right and the particular need. 
The term is borrowed from the political idea (an extension of the 
federal principle) that governance and government responsibility 
should be organized at the best and most appropriate level, according 
to the particular issue or responsibility at hand. For example, the 
maintenance of footpaths and gutt ers is best done at the level of 
a local or community authority rather than a central government, 
while it is normally inappropriate to provide for national defence at 
the level of the local.
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How then should rights be allocated? The answer to the question 
is: they should be allocated according to a non-arbitrary and 
appropriate scale of needs. Human rights should be available to all 
humans, political participation should be available to all adults who 
live within a jurisdiction, and so on. Iris Marion Young (2002, 236) is 
correct to claim that “[e]specially under contemporary conditions of 
global interdependence, obligations of justice extend globally” and 
to reject a nationalist argument against the extension of obligations 
beyond national borders, but she derails her own argument by 
employing the language of citizenship. Instead of a discourse of 
citizenship rights, we should turn our att ention to the questions 
of who needs rights, and which particular rights are appropriate 
at which level, in other words, how to bring about a non-arbitrary 
allocation or subsidiarity of rights. In none of this should we forget 
that both citizenship and rights are matt ers of law.
There are, additionally, good public policy reasons for allowing 
non-citizens, or aliens, to enjoy rights, in addition to the principle 
of non-arbitrariness. It is highly likely that the right to participate in 
the political community discourages alienation and disenchantment, 
and thus contributes to the reduction of the destructive consequences 
that may otherwise follow. The right to participate facilitates the 
existence of a robust and healthy civil society. In fact, to anticipate, 
it seems that many people who use the language of “citizenship” 
in relation to rights and duties are in reality speaking about the 
desirability of a strong civil society and responsive government 
rather than, specifi cally, about individual conduct or entitlements. (I 
return to this below, in a discussion of civility.)
CITIZENSHIP AND DUTIES
At this point advocates of a non-legal understanding of citizenship 
might want to change direction. They might argue that the question 
of whether rights derived from law come under the defi nition 
of “citizenship rights” is misdirected. Citizenship might be best 
associated with duties and responsibilities. Citizenship might be 
a form of behaviour rather than a ground upon which to demand 
rights or entitlements. It might, that is, be more a matt er of giving 
than receiving. This perspective is frequently found in the literature 
on citizenship. In Australia aft er the Second World War it was 
also adopted at the level of government. There is a long history of 
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offi  cial measures for enhancing “good citizenship”: citizenship 
“conventions” for immigrants in the 1950s and 1960s, compulsory 
civics education in schools in the past and in recent years, and the 
development and redevelopment of citizenship oaths and ceremonies 
for persons acquiring citizenship by naturalization.
What sort of duties do theorists have in mind when they argue 
for a reinvigoration or rediscovery of the tradition of “civic 
republicanism”? What might be expected of a good or exemplary 
citizen? As with the example of rights above, before reaching a 
conclusion let us consider the range of potential candidates for 
inclusion in a defi nition of citizenship as duties.
Obedience to the law is oft en routinely cited as an att ribute of 
citizenship, but it is relatively easy to show that this is misplaced. All 
persons in a country, regardless of their nationality or legal status, 
and however briefl y they are there, are required to obey the local 
law, and the one apparent exception of those protected by diplomatic 
immunity does not essentially alter this argument. There is nothing 
exceptional or particularly virtuous in obeying the law. On the other 
hand, particular legal duties, such as voting or performing jury duty, 
might be limited to citizens and obedience might be desirable, but, as 
we have seen, the law does not in fact require or permit all citizens to 
perform these duties and, indeed it expressly prohibits some citizens 
from doing so.
Other legal duties or responsibilities, such as paying taxes, might 
be required of citizens, but paying taxes is required of all residents 
who earn taxable income, and even in some cases, such as taxes 
on consumer goods, of mere visitors. Paying tax has nothing to do 
with citizenship. Performing military service during war might be 
considered a citizen’s duty, but it is not, at least in some countries, 
exclusive to citizens. For example, under sections 59 and 60 of the 
Australian Defence Act 1903, resident aliens, as well as citizens, must 
perform military service when ordered to do so. Some citizens or 
classes of citizen—the medically unfi t and those whose origins or 
political allegiances are suspect, for example—are disentitled from 
performing military service. Thus, if we began by saying that “good 
citizens” must obey the law, or defend their country when required 
by law, we would not be saying very much.
If, however, citizenship were tied to particular legal duties and 
vice versa, how would these duties be enforced? For example, might 
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a person not be permitt ed to vote if he or she did not pay taxes? This 
would mean that citizens would be subject to a double regime of 
penalties, whereas those who were not citizens but earned taxable 
income (since paying tax is not exclusive to legal citizens) would be 
subject only to the usual penalties for not paying taxes. Would citizen 
conscientious objectors be punished for refusing to perform military 
service, while able-bodied resident aliens were left  in peace?
Perhaps this is to place too much emphasis on legal duties. 
Might not “citizenship” depend less upon law and more upon 
the performance of certain desirable duties? What other duties or 
responsibilities might one want to att ach to citizenship that are not 
already required by law? What about the “civic duties” or elements 
of “civic virtue” that are so oft en associated with a normative 
or aspirational defi nition of the citizen? Should all citizens, for 
example, be required to att end public meetings, join political parties 
or community organizations, or perform volunteer service? What if 
they failed to do so? There are many citizens whose contribution to or 
membership of community organizations, for example, would not, as 
a matt er of course, be fruitful or desirable. The participation of some 
might, indeed, be unproductive, even destructive. Many others have 
limited capacities, or lives that are already overburdened; others 
fi nd simply gett ing through the normal routine of each day to be 
an ordeal, for one reason or another. These people, already short on 
time or resources, would be doubly deprived if we chose to identify 
citizenship closely with the performance of civic duties.
Would the withholding of rights or entitlements be a consequence 
of the failure to perform what we might broadly call community 
service? In many cases it would be counterproductive to att ach 
sanctions to such actions. Rewards may perhaps be productive—and 
there are systems (albeit imperfect) of special rewards for community 
service in many countries, such as the New Year or Queen’s Birthday 
honours in Australia and Britain—but a withdrawal or denial of 
rights would surely not be productive. It would simply entrench 
the very reasons for, or sources of, disadvantage that may well have 
made the performance of approved duties diffi  cult in the fi rst place.
Aristotle’s model of the citizen, described in the Politics, is of a man 
with the leisure and the capacity to understand political issues. Those 
who were employed in manual work were, like women, unsuited to 
the Agora and could not, therefore, be “citizens.” Similarly, among 
the historical arguments levied until quite recently against the 
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female franchise, we fi nd the claim that voting was a privilege, of 
its essence, suited only to men. Voting, it was said, was based upon 
certain duties, pre-eminently the military defence of one’s nation, 
something from which women were excluded. Since women did 
not have the capacity to defend the country, they should not have 
the right to vote, either because voting was a reward for service or 
because women were not entitled to take part in making decisions 
about the defence of their country in the absence of the capacity to 
carry these out in person.
We need not embrace any of these particular conclusions to see 
that the association between citizenship and duty or service is 
problematic. If we are to defi ne citizens as “good citizens,” we must, 
as Aristotle did, invariably exclude from citizenship those who, for 
whatever reason, do not have the qualifi cations to meet the standards 
for being “good.” In any case, the compulsion to perform good works 
actually undermines the concept of the “good citizen,” turning 
him or her into the “compliant” citizen. Community service may 
legitimately be required, for example in cases of persons convicted 
of off ences as an alternative to a prison sentence, but to require it of 
persons merely because it is considered desirable is fundamentally 
to alter the relationship between the individual and the state, at least 
in liberal-democratic societies.
Those who advocate a correlation between citizenship and good 
behaviour also overlook the role of non-citizens or aliens. If we 
want people who live in our community to be “good,” we do not 
want only those who are legal citizens to be good. Also, those who 
advocate a correlation between rights and duties fail to account for 
what should follow, other than the sanction of the law where a legal 
duty is shirked, from the refusal of some citizens, and indeed some 
non-citizens, to be “good citizens.”
Perhaps all this is too literal-minded. Perhaps all that advocates 
of “virtuous citizenship” have in mind is duty in the sense of acting 
responsibly, being cooperative, and treating others with courtesy and 
consideration. This type of behaviour, without a doubt, is laudable 
and commendable, and there should be more of it, but why talk 
about it in terms of “citizenship”? One wants all persons, whether 
citizens, aliens, residents or temporary visitors, to pick up their own 
litt er aft er a picnic in the park, or to stand up for infi rm persons on 
public transport, for example.
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It might be objected, next, that using the language of citizenship 
hardly matt ers. If the goal is responsible and thoughtful public 
behaviour, why not describe it as “citizenly” or att ribute it to 
“citizens”? It might not be accurate legally, but it may accurately 
convey something in a non-legal sense that most people understand 
and appreciate. It matt ers, I argue, for several reasons. First, as 
soon as there are consequences, such as fi nes for not cleaning up, 
or public education campaigns designed to encourage “good” 
behaviour, then the target of these sanctions or campaigns needs to 
be described accurately. Second, it matt ers symbolically in the same 
way that talking about “men” or “mankind” matt ers when what is 
really or ideally intended is all persons, male and female. One might 
well use the word believing or claiming that it is innocent and that 
it embraces women as well as men, but the reality is that it masks a 
normative code and a historical message of exclusion. The language 
of “citizenship” too is a language of exclusion.
GLOBAL CITIZENSHIP?
If the state does not guarantee any rights to an individual by virtue 
of his or her citizenship, and if the demand that it should do so is 
problematic, perhaps the problem lies in the att achment of citizenship 
to the state. Perhaps we should detach it from the state, so that it 
becomes a form of membership of the global community to which 
all persons can equally belong. Might we then be able to speak about 
“citizenship” meaningfully or inclusively, making the term work in 
support of claims for equality, for equitable shares in resources and 
equal life-chances? Such claims are made by advocates of “global 
citizenship” and are supported by globalization theorists, who hold 
that power no longer resides within the nation state. For David Held 
(2002, 97), for example, “the locus of eff ective power can no longer be 
assumed to be national governments.” For Iris Marion Young (2002) 
the demands of justice require a global distribution of rights and 
thus a transnational notion of citizenship.
Advocates of global citizenship point out that the majority of the 
world’s resources, goods, and rights are presently locked up in the 
more favoured parts of the world. Because the borders of nation states 
and of transnational unions are policed, only the already-favoured 
“citizens” are entitled to live in them and enjoy their benefi ts. People 
from the poorer parts of the world are denied access to such benefi ts 
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because citizenship is currently defi ned by the laws of the state. Such 
rights and benefi ts would, or so these advocates suggest, redistribute 
themselves, in the manner of water fi nding its own level if released 
from what currently keeps it “dammed up” for exclusive territorial 
use. People would be free to “fl ow across” borders, to work and to 
sett le, and to exercise rights and entitlements equally throughout the 
world. Once this was achieved, the world’s populations would level 
out, spreading rationally in proportion to the equal availability of 
rights and goods, divided by territorial capacity.
There are as many problems associated with this alternative form 
of citizenship as with claims based on national or state citizenship. 
Those who advocate global citizenship through articulating a 
concept of citizenship that revolves around “rights and obligations” 
are seeking to extend a legal category (national citizenship) into a 
new, extra-legal form (global citizenship) without acknowledging 
that rights and even obligations were never invariably att ached to 
the old. Given the historically contingent nature of rights, there is no 
guarantee that all global citizens would enjoy equal rights to begin 
with. The absence of any transnational institutions or authorities that 
could enforce the allocation of rights makes such enjoyment doubly 
uncertain. It is also assumed that if borders were made entirely 
porous, resources, infrastructure, and space would adapt quickly 
and appropriately, expanding and contracting as needed, to meet 
an open-ended level of population. In reality, at least in the short 
term (a short term that would prove signifi cant), the risk would be 
that governments would fi nd it very diffi  cult, perhaps in some cases 
impossible, to guarantee the very rights and benefi ts that “global 
citizens” seek.
It is true that the claim that greater numbers of people coming to 
live in a country would deplete the resources that made the country 
att ractive in the fi rst place is oft en made by those who simply oppose 
immigration and want to keep others away from the sometimes 
abundant natural and economic benefi ts they enjoy. This is certainly 
the character of much of the opposition to increased immigration in 
Australia. Yet even advocates of an “open door” immigration policy 
must accept that planning would be necessary to meet the demands 
of new arrivals and expanded populations. Services would need to be 
provided and infrastructure created if rights were to be meaningful, 
and these would require a “tally,” at the very least, of persons and 
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of their characteristics (age, sex, language, and other skills). How 
could this be done without some designation of persons, without 
some system of sorting between those already inside and those at 
the point of entry, and without some control over the numbers who 
come in?
Although not all persons who live within a state are citizens, the 
legal status of citizenship is the frame within which the classifi cation 
of persons is organized within a territory. Legal citizenship is the 
“norm,” representing the core or the bulk of the population. Alien 
residents are defi ned, or identifi ed, by contrast with legal citizens. 
Citizenship is the means by which, both internally and in relation 
to the international community, a state keeps track of its population. 
Even where transnational rights or entitlements are available to 
citizens of another country, usually based on a reciprocal accord or 
treaty as within the European Union, a person’s original citizenship is 
determined by the law of his or her state. This, as with all citizenship 
laws, is tightly controlled. Even in the European Union a citizen does 
not exist without a state. A person without a state is not a citizen of 
the world but a stateless person. The parameters of the state may be 
up for discussion, but global citizenship, which would be citizenship 
without a state, is incoherent.
Legal citizenship is a means of maintaining cohesion among, and 
coordination of, populations in otherwise diverse and stratifi ed 
political communities. Regulated by law within state borders, it 
helps to facilitate and maintain the organization of political life and 
stability over a manageable territorial community. It also has the 
virtue of creating a common membership among diverse persons 
within a state, either by giving stability to a person’s status above 
and beyond membership of ethnic, religious, and other cultural 
subgroups, or by off ering the goal of such stability. It both allows a 
state to organize its members and, in return, allows those members 
to identify, in a legal sense, both with each other and with the state. 
It permits and tolerates other forms of identity and community 
without allowing these to erode the identities and “rights” of others. 
It does not directly or automatically generate rights, but it gives the 
citizen the presumption of having a stake in the state and of some 
sort of claim on its recognition, an a priori claim at least to be counted 
among those “inside” rather than outside.
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CITIZENSHIP AND ALLEGIANCE
Although citizenship is defi ned by law, and is at the heart of 
ordering and managing otherwise diverse communities, its value 
is not merely administrative. It has what one can describe as a 
“solidarizing” character, not, as some would postulate, in generating 
nationalism or patriotism, but in another direction. To make sense of 
this we fi rst need to draw a distinction between several terms that 
are oft en confused or employed indiscriminately in the discourse of 
citizenship: “identity,” “belonging,” “loyalty,” and “allegiance.”
If we think of citizenship in terms of “identity,” we are either 
imagining a homogeneous national character or set of att ributes or 
making a claim for a subnational form of identity that we believe to 
be worthy of recognition under the name of “citizenship.” Either is 
problematic. Nationalism, or national patriotism, imagines a single 
common identity among citizens formed by and expressed through 
common membership of a nation state. This is both undesirable 
and unachievable. No values or aspirations can ever be embraced, 
no characteristics or att ributes ever displayed, by all the citizens, 
let alone the entire population of a nation or state, and any att empt 
to create the conditions for this would be coercive or manipulative. 
At the “light” end of the scale such att empts are associated with 
jingoism and offi  cial kitsch, and, at the extreme end, with oppression 
and measures to wipe out behaviour that is, for example, considered 
“un-Australian,” “un-British,” or “un-American.”
However, subnational claims for “citizenship” based on 
recognition of a separate ethnic, linguistic, or cultural identity 
overlook the problem of att aching a term that is shared by persons 
without such an identity to the claims for the recognition of a subset 
of such persons. The argument that groups with such “identities” 
need to be fully recognized as members of the political community 
is a political argument, not an argument about what follows from 
having an “identity.” What makes sense of a claim for “citizenship” 
as membership of the political community is a claim about what is 
shared, or held in common with others, not what is diff erent. To 
argue for particular subnational forms of “citizenship,” especially 
those built around fi xed identities and non-porous membership, is to 
lose the very point of citizenship, as a title designating membership 
of a national or state community that transcends the otherwise 
diverse communities within any state. On the other hand, since there 
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is no way that what can be held in common with all members of the 
political community is a single “identity,” the claim fails from both 
sides.
“Belonging” is another term frequently att ached to claims about 
citizenship. It is oft en assumed to be both self-evidently desirable 
and psychologically necessary for human beings to experience a 
sense of belonging to a cultural community. Yet Jeremy Waldron 
(1992, 782) is right to question “the assumption that the social world 
divides up neatly into particular distinct cultures, one to every 
community, and secondly, the assumption that what everyone needs 
is one of those entities—a single, coherent culture—to give shape 
and meaning to his [sic] life.” (see also Sen 2006). However, even if 
it were demonstrably true that all persons need to “belong,” a sense 
of belonging has no single source, either territorial, communal, or 
cultural. Citizenship may be defi ned as membership of, or belonging 
to, a political-legal community, but belonging, which may or may not 
correspond to a sense of identity, may lie at many levels. Forms of 
community may be necessary and desirable for a sense of belonging, 
but “belonging” in an existential sense should not be the goal or 
test of citizenship. Many people who make valuable and worthy 
contributions to life, including the life of their nation, do not feel 
that they belong either in, or to, their country of citizenship. Others 
within a nation may feel that they belong only to a subnational group, 
or an ethnic or sexual minority, or a geographical or ideological 
community, among others, and may have no particular belonging-
att achment to their nation or state. Historically, a sense of alienation 
from one’s nation, or a “cosmopolitan” consciousness, has been the 
source of much creativity, as well generating signifi cant and lasting 
reforms through active challenges to dominant practices or social 
values. Heterogeneity is oft en a source of political vitality, a check 
upon or challenge to minority disadvantage. Such disadvantage 
may be tolerated, indeed may go unnoticed, in a culture of single 
“belonging.”
“Loyalty” is another matt er. We need fi rst to ask: what is at 
stake in any claim for loyalty or its absence? In the fi nal analysis it 
is whether a person will choose to side with or against the enemy 
or the opposing side during a confl ict. Loyalty to one’s nation is at 
issue only when there is war or confl ict with another country, or 
when internal subversion threatens. A state can and should embrace 
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many diff erent levels or types of identity and/or belonging, but it 
cannot tolerate disloyalty in this stark sense. One of the big modern 
dilemmas, a dilemma that probably drives many of the att empts 
to regulate or promote “citizenship,” arises from the fear that 
groups within a state holding diff erent identities or att achments 
may become subversive or disloyal. Their att achment to minority 
values or practices may override their loyalty to the country as a 
whole, particularly if they also identify with, or hold the citizenship 
of, another, hostile, country. Such a test of citizenship as loyalty is, 
in eff ect, the test that was applied during the world wars, when 
assumptions were made about propensities for disloyalty based on 
external criteria, primarily ancestry, and regardless of any att empt to 
“test” loyalty as an att itude. Persons were categorized according to 
their status as “enemy aliens” or their descent from enemy “stock.” 
(Signifi cantly, U.S. citizens of Japanese origin interned during the 
Second World War were designated “non-aliens” rather than citizens, 
in part to avoid an obligation to accord certain citizenship rights to 
them, but also, it appears, as a type of discursive strategy, stripping 
the moral value of the term “citizen” from them and thus making 
them appear both less deserving and more suspect than “true” 
citizens.) The assumption was made that persons of “enemy” origin 
were likely, because of their “identity,” to support the other side. 
To make this the test assumes that disloyalty automatically arises 
from, or is likely to be found in, groups with identities that lie at a 
subnational level. The consequences of such an assumption, whether 
in war or time of peace, may be disastrous. At the very least they are 
likely to engender or reinforce the very alienation that goes hand in 
hand with a disposition to disloyalty. A concept of citizenship that is 
adequate to peacetime cannot be built upon such a test.
Social or political disorder or disintegration may, of course, arise 
without war, and similar fears drive many claims for and about 
citizenship. The concern is that subnational groups with strong 
identities may come to dominate or erode the institutions that 
allowed them to enjoy and practice their own “identity politics” in the 
fi rst place. It is the spectre of, for example, religious fundamentalists 
gaining power and subsequently banning alternative religions 
or engaging in oppressive practices, using legal means to create a 
state with a single party, a single culture, or a single religion. Yet we 
do not want to throw the baby out with the bath water. In order to 
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avoid a takeover by political or religious fundamentalists aiming at 
the creation of a monocultural state we should avoid creating our 
own monocultural state built upon a single concept of citizenship 
as identity.
“Allegiance” is a bett er alternative. It is possible to expect, 
and encourage, allegiance towards one’s state, and towards the 
institutions of democracy, tolerance, and liberalism, without 
demanding that the members adopt a single identity or pass an 
associated test of loyalty. The appropriate allegiance is not emotional 
or aff ective. To adapt Isaiah Berlin’s celebrated distinction, “negative” 
(in contrast to “positive”) allegiance would mean having respect 
for democratic institutions and practices without either seeking to 
destroy them or necessarily choosing actively to uphold them. It 
would go hand in hand with having a stake in one’s country, with 
abiding by the “rules” and allowing others to do so. The concept of 
“constitutional patriotism” suggested by Jürgen Habermas (1994) is 
not perfect since the language of “patriotism,” especially since 2001, 
is problematic, and the conditions Habermas att aches to it seem to 
be too demanding, but it captures the type of allegiance proposed 
here. It is an allegiance of respect and compliance, of “playing by 
the rules” as others must do, even if at the same time one promotes 
alternative ways of playing.
This sort of allegiance is not exclusive to citizens, but it is 
structurally and ethically related to citizenship. As Habermas points 
out, “constitutional patriotism” involves att achment, or allegiance, 
to a concrete community. The body of fellow citizens is, I suggest, 
the single national or state category in which imaginary and concrete 
community can coincide. When I think of my “fellow Australians” 
I can imagine a body of real people, those with a common national 
“name.” It is in no way a homogeneous group and I do not 
necessarily feel any particular emotional bond with its members. 
What I do feel is a reciprocal entitlement to engage with them, under 
a shared set of rules that come with the “name,” in the name of a 
common allegiance, and on the assumption of a shared stake in its 
stability and workability. It is diffi  cult to foster such an allegiance 
in a country where the population cannot be regulated, in the sense 
described above, that is, where services, employment, education, 
infrastructure, and order cannot be planned and provided for. It is 
incompatible with a “laissez-faire” immigration policy and with a 
loose and ill-fi tt ing concept of citizenship.
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Allegiance, or “constitutional patriotism” in its useful sense, 
is and must be embedded in a set of institutions and practices. 
Commitment to democracy involves, at the least, recognizing and 
accepting democratic principles in practice. Both citizens and non-
citizen residents need to share such a commitment. In order for this 
to be generalized, it is essential that non-citizens do not feel excluded 
from the democratic constitutional community. A discourse of 
“citizenship,” where what is intended is active involvement in the 
institutions of politics, risks the alienation of non-citizens from 
this critical process. Imagine the state of mind of a resident alien 
confronted with the claim that each “citizen” should take part in 
civic life, or should know her or his rights. Is the alien intended 
to believe that these claims apply to her or him? Should aliens be 
expected automatically to know when “citizenship” is being used to 
designate persons who actually have the legal status of a citizen, as 
opposed to when it is being used merely metaphorically?
It is here that we can see more clearly that what many advocates 
of active or dutiful citizenship really have in mind is a vigorous 
civil society. The sort of behaviour that is readily att ributed to the 
“citizen” is, to use the term in an archaic sense, that of the civilian, of 
the individual acting civilly and representing civic virtue, rather than 
specifi cally “citizenly” virtue. In civil society, in the domain between 
the state and the individual, the legal character of the members is 
secondary. All persons who live in the same country should have 
the opportunity to be civilians, to participate in and be part of civil 
society.
CONCLUSION
Hand in hand with a planned immigration programme, the purpose 
of citizenship law is, ultimately, to distinguish between insiders 
and outsiders, between those who are entitled to have or to get a 
stake in the country and those who are not. This, to be sure, creates 
inequities and imbalances across the world’s population, but these 
would not be solved by an “open door” policy, or a presumption 
that rights and duties were automatically available to or required of 
all “global citizens.” A “subsidiarity” of rights permits a reasonable 
and reasoned distribution across local, regional, national, and 
international populations, without generating the problems of either 
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a homogenized citizenship or an unregulated national population. 
Obligations built on concepts of justice, rather than reciprocity, can 
be fulfi lled.
In order for these things to be achieved the language of citizenship 
needs to be reconsidered, and the identifi cation of rights-bearers and 
obligations-bearers as “citizens” needs to be discarded. The term 
“citizen” needs to be put back in its appropriate place, as a morally 
neutral status conferred and regulated by state law. It is a status that 
the majority of the state’s population should either have or seek to 
acquire.
Why would they wish to hold it or acquire it, if no rights 
(necessarily) came with it, or if, according to my scheme above, 
rights were shared with non-citizens? The best reason is that, in a 
world where citizenship is the norm and statelessness is undesirable, 
to be a citizen of the country in which one lives is, for most, the 
closest they can come to having a guarantee of the “right” to remain 
in that country and to require its institutions to speak on their behalf. 
It is a valuable precondition for stability and workability, a means 
of living with others in diverse populations, and a way in which 
heterogeneous groups of people can be “named” and att ached to a 
territorial subdivision in a chaotic world.
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AND THE MEANING OF CITIZENSHIP LAWS: 
IRELAND’S CITIZENSHIP REFERENDUM
Iseult Honohan
— What is your nation if I may ask? says the citizen.
— Ireland, says Bloom. I was born here. Ireland. (Joyce 1922, 
373)
On June 11, 2004, during the week in which Dublin celebrated 
the centenary of James Joyce’s Bloomsday, a large majority voting 
in a referendum in the Republic of Ireland approved the Twenty-
seventh Amendment to the Constitution, which qualifi ed the right 
to citizenship according to ius soli, birth on the island of Ireland. This 
right had itself been established as a constitutional provision only 
fi ve years earlier, although it had been eff ectively available under 
legislation since 1935 and, before that, under the union with Great 
Britain. The amendment restricted the right to citizenship by ius soli 
to those with “at least one parent who is an Irish citizen or entitled 
to be an Irish citizen.” This was represented by the government as a 
minor adjustment necessary to remove a perverse incentive to come 
to Ireland to give birth, a practice described as “citizenship tourism,” 
but critics of the amendment claimed that ius soli citizenship expressed 
a constitutionally guaranteed form of equality and condemned the 
“racist referendum” as radically changing the philosophical basis of 
Irish citizenship.
The passage of this amendment raises a number of important 
issues. To what extent do diff erent citizenship laws refl ect diff erent 
conceptions of political community? Should we see pure ius soli as 
the fairest basis for the ascription of citizenship? To what extent is 
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its restriction to be construed as a minor adjustment or as a measure 
that signifi cantly alters the notion of membership implicit in the Irish 
Constitution and citizenship law?
Debates on citizenship are oft en bound up with debates on 
immigration, and indeed the two are not wholly separable. However, 
access to citizenship, the membership of a specifi c state, raises 
certain issues distinct from those concerning the right to travel to, 
live in, or work in other countries. While the exercise of discretion 
in regulating immigration is contested in normative theory and 
somewhat constrained by international measures in practice, states, 
even member states of the European Union (EU) such as the Republic 
of Ireland, are recognized as having the right to determine their own 
conditions of membership. It might be thought that this means that 
membership will always tend to be strictly exclusive or conditional. 
Thus it has been argued that “in all cases the nationality law expresses 
and consecrates the conception of the nation, and reinforces the 
homogeneity of national populations” (Schnapper 1994, 107). Yet, 
while citizenship laws may express a conception of the nation or 
political community, such membership may be conceived of in ways 
that are more or less inclusive and open to diversity. While citizenship 
laws are by defi nition necessarily exclusive, since they regulate 
particular membership, criteria for inclusion and exclusion may 
be more or less justifi able. The signifi cance of these issues extends 
beyond the Irish case at a time when, on the one hand, the justifi cation 
for any kind of bounded citizenship has been challenged, and, on the 
other, more stringent conditions of integration for membership have 
been proposed as necessary to sustain political and social solidarity 
in a number of western states.
In what follows I examine to what extent ius soli expresses a 
distinct conception of political community and can be seen as a 
more justifi able criterion for awarding citizenship than others. I fi rst 
address a number of objections to identifying citizenship laws with 
conceptions of membership. I then show how, notwithstanding these 
objections, diff erent conceptions of political membership may favour 
certain constellations of citizenship laws. I outline a civic conception 
that, while still particular, entails criteria that are less exclusive 
and less demanding of homogeneity than other conceptions of 
membership. Finally I analyze the implications of changes in Irish 
citizenship laws in the light of these conceptions.
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CITIZENSHIP LAWS: HISTORICAL PATCHWORK, 
CONVERGENT OR OBSOLESCENT?
Normative distinctions between diff erent kinds of citizenship laws 
have recently been subject to considerable criticism. It has been 
argued, fi rst, that they do not refl ect conceptions of citizenship at 
all; second, that in practice they show signs of convergence towards 
common norms; and, third, that specifi c citizenship is politically 
irrelevant or normatively undesirable in a globalizing world.
The fi rst objection goes as follows. Although the grant of 
citizenship through ius sanguinis (based on descent) and its grant 
through ius soli (based on place of birth) have oft en been identifi ed 
with, respectively, “ethnic” and “civic” conceptions of citizenship, 
there are no good grounds for this. Thus, for example, the reason that 
the Republic of Ireland, Canada, and Australia all implemented ius 
soli was that they inherited it from British law, where it represented 
the claim of the monarch to sovereignty over all born in the territory 
under the monarch’s jurisdiction rather than any egalitarian intent. 
Ius sanguinis was introduced in revolutionary France to represent the 
right of citizens to pass citizenship on to their children, while ius soli, 
oft en identifi ed as quintessentially republican, was a late nineteenth-
century introduction designed to incorporate the children of France’s 
large immigrant population. Existing citizenship laws, rather than 
constituting systematic programmes, tend to consist of a patchwork 
of historical accretions infl uenced by diff erent legal traditions, local 
social and political circumstances, levels of immigration pressure, 
and international conventions. So, as Joppke (2003) argues,
rather than refl ecting particular visions of “nationhood,” ius soli 
and ius sanguinis are fl exible legal-technical mechanisms that 
allow multiple interpretations and combinations, and states 
(or rather the dominant political forces in them) have generally 
not hesitated to modify these rules if they saw a concrete need 
or interest for it.
On this view, then, it is not surprising either that Ireland has restricted 
ius soli or that Australia, for example, did so too, in 1986.
It may be true historically that the genesis of existing citizenship 
regimes cannot be explained entirely in terms of consciously 
intended and systematically realized conceptions of citizenship, 
72 Iseult Honohan
and that the same provision may function diff erently in diff erent 
circumstances. Nevertheless, public institutional provisions do carry 
meaning and, as with texts and works of art, this depends on their 
public interpretation as much as on their creators’ intentions. This 
is particularly true of constitutional provisions, which have special 
symbolic value. Moreover, citizenship laws constitute a legal norm 
that shapes the reality of citizenship. Thus ius soli came over time to 
represent the openness and accessibility of citizenship, both in the 
French republic and in immigration countries such as the United 
States or Canada, and gave rise to a citizen body that was diverse in 
origin, whatever other pressures to conform may have existed.
A more radical argument suggests that all att ributions of 
citizenship at birth are arbitrary, ius soli no less than ius sanguinis, 
since both are based on the accident of birth, whether of place or of 
parentage. This awards an unearned privilege to those who happen 
to be born in one situation rather than another (Shachar 2002). 
This is a crucial privilege, since most people continue to hold the 
citizenship they acquire at birth: only 2 percent of all the people in 
the world are naturalized citizens (although, as one might expect, 
in immigration countries, such as Canada or Australia, foreign-born 
residents account for nearer to 15 and 25 percent of the population). 
Even place of birth always depends in some sense on parentage. 
It may be going too far to say that “a state qua membership is 
fundamentally an ethnic institution, because membership is usually 
ascribed at birth” (Joppke 2003, p. 6), for the justice of citizenship 
regimes overall depends not only on laws of access to citizenship but 
also on immigration laws, the treatment of asylum claimants, and 
the rights awarded to non-citizens, both residents and applicants. 
Thus we should not exaggerate the egalitarian credentials of ius soli.
Yet even if ius soli and ius sanguinis cannot be directly mapped onto 
particular conceptions of citizenship, diff erent ensembles of policies 
dealing with citizenship at birth, provisions for naturalization, 
and dual citizenship may accord with diff erent conceptions of 
membership. I shall argue that, construed as a reasonable predictor 
of a common future life, ius soli, in conjunction with fair immigration 
policies and possibilities of naturalization, may constitute a distinct 
and less arbitrary basis for citizenship than extended ius sanguinis.
A second objection to identifying citizenship laws with diff erent 
conceptions of citizenship notes an observable tendency towards 
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convergence among nationality laws today. Most regimes now 
include elements of ius sanguinis and ius soli in diff erent combinations. 
Thus systems formerly based predominantly on ius sanguinis have, 
as Germany did in 2000, introduced elements of ius soli, granting 
citizenship to children born to permanent residents (either at birth 
or on maturity). Conversely, under immigration pressures, countries 
formerly adopting simple ius soli have almost all restricted its 
application in some way, as the United Kingdom did in 1981 and 
Australia in 1986 (Weil 2001, 17–35). On this view the retention of 
pure ius soli in a country such as the United States is an exception to 
be explained largely by its constitutional position in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and its symbolic and historic role in establishing the 
equal rights of black people to citizenship. In another convergent 
process naturalization has been made easier in most countries, with 
shorter residence and more limited cultural requirements. Likewise 
dual citizenship is now more widely tolerated than previously. It has, 
for example, been accepted by the Republic of Ireland since 1956, by 
Canada since 1977, and by Australia since 2002. Where states retain 
a greater emphasis on ius sanguinis, this refl ects particular problems 
of territorial integrity or unstable borders, which leave signifi cant 
populations of potential citizens outside the current territory (Weil 
2001, 25–26).
However, we should neither exaggerate the extent of this 
convergence nor see it as an inevitable or one-way process of 
evolution. Individual states remain sovereign in determining 
citizenship laws. In the context of increasing immigration, cultural 
tensions, and political confl ict, there have been proposals for more 
stringent requirements of cultural assimilation as a condition of 
naturalization in many countries, including the United Kingdom 
and the Netherlands, hitherto noted for their multicultural 
accommodations. Likewise, while roughly half the countries of the 
world now allow dual citizenship, it has also recently been the object 
of renewed distrust and debate in the light of post- 9/11 concerns 
about terrorism and divided loyalties among immigrants (Caldwell 
2004; see also, for example, Citizenship and Immigration Canada 
2004).
Finally, it has been argued that particular citizenship is increasingly 
irrelevant or undesirable. As the gap between the rights of citizens 
and those of non-citizen “denizens” has been diminishing, some 
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authors have identifi ed and extolled a trend towards “postnational” 
membership rooted in human rights discourse, where political 
rights are envisaged as a more or less transferable dimension of 
human rights held by individual persons: “In a world in which 
rights and identities as rights derive their legitimacy from discourses 
of universalistic personhood, the limits of nationness or of national 
citizenship become inventively irrelevant” (Soysal 1994, 162). Yet 
citizenship still plays a signifi cant role in determining a person’s life 
chances, and its value depends on the state of which she or he is 
a citizen. In the absence of any immediate prospect of an eff ective 
international guarantor of rights, state membership remains a 
powerful determinant of who does or does not enjoy rights. It 
determines not only individuals’ political powers but also where they 
can live and work. In most countries only citizens are guaranteed 
rights to vote and seek offi  ce at the level of national politics, and 
they have greater security with respect to rights and benefi ts of 
other kinds. Thus, for example, the U.S. Welfare Act 1996 restricted 
benefi ts available to non-citizen immigrants, and, within the EU, the 
citizens of the new member states in central and eastern Europe, 
being also citizens of the EU itself, are allowed to enter and to work 
in the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, but initially they 
cannot claim welfare benefi ts. Finally, citizenship is a symbol of full 
membership (Carens 2005, 35).
It may be argued that this state of aff airs is normatively 
undesirable, but, in response to such criticisms of specifi c citizenship 
as unjustifi ably particularist, there are good normative arguments 
for the persistence of bounded polities. Apart from a principled 
fear of the potential tyranny of a single world government, at any 
time the locus of possibility of realizing any degree of freedom and 
self-government is determined by the interconnections arising from 
factors such as geographical proximity, historical interdependencies, 
and common environmental and developmental issues. Citizenship 
is bounded because this is the only way in which politically 
guaranteed freedom can be constructed. As Seyla Benhabib (2004, 
220) puts it, “The logic of democratic representation … requires 
closure for the sake of maintaining democratic legitimacy.” Even 
if certain rights arguably can and should be guaranteed without 
reference to a specifi c population, that of collective self-government 
cannot, and world citizenship in this sense is not yet available to us. 
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Moreover, bounded states may be seen as facilitating experiments 
in collective living, adopting alternative approaches to, for example, 
welfare, education, or health care provision that may suit specifi c 
circumstances or be generalizable approaches from which others can 
learn.
It should be stressed that this argument for specifi c units of self-
government does not entail further arguments that the nation is the 
necessary basis of the bounded state, that no development towards 
larger-scale or multilevel government is justifi ed or required, or that 
all responsibilities of justice are delimited by state boundaries. While 
a distinction between citizens and non-citizens may be legitimate, the 
way in which non-citizens are treated is subject to considerations of 
justice and to human rights standards, and certain ways of allocating 
particular citizenship may be more justifi ed than others.
Thus the citizenship of particular states, apart from any bundle 
of political rights, is neither practically irrelevant nor normatively 
insignifi cant.
MODELS OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY AND ACCESS 
TO CITIZENSHIP
Existing states’ citizenship laws may not consistently exemplify 
alternative models of political community. However, we can 
distinguish theoretically among diff erent conceptions of political 
membership and consider the kinds of citizenship laws that in 
principle fl ow from, or accord with, each of these. Coming at the 
question from this direction, we may develop some critical standards 
by which to assess the ways in which citizenship laws in practice 
manage diversity.
While the dichotomous contrast between “ethnic” and “civic” 
nationality has been subject to extensive critique (see, for example, 
Yack 1996 or Brubaker 1999), recent analyses of nationality allow us 
to make more nuanced distinctions between conceptions of political 
membership. (It should be noted that employing these distinctions 
does not entail any position on the possibility of distinct forms 
of patriotic att achment, an issue that is not addressed here. The 
acceptability of forms of att achment may depend not only on their 
object but also on the intensity and exclusivity with which they are 
held and the actions they are held to justify.)
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Here I distinguish fi ve models of political community: ethnic 
nationality, community of shared values, liberal nationality, civic 
voluntarism, and civic republican community. These may help 
to clarify what is entailed in diff erent conceptions of separate 
membership. They are all ideal types to which no country corresponds 
exactly. They represent broad alternatives, however, towards which 
countries may incline, while oft en tending to combine elements of 
more than one.
On the fi rst model, ethnic nationality, the political community 
of which citizens are members is an ethnic nation. Citizenship is 
specifi cally defi ned and bounded in ethnic terms. Thus to the extent 
that a state is based on ethnic nationality it will limit or give preference 
in admission to citizenship to co-nationals, ethnically defi ned. This 
underpins laws through which citizenship is acquired principally on 
the basis of descent (ius sanguinis). Naturalization is relatively diffi  cult 
and may be granted, if at all, only aft er long periods of residence, on 
meeting stringent requirements of cultural integration and loyalty, 
and subject to discretion. Dual citizenship is not consistent with this 
model. On this view it is justifi ed to discriminate among applicants 
on ethnic or racial lines. Examples include the “White Australia” 
policy that prevailed in the mid-twentieth century and the German 
citizenship policies, prevalent up to 2000, that granted citizenship 
to those of German descent even without cultural connections. 
In Germany up to 1992, for example, naturalization required ten 
years’ residence, was subject to demanding conditions of cultural 
integration, and was also subject to extensive offi  cial discretion. 
Other countries with a leaning towards ius sanguinis include Israel 
and Japan (Weil 2001). Such citizenship laws have the eff ect of 
including or excluding people from membership solely on the basis 
of descent, and, in the context of immigration, lead to large numbers 
of people living in a country without being members of the political 
community, even if they were born there. The obverse of this is that 
these laws include as members descendants of emigrants who may 
have a minimal stake in or commitment to the political community.
On a second model, community of shared values, citizens are 
members of a community of shared, “pre-political,” cultural values 
or ways of life, rather than ethnicity. Citizenship is bounded because 
“the distinctiveness of groups depends upon closure, and without it, 
cannot be conceived as a stable feature of human life” (Walzer 1985, 
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39). Citizenship laws are a matt er for the community to determine, 
but we can hazard the generalization that the balance of ius soli and 
ius sanguinis depends on assumptions about whether membership of 
a such a community is transmitt ed through socialization in the wider 
community, favouring ius soli, or through the family, favouring ius 
sanguinis. While it is a matt er of choice by the community whom 
to accept and whom to reject, those who have been admitt ed and 
have become long-term residents should be granted citizenship 
through naturalization, though certain conditions may be required, 
emphasizing either linguistic and cultural assimilation or allegiance 
to community values. Naturalization tends to require relinquishing 
previous citizenship, and dual citizenship is regarded as incompatible 
with being a member of a closed and distinctive group. The limits on 
dual citizenship in the United States and Germany today, in Canada 
up to 1977, and in Australia up to 2002, and the current requirement 
of the oath of loyalty to Australia and its people could be interpreted 
as refl ecting this conception. These provisions, even if they are not 
as exclusive as the citizenship laws fl owing from ethnic nationality, 
imply a strong degree of cultural assimilation, and in any case 
impose heavy requirements of belonging to a single community that 
may well fail to accommodate the plural identities and commitments 
that members may legitimately bear.
On a third model, liberal nationality, what citizens share is a 
public culture, history, or institutional practices rather than pre-
political culture or values. Citizenship is bounded because of the 
inherently limited possibilities of extending such a binding political 
identity (Miller 1995, 188; Miller 2000, 88–89). This allows for greater 
diversity of culture and values among citizens than either of the two 
previous models. Here citizenship can be awarded by ius soli as long 
as there is a guarantee that citizens will be socialized into the public 
culture. Thus French law makes children born of immigrant parents 
in French territory citizens automatically at the age of eighteen if 
they have lived continuously in France for fi ve years. Naturalization 
is also available by choice at the age of thirteen. (This is in addition 
to the rule of “double ius soli,” whereby children born in France to 
French-born foreign parents become citizens at birth.) Ius sanguinis 
citizenship, by contrast, is quite limited, since those who live abroad 
are likely to lose their connections with developments in the public 
culture and politics more quickly than those they have with the wider 
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culture. Such a liberal nationality does not discriminate on ethnic or 
cultural lines among candidates for citizenship by naturalization, 
but it does require commitment to the state and competence in the 
public culture. The conditions for adult naturalization may include 
language and a grasp of history, if only as evidence of participation in 
the public culture. On this view also, citizenship may be understood 
as essentially singular membership of a sovereign body, but dual 
citizenship is more easily accommodated than with the two previous 
views. Elements of such a view can be found in the oath of loyalty to 
the country’s democratic beliefs and laws in the current procedures 
for naturalization in Australia, or in the affi  rmation of intention to 
observe the laws and fulfi l the duties of a citizen in Canada.
While more open to diversity than either of the preceding 
conceptions, and susceptible to more or less demanding 
interpretations and implementations, the way that this view grants 
weight to the existing public culture may not be fully consistent with 
the equal treatment of all citizens. Apart from the criticism that it 
is hard to separate the “public” elements from the wider culture, 
it tends, like ethnic nationality and value community, to emphasize 
retrospective features of citizenship, rooted in the grounds of common 
past connections and experiences. Hence, for example, the famous 
anomaly of repeated references to “nos ancêtres” (“our ancestors”) in 
the texts prescribed for use in schools by French governments, even 
though substantial proportions of children have immigrant ancestry 
(in France itself) or otherwise non-European ancestry (in its overseas 
territories).
This raises the question whether it is possible to envisage an 
alternative “civic” conception of citizenship founded on a more 
prospective basis. This more contested conception requires more 
detailed discussion than those that have just been discussed.
One articulation of such a civic view, which I term “civic 
voluntarism,” claims that citizenship can or should be based primarily 
on choice, voluntary consent or forward-looking commitment to 
shared principles or constitutional structures. The idea that citizens 
may be united by adherence to common principles may be taken 
to support both membership of specifi c political communities 
and the possibility of cosmopolitan citizenship. In either case, it 
implies that the necessary and perhaps suffi  cient condition of civic 
citizenship is consent, or adherence to liberal democratic principles. 
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It is then inappropriate to ascribe citizenship involuntarily either 
at birth, through ius soli, or automatically at majority. In contrast, 
naturalization may be extremely easy, once one has chosen to live 
in the country even aft er a short period, and dual nationality is not 
particularly problematic. This would be consistent with making ius 
soli and ius sanguinis take second place to naturalization on the basis 
of open conditions of choice and residence, perhaps even shorter 
than the two years currently required, for example, in Australia.
However, adherence to certain principles is not what distinguishes 
citizens of diff erent states. This reinforces the fact that political 
membership is not and cannot be a matt er simply of rational 
commitment. Critics have been able to point to the way in which 
apparently civic arguments implicitly rely on a form of more or 
less liberal nationality (see Yack 1996 and Canovan 2001). Nor is 
it like membership of a club that people can opt into, or out of, at 
will. Citizenship is inherently rooted in the fact of subjection to a 
particular common authority. While this cannot be identifi ed with 
a common past or even with proximity alone, it cannot be based 
primarily on choice either, but derives from the involuntary sharing 
of this common predicament, in which interdependent citizens also 
share at least the possibility of calling government to account and 
establishing some degree of self-determination of their common 
future. (I use the term “future” rather than “fate,” as the latt er tends 
to convey a more deterministic trajectory equivalent to a destiny laid 
down in the past.)
Thus a bett er formulation of a civic approach, which I term “civic 
republican community,” sees citizens as at most semi-voluntary 
members of a political community. In contrast to value community 
and liberal nationality, on this view membership is defi ned in terms 
neither of pre-political nor of public culture. Of course culture cannot 
be excluded, but existing culture and values can be awarded less 
unassailable priority over those that emerge in exchanges among 
citizens. Common cultural values emerge as outcomes of political 
interaction, provisionally embodied and open to change. In contrast 
to the case under civic voluntarism, commitment is specifi c to a 
particular community rooted in a common predicament.
Like civic voluntarism, civic republican community has a distinctly 
prospective dimension. Thus ius soli ascription is justifi ed in so far as 
it represents the current predicament of political interdependence 
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and participation in a common future life. Birth in the territory of 
a state may be taken as a reasonable predictor of a shared future 
in the political community, but it is not infallible. Thus, if granting 
citizenship at birth by ius soli is seen as arbitrary in certain cases where 
other connections with the state are absent, it may be reasonable to 
confi rm the citizenship of those who continue to live in the state 
as adults at some point. While, for example, the United Kingdom 
and Australia have modifi ed ius soli, they do grant citizenship to a 
child born in the country who continues to live there for ten years. 
Conversely, any element of ius sanguinis, refl ecting the fact that 
citizens may leave without losing all contact, tends to be limited 
in duration and to depend on continued interdependence and 
connection. This accords with the suggestion by Shachar (2002, 29) of 
the relevance of a “ius connexio,” but it grants a greater weight to the 
fact of birth in the state in att ributing citizenship than she endorses.
This civic republican account of citizenship favours relatively 
generous conditions of naturalization. Long-term residents become 
citizens on a virtually automatic basis, just as natives do, taking 
residence in the state as a shorthand for interdependence and the 
sharing of a common future, in virtue of living, working, paying 
taxes, and sending children to school, for example. This would be 
neither purely a matt er of choice nor subject to discretion. As the 
nuances of politics are oft en one of the last aspects of a country’s 
life to be fully grasped by a newcomer, a period of prior residence 
somewhat longer than a consent-based view might suggest may 
be appropriate. Any exact period is necessarily arbitrary, but three 
to fi ve years, as in France, Canada, or the United States, would be 
more appropriate than either a short period such as two years or a 
long one such as ten years. Other conditions may be very limited. A 
knowledge of language, history, or institutions could be required, as 
indicating the capacity for political interaction rather than cultural 
assimilation, but more important may be the forward-looking 
intention to live in the country, rather than acquiring citizenship 
either as a badge of identity or as a fl ag of convenience. It is not clear 
that an oath of allegiance should be required that is not required of 
citizens by birth, since it is sharing a common authority with others 
rather than loyalty to it that defi nes citizenship.
On this view dual citizenship is not particularly problematic. 
Indeed, the extension of citizenship to long-term residents tends 
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to give rise to dual nationality. There can be real interdependencies 
with countries both of origin and of current residence, especially for 
someone who holds out hope of returning, or who supports relatives 
there. However, dual citizenship of this kind would characteristically 
apply to individuals moving between countries, rather than being 
inherited by children over generations.
A civic republican conception of political membership, based on 
the possibility of self-government by interdependent citizens facing 
a common future, results in citizenship laws that grant citizenship 
predominantly by ius soli, and on a more restricted basis by ius 
sanguinis, and allow relatively easy naturalization and holding of 
dual nationality. Though bounded, such a conception is less exclusive 
and less demanding of homogeneity than ethnicity, shared values, 
or liberal nationality. Because the citizenship laws that fl ow from 
it do not depend on a shared past or require cultural adjustment 
as a condition of membership, they are intrinsically more open to 
diversity.
In practice liberal nationality tends to be in the ascendant. While 
citizenship laws in a number of countries today display certain 
elements common to liberal nationality and civic republicanism, 
they tend to place more weight on retrospective than on prospective 
grounds for citizenship.
IRELAND’S CHANGING CITIZENSHIP LAWS
Irish citizenship laws have evolved under the infl uences of the 
British legal inheritance, republican ideas of political membership 
expressed in the state’s founding documents, the territorial claim 
over Northern Ireland, and the fact of emigration. The fi rst three 
infl uences contributed to the centrality of ius soli, the last to the place 
of ius sanguinis in these laws.
Although everyone resident on the island of Ireland at the 
foundation of the state was deemed a citizen, Irish citizenship was only 
gradually determined by legislation, mainly in 1935 and 1956 (Daly 
2001). The Constitution of 1937 originally provided for citizenship 
to be determined by law. In the system that emerged citizenship 
was granted on the basis of ius soli to those born anywhere on the 
island of Ireland, and on the basis of ius sanguinis to the children 
and grandchildren of such “natural born” citizens. The current 
conditions allow those with an Irish-born grandparent to claim Irish 
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citizenship, while those born abroad to Irish citizens born abroad 
may become citizens on registration. Thus, alongside a conception 
inclusive of the resident population, the children of emigrants were 
granted citizenship on a medium-term basis. Nonetheless, compared 
with the hundreds of thousands of citizens who emigrated aft er 1922, 
those claiming citizenship on ius sanguinis grounds alone between 
1936 and 1986 numbered only 16,500. Aft er 1986 the conditions 
for ius sanguinis citizenship were tightened somewhat, to apply to 
descendants only from the time of registration (Daly 2001, 403).
What was remarkable in this case was the way in which an unstable 
border was refl ected in an emphasis, not only on ius sanguinis but 
on a singular version of ius soli that applied to a territory extending 
beyond the recognized jurisdiction of the state. The foundation of 
ius soli laid the basis for a relatively open conception of citizenship, 
albeit one that sat uneasily with the more fi rmly bounded and 
exclusive ethnocultural conception of the nation that prevailed 
in the public consciousness and infl uenced many areas of policy. 
Indeed, there has been a continuous tension between loosely ethnic 
and civic conceptions of membership, encapsulated in the debate in 
James Joyce’s Ulysses between “the citizen” —who defi nes the nation 
in ethnocultural terms, speaks of “our greater Ireland beyond the 
sea,” and says “we want no more strangers in our house” —and the 
Jewish Leopold Bloom, who defi nes himself as Irish because he was 
born in Ireland, and the nation as “the same people living in the 
same place” (Joyce 1922, 371, 364, 373, 372).
Other avenues to citizenship were initially derived from and 
similar to British legal practice. In principle, naturalization was 
relatively easily acquired by adults with legal residence in fi ve of the 
previous eight years and the intention to live in the country. There 
were no ethnic or liberal-national criteria of language ability or 
cultural assimilation. Against this, a person seeking naturalization 
was subject to conditions implying a “community of shared values”: 
having to be deemed to be “of good character,” swearing an oath of 
fi delity to the nation and loyalty to the state, and being subject to a 
high level of ministerial discretion, including the power to dispense 
with conditions on the basis of Irish descent or associations. In 
practice, until recent years the numbers applying were also rather 
limited: applications rose from about 300 in 1995 to 3,500 in 2002, 
though slow processing meant that only 500 were granted between 
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1999 and 2000, and 1,529 in 2002. (We do not have fi gures on the 
almost certainly greater numbers of citizens born to foreign parents 
throughout the existence of the state.)
A signifi cant proportion of non-citizen residents were British and 
already enjoyed, on a reciprocal basis with the Irish in the United 
Kingdom, what has been called “de facto” citizenship (Hammar 
1990), including rights to live, to work, and to vote in national 
elections. Dual citizenship was recognized from 1956 onwards, 
under the Citizenship and Nationality Act of that year.
Thus these laws embodied quite an open conception of 
membership, with the combination of ius soli, relatively limited 
ius sanguinis, and naturalization available mainly on grounds of 
past and future residence. The notion of a shared future infl uenced 
perceptions of Irish citizenship. This was well expressed by Mosajee 
Bhamjee, the fi rst Muslim to become a member of the lower house of 
the Irish Parliament and himself a naturalized citizen, when he said 
in an interview (with Carrie Crowley on RTÉ Radio) in 2002, “I am 
an Irish citizen—of course in one way I will never be Irish, but I will 
die in Ireland.”
It is undeniable that these relatively generous provisions owed 
their origin and continued existence to the imperial legal inheritance, 
the Republic of Ireland’s dependence on the United Kingdom and 
the need to retain access to the United Kingdom for Irish emigrants, 
administrative underdevelopment, the absence of immigration 
pressures before the 1990s, and some degree of lip-service to 
republican ideals of equality. For many years, however, these 
provisions were accompanied by considerable offi  cial resistance to 
admitt ing immigrants, notably in the case of Jews seeking refuge 
from Nazi-occupied Europe (see Keogh 1998, O’Halpin 1999, and 
Fanning 2002, chapter 4). In addition, the single travel area between 
the two islands of Ireland and Great Britain gave the Irish government 
responsibility for admissions to the British Isles (Meehan 2000, 
chapter 3).
It may be argued that, above all, it was the territorial claim to the 
six counties of Northern Ireland that maintained the central position 
of ius soli. Nonetheless, whatever the intent, or lack of it, that brought 
this constellation into being, the citizenship laws of the Republic of 
Ireland up to 2004 can be seen as striking a balance that inclined 
towards a civic republican conception of political membership, in 
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the prospective sense outlined above, and as giving expression to 
a conception of membership of the Irish polity that persisted over 
more than seventy-fi ve years. The question was whether they could 
survive the challenge of increasing immigration.
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS ON ACCESS TO 
CITIZENSHIP
From the late 1990s a number of proposed changes made access to 
citizenship in Ireland the subject of public debate and, for the fi rst 
time, a constitutional issue.
The fi rst change arose in the context of developments in the 
Northern Ireland peace process and, in particular, the dimension 
of North‒South reconciliation in this process. As part of the Good 
Friday (or Belfast) Agreement the original text of Article 2 of the 
Constitution of 1937, asserting that “the national territory consists of 
the whole island of Ireland, its islands and the territorial seas,” was 
replaced by the following wording, approved, with the rest of the 
constitutional changes required under the Good Friday Agreement, 
by a majority in a referendum on May 22, 1998:
It is the entitlement and birthright of every person born in 
the island of Ireland, which includes its islands and seas, to 
be part of the Irish nation. That is also the entitlement of all 
persons otherwise qualifi ed by law to be citizens of Ireland. 
Furthermore, the Irish nation cherishes its special affi  nity with 
people of Irish ancestry living abroad who share its cultural 
identity and heritage.
This amendment was intended to establish constitutionally what had 
previously existed on a statutory basis. It granted the right to Irish 
citizenship to those born in Northern Ireland independently of the 
claim to territorial sovereignty over Northern Ireland. At the same 
time it made a gesture towards the claims of Irish descendants that 
fell short of any explicit constitutional right to citizenship. It may be 
noted that this measure ran directly counter to the observed trend 
for countries with pure ius soli to restrict it, and it actually gave ius 
soli citizenship additional symbolic recognition by raising it from a 
statutory to a constitutional right. It should also be noted, however, 
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that it is membership of the nation, not of the state, that is specifi ed. 
On this basis it has been argued that this does not constitute a 
guarantee of citizenship (for example, by MacEochaidh 2004), but 
this is not the prevailing view, nor is it the interpretation of the Irish 
government’s legal advisers, who took this to constitute a guarantee 
of citizenship that required restriction through the Twenty-seventh 
Amendment in 2004.
In fact, a separate train of events led to that amendment, which 
was introduced in the context of increasing numbers of immigrants 
and, more particularly, of asylum-seekers. While returning emigrants 
had at fi rst dominated net inward migration from 1990, numbers of 
foreigners then increased, raising their proportion in the population 
from around 2 percent in 1990 to 10 percent in 2006. The number of 
asylum-seekers rose to more than 11,000 in 2002, which at that time 
was equivalent to the third highest rate per capita in the EU.
Following the tightening up of procedures in the late 1990s, 
asylum claims decreased to 4,766 by 2004, but increasing numbers of 
applications by non-citizens for residence rights based on parenthood 
of an Irish-born citizen were received. The numbers of requests to 
remain on the basis of having citizen children were 3,153 in 2001 and 
4,027 in 2002, and 11,000 outstanding applications remained aft er 
January 2003. (In early 2005 the minister for justice announced that 
applications to remain would be considered with respect to children 
born before January 1, 2005.)
When, on January 23, 2003, the Supreme Court ruled, in the case of 
Lobe v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, that parentage 
of an Irish citizen gave no automatic right to remain, the government 
suspended the application process as previously administered. 
However, some continued to express concern about the number 
of late maternal arrivals and the proportion of pregnant female 
asylum-seekers. Although parentage of an Irish citizen no longer 
guaranteed residence in Ireland, it remained a potential ground for a 
residence claim in other member states of the EU. Forecast before the 
referendum, this was later confi rmed by the ruling of the European 
Court of Justice in Zhu and Chen v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department (Case C-200/02), granting the right of residence to a 
Chinese woman living in Cardiff  who had given birth to a child in 
Belfast. This eff ectively gave a right to reside in EU member states 
other than the Republic of Ireland, and under conditions of economic 
independence.
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Thus the Irish government introduced the proposal to restrict ius 
soli as a technical change necessary to remove a perverse incentive 
to give birth in Ireland. The restriction was defended on a number of 
grounds, which included preserving the integrity of Irish citizenship, 
coming into line with other EU member states, reducing pressure on 
maternity hospitals, and protecting the health of babies and their 
mothers induced to travel in late pregnancy.
Rather than removing or amending the recently introduced Article 
2, the proposal inserted a new section 2 in Article 9 (on citizenship), 
as follows:
1. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, 
a person born on the island of Ireland, which includes its 
islands and seas, who does not have, at the time of the birth 
of that person, at least one parent who is an Irish citizen or 
entitled to be an Irish citizen is not entitled to Irish citizenship 
or nationality, unless provided for by law.
2. This section shall not apply to persons born before the date 
of the enactment of this section.
This returned the allocation of citizenship on the basis of ius soli to 
being a legislative matt er, but constitutionally it retained an element 
of eff ective ius sanguinis in making constitutional ius soli citizenship 
dependent on the citizenship of a parent. The legislation subsequently 
introduced, the Irish Citizenship and Nationality Act 2005, grants ius 
soli citizenship only to a child whose parent has been legally resident 
for three of the previous four years, focusing thus on the parent’s 
status and length of prior residence. (While those on student visas 
are specifi cally excluded, those on short-term work permits of yearly 
duration are merely less likely to qualify.)
Both these features strengthen the retrospective dimension of 
the att ribution of citizenship. Not just a technical adjustment, this 
change eff ectively tilted the conception of citizenship embodied in 
the Constitution towards ius sanguinis.
In the short period of public debate that preceded the referendum 
the opposition campaign focused preponderantly on denying that any 
change was necessary or desirable. Rather than proposing alternative 
terms or provisions, it tended to criticize a lack of consultation and 
inadequate statistical evidence, to claim that birthright (that is, ius 
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soli) citizenship was implied by constitutional equality, and to cast 
doubt on claims of pressure from other EU member states. Moreover, 
despite reference to EU norms, there was limited public discussion 
of the debates on proposed changes to ius soli citizenship that had 
taken place in the United States and France in the 1990s, debates 
that featured some parallel arguments and suggested a number of 
possible alternative courses of action.
In addition to retaining unconditional ius soli, alternative 
constitutional possibilities included introducing a diff erent 
amendment, or removing all provisions about citizenship. 
Alternative legislative possibilities included sett ing a less restrictive, 
if still retrospective, period of parental residence or including a 
prospective dimension in ius soli citizenship.
ALTERNATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL MEASURES
The fi rst possibility was to retain the status quo granting simple 
ius soli, as is the position in the United States (and Canada), where 
similar issues of perverse incentives and “citizenship tourism” have 
arisen. In the United States, too, it has been determined, following 
Perdido v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 420 F. 2d 1179 
(5th Cir. U.S. App 1969), that the state can deport the parents of 
citizen children. However, proposals to limit ius soli citizenship, 
repeatedly advocated and introduced in Congress in the 1990s, have 
been unsuccessful. They have been opposed on various grounds, 
including the assertion that equality is central to the values that 
the United States stands for, the view that children should not be 
penalized for the actions of their parents, and the claim that the 
United States has always been a country open to incomers (see, 
for example, Hsieh 1998). The contrast between the Irish and U.S. 
positions is noteworthy given the considerable numbers of Irish 
people with U.S. citizenship derived from their birth to parents living 
there as students or temporary workers. Nonetheless, it may be 
argued, there are signifi cant diff erences between the two countries. 
The Republic of Ireland does not describe itself as a country based 
on immigration, and other comparable countries have already 
modifi ed ius soli. Furthermore, the constitutional entrenchment of 
ius soli has a uniquely symbolic meaning in the United States that 
makes any change particularly diffi  cult. (Among other self-described 
immigration countries, Canada has retained pure ius soli citizenship, 
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but Australia has qualifi ed it.) Moreover, Ireland’s geographic 
position and its membership of the EU make it disproportionately 
vulnerable to people seeking citizenship as a means of access to the 
EU.
Thus it can reasonably plausibly be argued that some modifi cation 
of ius soli citizenship was permissible on practical grounds. As Carens 
(2005, 38) has writt en,
From a normative perspective a ius soli rule that grants 
citizenship to everyone born on the territory is considerably 
broader than justice requires, and the reforms by other 
common law jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom, 
Ireland, and Australia, to limit ius soli to the children of citizens 
and permanent residents is morally permissible in my view. I 
would add two provisos to this, however. First, if children are 
raised in a society, they should automatically acquire citizenship 
regardless of the legal status of their parents … (British law 
recognises this.) Second, it would be morally wrong for the 
United States to modify its ius soli provisions for historical and 
symbolic reasons that are contextually specifi c, and it would 
be a bad practice for Canada to do so in large part because this 
practice has become so fi rmly associated in Canadian public 
discourse with a welcoming stance towards immigrants.
Nonetheless, once any provision has been embedded in a 
constitution, it gains a heightened symbolic importance. Introducing 
and then removing that constitutional provision has a signifi cance 
that creates a situation quite diff erent from changing the provision by 
law in the case where it had not been established in the fi rst place.
Alternative forms of constitutional change could have been 
considered, forms more consistent with the role that constitutions 
oft en play in expressing the highest aspirations of the political 
community. Compare the following hypothetical formulation of 
Article 9 with the current position (with emphases added to facilitate 
comparison):
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, a 
person born in the island of Ireland, which includes its islands 
and its seas, or who has, at the time of his or her birth, a parent 
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who is an Irish citizen or entitled to be an Irish citizen, is entitled 
to Irish citizenship or nationality, only if provided for by law.
Though this makes no concrete provision, it preserves the symbolic 
commitment to grant citizenship to those born anywhere in the 
island of Ireland, as required by the Good Friday Agreement, 
while putt ing the two paths to citizenship, through place of birth 
and through citizen parentage, on an equal footing, and leaving the 
detailed specifi cation of conditions to legislation.
If it is accepted that some change was necessary, another approach 
would have been to remove all reference to citizenship from the 
Constitution and return the matt er entirely to the sphere of legislation. 
Citizenship was not the subject of constitutional provision up to 
1998 and it does not have to be now. This too would have avoided 
giving an element of ius sanguinis citizenship a privileged symbolic 
position. While such a change, it may be argued, would involve a 
unwarranted unilateral departure from the delicate structure of the 
multinational, multiparty Good Friday Agreement, similar doubts 
were expressed about the change that was actually introduced. (The 
Irish government consulted the British government, and they issued 
a joint statement agreeing the terms, but the other parties to the 
agreement were not consulted. In any case, Article 9, section 2, as 
introduced, has the eff ect of overriding the provision of Article 2, if 
this is understood as a guarantee of citizenship.)
ALTERNATIVE LEGISLATIVE MEASURES
If either of the latt er two options was taken up, and the constitutional 
position established in 1998 was altered, legislative follow-up on 
the substance of the question would still be required. Here, too, 
alternatives to the current legislation present themselves.
The three-year period of parental residence necessary for the 
citizenship of a child is less demanding than the eight years laid 
down in, for example, current German nationality law, where, as in 
Ireland, the grant of citizenship at birth to children of non-citizens is 
determined by the retrospective consideration of parental residence 
(although in Germany the child must opt for one citizenship at the 
age of twenty-three). However, there are arguments for a still shorter 
period. First, if the crux of the problem was the incentive to travel in 
late pregnancy, the period of required parental residence could have 
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been nearer to nine months than three years. This would remove 
one of the most urgent aspects of the perverse incentive, travel in 
late stages of pregnancy, without discriminating so much in practice 
between permanent residents and, for example, holders of shorter-
term work permits or other recent arrivals.
If the central issue was the incentive to establish a child’s citizenship 
in order to gain residence in the rest of the EU, any residence period 
would increase the costs and thereby potentially reduce the numbers 
of those att empting to translate the birth of an Irish citizen child into 
EU residence rights. It would not, however, rule out the use of Irish 
citizenship in this way. In any case, parental residence requirements 
grant ius soli citizenship on retrospective terms.
This bias towards a retrospective criterion for citizenship could 
have been avoided by a provision granting ius soli citizenship to the 
children of non-citizens, or of those with temporary resident status, in 
a prospective manner, on the basis of the child’s continuing residence 
at, say, ten years old, as in the United Kingdom or Australia. (Irish 
law now includes a provision making possible the naturalization of 
minors, which was not previously available, but it does not provide 
for any easier access to citizenship for those born in the state.) This 
proposal addresses the primary problem of “citizenship tourism,” 
since it gives no basis for claiming residence directly in other EU 
member states. It is also compatible with a “civic republican” 
conception of citizenship as sharing a common predicament and 
future.
The justifi cation for granting citizenship automatically to the 
children of immigrants was extensively discussed in France in the 
mid-1990s in the debates over the automatic grant of citizenship 
at majority to children born to immigrants in France. Parties of the 
right argued that citizenship should be a matt er of explicit choice, 
rather than an involuntary imposition, and should not be awarded 
to those whose loyalty was not guaranteed. Thus in 1993 citizenship 
at majority was made conditional on application and an oath of 
loyalty. Opponents argued that automatic ius soli citizenship was 
fundamental to the republican values of universality and equality, 
and in 1997 a Socialist government reversed the position to more 
or less the previous att ribution of citizenship. These debates, it 
must be acknowledged, took place in the specifi c French context 
of concern about the integration of the children of immigrants, in 
which the grant of citizenship at majority refl ects a principle of 
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liberal nationality, the guarantee of prior socialization into the public 
culture. In the hypothetical proposal outlined here, by contrast, the 
grant of citizenship confi rms as citizens those who share a common 
future with others in the polity, whatever their origin or culture.
The contrast between current German and French provisions 
for ius soli citizenship, retrospective and prospective respectively, 
shows that there are still choices open to states in sett ing their 
citizenship laws and that these may refl ect alternative conceptions 
of citizenship.
CONCLUSION
Diff erent conceptions of political community favour diff erent 
constellations of citizenship laws. Although most states in practice 
combine elements of these, they may also incline towards one or the 
other. Ius soli is not in itself the only just or fairest way of allocating 
citizenship, but it forms a fundamental part of the ensemble of 
citizenship laws favoured by a civic conception of citizenship, in 
which citizens are seen as sharing a common present and future 
rather than a common origin. Such a civic conception favours 
citizenship laws inclined towards ius soli, granting relatively easy 
naturalization and accommodating dual citizenship.
By the end of the twentieth century Irish citizenship laws embodied 
signifi cant elements of such a conception of citizenship, more open 
than the ethnocultural conception of the nation that still prevailed in 
other areas of political and social practice. This off ered an opening 
to a latent more civic view of what it is to be Irish, a view towards 
which there appeared to be some movement in recent years. The 
change introduced with the Twenty-seventh Amendment in 2004, 
while not explicitly or necessarily racist, was more than a technical 
change, and signifi cantly shift ed the symbolic balance of citizenship 
away from this.
Even if some measures needed to be taken to remove perverse 
incentives for people to give birth in Ireland, the balance of citizenship 
need not have been so unrefl ectively tilted towards ius sanguinis and 
away from ius soli. A bett er solution to the issues that had arisen 
would have left  the constitutional positions of the two principles at 
least more evenly balanced, rather than privileging an element of ius 
sanguinis. Legislation could have required a shorter period of prior 
parental residence, or, more importantly, granted ius soli citizenship 
to children of immigrants on a prospective basis.
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In practice, it may be claimed that there is not so great a diff erence 
between the alternatives outlined here and the current legal 
provisions for access to citizenship. However, the constitutional 
reversal and the current constitutional provision have clear symbolic 
signifi cance, which, it may be argued, may well make a concrete 
diff erence to the integration of the increasing number of immigrants 
who are coming to live in Ireland. In the case of young people, where 
having foreign parents, a diff erent language, accent, skin-colour, or 
dress previously implied nothing about their citizenship, these now 
give a reasonable basis for assuming that they are not members of 
the political community, one important way at least in which they 
could claim to be Irish.
The real concern in Ireland, it may be argued, was not the 
integration of immigrants, which has yet to arise as a political issue, 
nor most centrally the number of late maternal arrivals, nor even 
the alleged abuse of Irish citizenship to claim residence in other 
EU member states, but the fact of unregulated immigration, at this 
point through claiming parentage of an Irish citizen. It should be 
noted that this was at a time when the economy was performing 
strongly, and there were signifi cant labour shortages both in high-
skilled and less skilled areas. Yet, while seeking to remain open to 
migrants from other EU member states, the state sought to contain 
other migrant labour within a system of short-term work permits 
and work visas. It has not acknowledged that Ireland is becoming 
an immigration country. Thus it may be that, as has been said of 
France in the 1990s (Favell 2001, 41), a debate that was really about 
immigration was framed in terms of citizenship. Indeed, opinion 
polls conducted at the time of the referendum suggested that many 
voters interpreted immigration as the issue at stake and cited the 
numbers of immigrants as a reason for voting in favour of the 
amendment. Changing citizenship laws hardly begins to address 
the issues of managing diversity that increasing immigration will 
raise for the Republic of Ireland, as it has for the rest of the EU and 
the wider world.
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FEDERALISM AND THE POLITICS OF 
DIVERSITY: 
THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE
Alain-G. Gagnon and Raff aele Iacovino
The challenges associated with the management of diversity in 
Canada touch a variety of intellectual traditions and disciplines. The 
notion that pluralism has come to challenge the privileged place of 
national identity as the legitimate order of contemporary liberal-
democratic political communities is a subject of debate within and 
between fi elds as diverse as political science, legal theory, sociology, 
history, social anthropology, and international relations, to name a 
few. (We have contributed to this debate in Gagnon and Iacovino 
2007, and this chapter develops and expands an argument we 
presented there.) Moreover, the idea of diversity itself engenders 
a multitude of avenues of thought, ranging from cognitive self-
understanding vis-à-vis others (identity) to the place of collective 
projects in interstate relations, and in internationalized commercial 
and social transactions. Indeed, diversity has become somewhat of a 
rallying cry for those opposed to homogenizing forces, which, they 
argue, are having eff ects on two fronts.
First, cultures are increasingly converging, interacting, and 
interconnecting with one another due to phenomena generally 
associated with globalization. Many scholars thus propose a 
revaluation of the particularistic “national” markers of identity within 
political communities, or at least argue for a retention of the tools to 
govern and intervene on behalf of these collective goods. Some even 
envision an international convention that would recognize “culture” 
as a collective good, for the sake of which states can legitimately 
intervene in the face of globalizing pressures. The enshrinement of 
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cultural diversity as a fundamental right for political communities 
has been debated at UNESCO for several years.
Second, and related to transnational developments, we are 
witnessing increasing legitimacy att ached to “thin” conceptions 
of liberal citizenship, or of postnational citizenship within liberal 
democracies, that value civic membership above particular “pre-
political” ethnic markers of belonging, and individual rights-based 
polities over collective social projects based on comprehensive 
liberal doctrines. According to Christian Joppke and Ewa Morawska 
(2003), there seems to be a convergence among liberal democracies 
towards sociological multiculturalism as fact, and eff orts at political 
integration based on the twin pillars of a common public language 
and individual rights as responses by state actors. Diversity in 
this sense has come to be associated with models of citizenship 
that acknowledge cultural pluralism within states, allowing for 
citizenship to be defi ned through particular cultural att achments 
as opposed to top-down defi nitions of citizenship that refl ect 
homogeneous majority cultures as a precondition for belonging.
SELF-UNDERSTANDING, REPRESENTATION, AND 
SOVEREIGNTY
The Canadian case lies at the crossroads of these two developments. 
Canada faces diversity on both fronts. In many ways Canada must 
navigate through questions surrounding a plurality of nation-based 
forms of representation and sovereignty, while simultaneously 
addressing issues related to self-understanding, belonging, and more 
generally, citizenship, in a sett ing characterized by diverse social 
and cultural identities. Since Canada is a multinational democracy, 
debate surrounding diversity tends to stop short at sorting out the 
various layers of diversity—national, ethnocultural, social—without 
actually taking a step further to fi nd solutions for the management of 
diversity. Will Kymlicka (1995 and 1998) has done pioneering work 
in this area, looking at the challenges that diversity poses for liberal 
citizenship. He contends that the “bundle of rights” for ethnocultural 
communities cannot be the same as those considered for national 
minorities. The former seek inclusion within a larger political 
community, or equalized conditions for integration, while the latt er 
seek self-government rights that, in many respects, constitute a 
rejection of citizenship as defi ned at the level of the “multination.”
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In Canada the distinct layers of diversity are oft en pitt ed against 
one another, and political projects or solutions made in their 
names are employed to undermine other legitimate expressions 
of diversity. On the one hand, Canada must manage the question 
of “national” diversity, a challenge that several liberal nation-
states, such as Australia, Germany, and the Republic of Ireland, 
do not have to grapple with to the same extent. On the other 
hand, Canada is also involved in craft ing the boundaries of 
citizenship and must address questions related to the integration 
of immigrants, cultural pluralism, and ethnocultural diversity 
while respecting its federal constitution. This is the fundamental 
challenge confronting the country today, and any att empt to sort 
through the issue of diversity must account for this entanglement.
Conceptually, the question of diversity itself must be disaggregated 
to refl ect distinct political and social projects. Methodologically, a 
multinational democracy such as Canada is precisely the case with 
which to evaluate such projects, since the term diversity means 
diff erent things to diff erent social and political interlocutors.
Postnationalists argue that the nation no longer defi nes the political 
subject as constitutive of a collective project. Even assuming that that 
is the case, what defi nes the boundaries of the political community, 
territorial conceptions of sovereignty and representation if not, at the 
very least, remnants of the nation form? In a sense postnationalists 
have become proponents of political stability more than advocates of 
justice (see Helen Irving’s chapter in this volume), whereas several 
well-grounded political philosophers argue that justice is a guarantor 
of political stability. Regardless of the extent to which national 
identity is decoupled from citizenship, it still structures our cognitive 
understanding of politics, particularly in relation to territorial 
modes of representation, deliberation, and policy outcomes. This is 
the crux of the dilemma for most liberal-democratic nation states. 
The overwhelming response has been to recreate the nation away 
from exclusive pre-political markers towards inclusive rights-based 
conceptions that recognize few collective att ributes of membership 
other than instrumental ones, such as a common language or respect 
for the basic laws of the state.
In more recent years nationalism has also gained legitimacy as 
a complement to liberalism, with some observers highlighting its 
capacity to provide the solidarity and cohesion necessary for liberal 
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values to take hold in any society. For example, Jeff rey Spinner 
(1994) notes that liberalism enhances the importance of language 
as a marker of identity. The liberal ideal of equal opportunity 
could not be realized in Quebec, for example, unless language was 
institutionalized. By reducing the salience of ascriptive “ethnic” 
markers of identity, liberalism may increase the likelihood that 
people att ach themselves to national identities. For Spinner (1994, 
157) nationalism is compatible with liberalism if two conditions 
are met: fi rst, the nationalist movement should mobilize around a 
speech community that is large enough to support the institutions of 
an industrial society; and, second, the movement should be willing 
to construct a liberal, pluralistic public space.
Conclusions commonly referring to postnational developments 
may be pointing to developments in liberal thought and practice 
that do not undermine the existence of the nation altogether but, 
rather, reinforce its relevance. Indeed, though diversity involves the 
acknowledgement of diff erence as a defi ning aspect of a particular 
political community, according to Yael Tamir (1993), all liberal 
nations are nevertheless “entitled to a public sphere in which they 
constitute a majority.” The very logic of liberalism, by soft ening the 
edges of “thick” nationalism, is thus deemed by some to refl ect a 
“new” phenomenon of postnationalism.
It may be argued, then, that substantive culture as the essence of 
the nation has largely been replaced by the procedural culture of 
liberalism itself. In the end advanced democratic states are simply 
reverting to liberal solutions, throwing rights at the issue of diversity 
and widening the private sphere. Even Jürgen Habermas, the 
recognized champion of postnational thought, has conceded that his 
preferred notion of “constitutional patriotism” is not devoid of certain 
collective att ributes that precede process and form. In Habermas’s 
view, public spaces demarcated by rational social communication 
and devoid of “thick” sociocultural markers of citizenship 
nevertheless require a common language and some consensus with 
regard to the parameters of the common political culture. In essence, 
the term “postnational” itself causes some confusion, to the extent 
that it implies a state of aff airs that has moved beyond monistic 
conceptions of belonging, even though Habermas himself, in 
refashioning belonging based on a procedural patriotism, assumes 
that there is a political community in which such consensus and 
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deliberation takes place. For Habermas the exercise of sovereignty 
defi nes the parameters of citizenship, as opposed to stemming from 
“pre-political” ethnic identities. This does not imply, however, that 
political communities can be constructed anywhere and at any time 
so long as a procedural constitution is in place. Habermas’s main 
contribution to redefi nitions of the nation is indeed the very notion 
that citizens converge around a constitution, which is deemed 
as somewhat of a victory, in the sense that there is widespread 
consensus as to the legitimacy of the basic laws governing a political 
community. For Habermas it is the process of “citizenization” itself 
that leads to such ends (see Dufour 2001, 157–210).
In the Canadian case this consensus is absent and the process of 
deliberation is stunted, due to central nation-building eff orts that 
undermine the fl ourishing of one political community in order 
to construct a larger procedural basis for citizenship. The present 
Constitution of 1982 is simply instrumental and a large proportion 
of Quebecers appear to consider it a nuisance. Debates on the merits 
of diversity in Quebec have proceeded in conjunction with those in 
the rest of Canada, but the model of social and political integration 
itself must, by defi nition, recognize the primacy of a national centre 
for convergence.
Quebec is a postnational province to the extent that its version 
of national belonging allows room, in principle, for a plurality of 
identities and individual rights (see Gagnon and Iacovino 2004). 
However, it does not have the luxury of adhering to a radically 
postnational model that disregards all collective initiatives and a 
modest conception of comprehensive liberalism, because its raison 
d’être, as a distinct political community within the Canadian federal 
arrangement, stems, as in other cases where the demarcations 
of national identity are being reformulated, from “pre-political” 
sociocultural markers, such as language, memory, history, and shared 
institutions. Quebec national identity is recognized as a collective 
good by most of the people living in the province (see table 4.1) and 
as such, may well constitute an object of policy for as long as Quebec 
does not have its own fully developed constitution, and for as long as 
a Canadian constitution that has received Quebec’s endorsement is 
not formalized and entrenched. In this sense what is also absent from 
Habermas’s contribution is a sensitivity to social and political forces 
that provide the context for particular constitutional trajectories, 
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Table 4.1: The Dual Identity Question in Quebec: Responses to a 
Survey by CROP and the Montreal Gazett e, March 27 to April 1, 
1998 (%)
Francophones Anglophones Allophones Total
Canadian only  3  9 15 5
Canadian 
fi rst, but also 
Quebecer




31 40 38 32
Quebecer 
fi rst, but also 
Canadian
37  2 13 31
Quebecer only 14  8  - 12
Do not know  3  3  9  3
Source: Wells (1998).
which vary from one state to another in distinct historical sett ings. 
Notions of consent, mutual recognition, and, to a lesser extent, 
continuity, which form the bases of just constitutionalism, are largely 
ignored (see Tully 1995).
Moreover, in a multinational context universal approaches that 
dilute sociocultural att achments in the management of diversity 
actually work against minority nations and, paradoxically, undermine 
diversity, to the extent that national diversity is not acknowledged as 
constitutive of the country and, more specifi cally, as constitutive of 
citizenship status. They cannot be considered separate issues, as the 
actions aimed at one set of problems invariably touch the other. If 
postnationalism can be equated with the logic of universal liberalism 
itself, in which citizenship is defi ned by fundamental rights based 
on a universal conception of personhood, then this serves, it may 
be argued, the political purposes of the central Canadian state, 
since it tends to obfuscate the perception of a plurality of distinct 
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host societies or societal cultures (a term att ributed to Kymlicka). 
For those who view cultural diversity as a Canada-wide area 
of management, Quebec’s appeal for “national” recognition is 
antithetical. A model of cultural pluralism, such as Canada’s 
policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework, does not 
specifi cally recognize national belonging as a basis for citizenship, 
at least in its sociocultural expressions. Nonetheless, “universal” 
models of membership in a multinational context oft en exhibit strong 
majority nationalist pressures on the defi nition of the larger political 
community, in the sense that the will of the majority is refl ected in 
public policy outcomes (see Gagnon 2003). For many Quebecers, on 
the other hand, certain aspects of “pre-political” nationalism cannot 
be divorced from their sociopolitical project because of the particular 
status of the province as a minority nation or societal culture within 
Canada.
WHAT IS THE PLACE MADE FOR QUEBEC DIVERSITY 
IN THE DEBATE OVER IDENTITY IN CANADA?
With regard to cultural pluralism, Canada has entrenched offi  cial 
multiculturalism in its Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This 
approach has endured over many years, and in order to trace back 
the debates around which this vision was adopted it is necessary to 
review the impact of former Prime Minister Pierre Elliott  Trudeau, 
acknowledged by many to be the principal architect of this approach 
to diversity in Canada.
Trudeau rejected the nation-state model, although he defended 
Canadian sovereignty against any U.S. encroachments, valuing the 
foundations of the modern state as based on universalizing and 
individualist liberalism. He thus contrasted the “sociological nation,” 
which he associated with reactionary and emotive politics, to the 
“juridical nation,” which he linked with universalism and reason. 
For Trudeau national identity was an outdated form of loyalty, 
driven by narrow interests and impeding the progress of civilization. 
Quebec’s neonationalism was thus deemed to constitute a threat to 
progressive politics, being, in his view, certain to lead to a cycle of 
never-ending confl icts that would hinder reconciliation and unity. 
For Trudeau a federal state was most conducive to the development 
of the juridical nation and the exercise of reason in politics (see 
Karmis 2004). These pillars of Trudeau’s thought culminated, in 
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the end, in the formal construction of a pan-Canadian nationalism 
based on multiculturalism, institutional bilingualism at the federal 
level, and, above all, the primacy of individual rights and freedoms. 
Although culture is recognized, through the formal entrenchment 
of multiculturalism, as fundamental to each individual’s autonomy 
and equality, and constitutive of his or her rights and freedoms, the 
vision sought by Trudeau and his colleagues did not encourage any 
particular collective status based on historical, cultural, or territorial 
claims as defi ning political markers of att achment to Canada.
Constitutional developments, up to and including the Clarity Act 
of June 2000, show how this vision of Canada has endured. Since 
1982 this vision has left  a mark on Canada’s self-understanding 
which makes it extremely diffi  cult to allow for other “formal” 
approaches to the management of diversity, particularly with regard 
to some form of constitutional formula that might disaggregate the 
countervailing ten-dencies of acknowledging sociocultural diversity 
simultaneously with national diversity. Also, the Canadian approach 
to the management of diversity, although pluralist and postnational 
in rhetoric, paradoxically undermines the substantive aspirations of 
distinct societal cultures by interpreting (in our view, misinterpreting) 
the meaning of “equal status” to link it with homogeneous and 
universal legal provisions.
Through the central institution of citizenship Canada has carved 
out the national boundaries of the country from coast to coast, based 
on a rights regime that has not undergone the process of acceptance 
and consensus that even a proceduralist such as Habermas deems 
necessary for any legitimate political community. This situation has 
contributed to undermining the context of choice for Aboriginal 
nations and Quebecers within current federal arrangements. In 
other words, federalism as a political tool for the management of 
diversity in a multinational democracy must, we would argue, 
account for qualitative diff erences in citizenship, leading to an 
asymmetrical federalism as an acknowledgment that constituted 
political communities that assent to the federation may vary in the 
nature of their relationship with the central state or to the wider 
political community.
Diversity, however, can mean many things to many interpreters. 
The fundamental question when it comes to the management of 
diversity in Canada is not “What is Canada’s position on pluralism?” 
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Rather, a commitment to diversity that accounts for its multilayered 
character would lead to something like the question “How does 
Canada accommodate demands by distinct national groupings 
that constitute the country to determine the boundaries of diversity 
within their respective polities?” In other words, the use of the 
institution of citizenship by the central state would not be aimed at 
creating pan-Canadian sentiments of belonging among citizens - in 
a universal sense.  Rather, it would exhibit a stronger commitment 
and eff ort to manage the challenges associated with diverse modes 
of membership to the polity, in eff ect acknowledging its limits as 
an arbiter of citizenship status formally, through constitutional 
adjustments, and not by way of ad hoc arrangements.  This implies 
an asymmetrical federal confi guration that would account for the 
complexity of the notion of equality in a multinational context as 
a basis for citizenship. Short of such measures, diversity in the 
Canadian context, defi ned by multiculturalism in a bilingual 
framework, the formal equality of the provinces, and the Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, is not postnational, but it fi lls in a national 
void in the “pre-political” sociocultural sense of the term.
A genuine commitment to postnational identity in Canada, which 
as a multinational state might seem a likely candidate, would lead to 
resistance to the top-down nation-building temptations of traditional 
nation states and allow for diverse political communities to work 
out the delicate balance between collective goods and individual 
rights themselves. In most liberal-democratic nation states, where 
citizenship has been traditionally congruent with the boundaries of 
national belonging, states have accepted pluralism as a sociological 
reality and have adapted by thinning out the requirements of 
membership. (This is an empirical development whose roots cannot 
be explored at length here.) In Canada, however, the institution of 
citizenship itself has recently been employed with the aim of making 
a single nation, a process whose peak in industrializing Europe 
was reached by states even before the development of Marshallian 
political, civil and social rights, when a vertical relationship between 
citizen and state was the norm and states simply set out to assimilate 
diverse identities into an elite-driven conception of nationality. 
This legacy does not bode well for a politics committ ed to diversity, 
regardless of what the rhetoric of multiculturalism and federalism 
suggest.
104 Alain-G. Gagnon and Raff aele Iacovino
A POSTNATIONAL NATIONALISM IN QUEBEC?: NEW 
AVENUES TO EXPLORE
The parameters of national identity in Quebec must be assessed in 
the context of its minority status within Canada. As noted above, 
Quebec’s status as a “nation” is not recognized formally in the 
Canadian Constitution. Quebec is considered to be a province, 
equal in status to the others, and individuals in Quebec are to enjoy 
fundamental rights and freedoms with those enjoyed by all other 
Canadians. Debates in Quebec concerning the defi ning characteristics 
of national identity have thus taken place in a sett ing in which it has 
to compete with a larger political community that delivers formal 
citizenship. National identity in Quebec faces the added burden of 
accounting for institutional and symbolic barriers that are externally 
imposed.
Moreover, the very legitimacy of the claim that Quebec is a “nation” 
is questioned by a signifi cant proportion of its population, due to 
the ambiguous nature of belonging in a hybrid political community. 
Debates surrounding the sociocultural versus “civic” or liberal 
character of national identity are easily dismissed by some, due to 
the fact that the national movement itself is articulated mostly from 
within one sociocultural grouping, the Francophone Quebecers. 
Quebec’s national project is at times dismissed as reactionary, 
retrograde, and “ethnic.” For example, Christian Joppke and Ewa 
Morawska (2003, 9), discussing the tendency of contemporary 
liberal states to converge in their discourse about, and treatment of, 
the integration of immigrants, assume that Quebec is paying “lip 
service” to cultural pluralism while its nation-building eff orts are 
necessarily monocultural:
Consider the case of Quebec, the secessionist French-speaking 
province of Canada, which shows that in a world of liberal 
states even an extreme nation-building project must bow to the 
dominant rhetoric of cultural pluralism. Because of its nation-
building (and thus monocultural) ambition, Quebec has always 
rejected the offi  cial multiculturalism practiced since the early 
1970s by the Canadian government.
Historically, nations and states have been coterminous, so it has 
been assumed that the larger “state” must be a refl ection of some 
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“nation” that fi nds its clearest expression at the level of the central 
government, which in the fi nal analysis represents the institution that 
determines citizenship laws. Kenneth McRoberts (2003, iv) reminds 
us of this essential distinction between nation-states and “internal 
nations”: “With the nation of the nation state, the citizenship laws of 
the state provide clear answers as to who is a member of the nation 
and who is not. The internal nation may not have a central institution 
to perform this task.”
Others view Quebec’s eff orts at defi ning the contours of citizenship 
as but another refl ection of att empts to broaden the discourse’s 
normative impact given the widespread growth of identity claims 
and not as a competing centre for determining the very boundaries 
of citizenship. From this perspective Quebec’s demands are 
interpreted as merely another set of claims on citizenship, similar 
to those of social movements more generally. The key assumption 
here is that the “challenge” posed by Quebec nationalism rests 
among other developments that “unsett le” nation-state citizenship, 
leaving litt le room for the conclusion that Quebec itself is involved 
in its very own debates about how to craft  “nation-state” contours 
of membership. For example, in pointing out new developments in 
citizenship studies in Canada, Daiva Stasiulis (2002, 367) implicitly 
subsumes Quebec’s societal project under the broad heading of an 
emerging “multiplicity of citizenships” in referring to “the creativity 
and culture-sett ing agendas of contemporary social movements 
(Aboriginal, Québécois, diasporic, queer, children).”
The very discourse of managing diversity in Canada through the 
institution of citizenship, from a Quebec nationalist perspective, 
is persistently coloured by the fact that the central institution 
of citizenship remains the preserve of the Canadian political 
community, and that Quebec identity is but an object to be managed 
in the larger canvas of diversity. This is the backdrop against which 
debates about managing diversity within Quebec, and reconciling it 
with Quebecers’ conception of themselves as forming a nation, take 
place. Those debating the contours of Quebec’s national identity, in 
contrast, seek to defi ne the political subject in the specifi c context of 
Quebec’s political community. It is to this debate that we shall turn 
our att ention.
As is common for most claims about nations, absolute consensus 
with regard to the substance of shared identity in Quebec does not 
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exist. The main problem with regard to the boundaries of Quebec’s 
national identity relates to justifi cation of the idea that it has or can 
achieve nation-state status, or, more broadly stated, achieve some 
arrangement that recognizes a claim to Quebec sovereignty. The 
paradox is that the more “civic” or liberal the movement becomes, 
and the more it moves away from its “thick” sociocultural roots 
towards the trend of postnationalism, the more its justifi cations for 
sovereign status appear to be weakened (see Beauchemin 2002). On 
the other hand, several authors have argued that it is precisely the 
move towards a sociopolitical conception of the nation, demarcated by 
the territory of Quebec, that demonstrates the political community’s 
commitment to liberal democracy and its credentials as a societal 
culture without “internal restrictions.” (Nonetheless, Kymlicka 
(1995), for example, has a concern for liberalism that has led him to 
discount any societal culture that places illiberal internal restrictions 
on its citizens as illegitimate, and for him the Quebec model is very 
much in line with most liberal democracies in its commitment to 
liberal citizenship. Joseph Carens (2000, 107–39) agrees with this 
conclusion.
In the period since the “Quiet Revolution” of the 1960s 
interpretations and debates around Quebec’s national identity 
have essentially developed in line with those of most societies 
in a period of late modernity. As shown in the excellent overview 
off ered by Maclure (2004), during the era of Quebec state-building 
that coincided with the “Quiet Revolution,” and was marked by 
an economic and cultural awakening of Francophone Quebecers, 
ideas and debates about Quebec’s self-interpretation ranged from 
“melancholic nationalism” to anti-nationalist discourses, and each 
had its implications for political sovereignty. More recently, however, 
the foundations of collective consciousness have come to be debated 
in terms of their reconciliation with an increasingly pluralistic society. 
It is these latt er debates that are addressed here. The main concern 
has been with the burgeoning plurality of constituted identities and 
their impact on the project for political sovereignty. Indeed, national 
identity as the basis for political sovereignty and autonomy in 
Quebec was based on an ethnic conception of the nation in the years 
before the “Quiet Revolution,” based on a particularistic defi nition 
of belonging that was incompatible with openness to cultural 
pluralism. Since that era, however, the defi ning features of the 
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Quebec nation have evolved to incoprorate more civic and secular 
bases of what it means to be a Quebecker. Nationalism in Quebec 
has thus faced the task of being reconceptualized to accommodate 
the multiplicity of collective projects that compete, if indirectly, 
with particular conceptions of belonging based on the sociocultural 
nation. This is a familiar debate that in many respects has prompted 
scholars to point to the phenomenon of postnationalism as a marker 
of late modernity. In Quebec, however, the debate is rendered more 
complex because of the project for political sovereignty.
Some authors contend that there is an urgent need to move beyond 
sociocultural representations of the nation that requires openness to 
liberal and pluralist conceptions of collective consciousness. One such 
author, the political philosopher Michel Seymour (1999), att empting 
to move the debate past its “civic versus ethnic” paradigm, proposes 
a sociopolitical conception of the national that demarcates it from 
absolute universal markers, while maintaining a commitment to 
late modern developments in Quebec society, accepting that no 
national imaginary can be legitimate if it excludes any portion of 
the population. For Seymour a nation that is purely civic can only 
be a nation that is already recognized as sovereign. The identity 
aspects of the national movement, while not necessarily resting on 
objective sociocultural markers, are, however, conceptualized as a 
project in the context of the quest to achieve sovereign status. This 
is the key marker, and debates cannot simply rest on an ethnic/civic 
continuum. If the nation is identifi ed as ethnic, then it excludes a good 
portion of society from membership, delegitimizing the movement 
altogether. If it is conceived as a civic collectivity, then what is the 
fundamental justifi cation for distinct sovereign status? It is a key 
component of Seymour’s argument that forming a distinct political 
community that is shared with minority groups does not rule out the 
cultural, moral, and historical foundations of the majority linguistic 
grouping, yet at the same time it recognizes, through open political 
and social processes, the contributions of minority groups to shaping 
and reshaping, over time, the identity narratives of the project in 
progress.
Although reconciling the national with the postnational 
foundations of any society is a diffi  cult theoretical task, the balance 
lies in recognizing that the sociopolitical aspects of the nationalist 
movement in Quebec must be interpreted in the context of its 
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predicament as a societal culture that remains a work “in progress,” 
and whose defi ning characteristics cannot be separated from its 
condition as minority nation that is free to achieve the status of a 
nation state. Debates about the postnationalist character of Quebec 
nationalism cannot fundamentally be grasped without reference to 
this paradox of self-interpretation.
The question of “belonging” in most liberal-democratic nation 
states is addressed through the central institution of citizenship. 
Debates surrounding the postnational markers of identity in such 
states, in an era of social pluralism and cultural diversity, do not 
have to contend with national diversity. Too conveniently perhaps, 
that they seek to accommodate diversity by stripping citizenship 
of its particular “national” bases and defi ne it along with universal 
entitlements that transcend national identity. In the Quebec case, by 
contrast, the nationalist movement itself, as a process of defi nition 
and redefi nition, rests upon interpretations of belonging that 
att empt to delineate it from a plurality of collective identities that 
are defi ned by a central institution of citizenship whose boundaries 
are set by the central Canadian state. In this sense managing internal 
diversity in Quebec can only be reconciled with the project for 
sovereign status if it assumes that the Quebec political community 
constitutes a “centre for convergence.” Any conceptualization of a 
national model in Quebec cannot accept the universal premises of 
postnationalism, whether this takes the form of individual rights 
based on “personhood” or a cultural pluralist model that does not 
recognize the primacy of any majority sociocultural markers of 
identity, such as Canadian multiculturalism, without conceding 
that its project is no diff erent from that of any grouping that seeks 
diff erentiated recognition from the larger institution of citizenship.
The offi  cial position in Quebec with regard to markers of 
belonging to the political community has been given form in two key 
government documents on the topic of Quebec citizenship (Conseil 
des relations interculturelles 1997 and Ministère des Relations avec 
les citoyens et de l’Immigration 2000). Without delving too deeply 
into the details of such policies, it suffi  ces to say that Quebec’s 
position on the construction of citizenship and, broadly speaking, 
on the contours of membership, diff erentiates itself from Canada’s 
approach to diversity by stressing a “common public culture” and 
a pole for cultural convergence that is absent from offi  cial Canadian 
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multiculturalism. There is an emphasis on language, which is 
viewed as a bearer of culture but also as a common good that must 
be viewed as a rallying point for all residents of Quebec, delimiting 
the public space for democratic participation and debate. However, 
according to Danielle Juteau (2002, 441), the very adoption of the 
language of citizenship signifi es a shift  from a pluralist conception 
of the community to a conception of belonging that merges with 
nationality:
In spite of a shift  from a cultural to a territorially based 
defi nition of the community, I argue that the citizenship 
presently developed is anchored in a homogenized notion 
of cultural belonging, as the Quebec state is att empting to 
defi ne a “universal” national identity that would subordinate 
all others. The national model of citizenship is preferred 
over the postnational, the republican over the pluralist, the 
undiff erentiated over the diff erentiated, at least when it comes 
to cultural identity.
Juteau contends that, while Quebec fl irted with a more unmitigated 
commitment to cultural pluralism in the early 1990s, the discourse 
under the Parti Québécois government that was in power from 
1994 to 2003 was centred on citizenship, representing a shift  to a 
more homogenous conception of the nation, which is contrary to 
international trends that are pushing liberal-democratic nation 
states towards multicultural rights and diff erentiated postnational 
identities.
Dimitrios Karmis (2004) adds to our understanding of identity in 
Quebec in the contemporary period, noting that there is a persistent 
strain within the “civic” strand of national identity that alternates 
between Jacobin-style republicanism and integrationist nationalism. 
For Karmis the notion that the construction of the nation in Quebec is 
based on ethnic defi nitions, along the lines of Trudeau’s depiction of 
“old” Quebec, is a debate that has seen its last days. At present, in his 
view, the real tension lies within the “civic” camp. The past fi ft een 
years have seen alternating conceptions that lie somewhere in the 
middle between integrationism and republicanism. For integrative 
nationalists Jacobinism represents a defensive approach to identity. 
In its place Francophone Quebec is interpreted as a strong linguistic 
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and cultural space, open to pluralist liberal-democratic citizenship 
as a shared good across the political community, which is open to the 
contribution of all cultures. Moreover, this model recognizes certain 
collective rights of national minorities, notably the Anglophone 
community and the Aboriginal peoples. The French language 
is valued as a bearer of a cultural heritage, but also for its public 
function of facilitating solidarity and deliberation, and as a point 
of convergence for various ethnocultural communities. The offi  cial 
model of “interculturalism” emerged in the 1990s along these lines, 
as a model resting on the interchange of cultures rather than one 
based on their pillarization.
We concur with Juteau and Karmis that recent turns have moved 
the model closer to republicanism, particularly in the consultation 
document presented by the Parti Québécois government at the 
Forum national sur la citoyenneté et l’intégration (Ministère des 
Relations avec les citoyens et de l’Immigration 2000). This approach 
places relatively more emphasis on unity, consensus, and cohesion 
in its treatment of pluralism. We also contend that this distinction is 
of minimal consequence and represents a minor shift  in emphasis 
as opposed to a wholesale redefi nition of belonging, as Juteau 
suggests. As highlighted above, Quebec nationalism’s construction 
of boundaries must always account for a centre of convergence due 
to its status as a movement, in the process of defi nition within a 
larger citizenship regime.
One can argue that the move towards more republican conceptions 
of the Quebec model has been overstated. Quebec’s att empt to 
balance unity and diversity nevertheless maintains a commitment 
to cultural pluralism within limits, and it cannot be lumped in 
with French or even American republicanism. In any case, both 
integrationist nationalism and more republican conceptions cannot, 
by their very logic of constituting a counter-movement, adopt 
unmitigated postnational markers of belonging. In the end Quebec 
does not simply face the question of diversity but must also address 
this question while justifying its very existence as a nation in a 
larger sociopolitical sett ing that does not formally recognize this 
fact. Postnational belonging comes aft er national belonging is taken 
for granted, and Quebec cannot simply skip this step. Quebec has 
demonstrated its commitment to the values of democracy, liberal 
justice, and cultural and national pluralism. It has abandoned 
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exclusive ethnic markers of belonging both in offi  cial national 
models and intellectual discourses. It cannot, however, undermine 
its claims by promoting the end of the nation form in the structuring 
of political sovereignty. That trend is reserved for nation states whose 
existence is not in question.
CONCLUSION
Diverse identities are indeed characteristic of modern liberal 
societies, and this has forced social scientists and political theorists 
to reconceptualize the institution of citizenship. However, reducing 
the Quebec national question to one among many other identities 
that make claims on the institution represents a political strategy by 
the Canadian state that does litt le to off er promise for the future. 
Canada must be postnational, in our view, not by way of universal 
and homogenous rights but by acknowledging the existence of 
several citizenship centres that are national in form to the extent 
that they are given the capacity to determine citizenship laws 
usually associated with central nation states. For us, Canada as a 
multinational federation is a worthwhile political project.
Quebec remains mired in debates about the character of its national 
sentiments. The proposal to off er a radically postnational basis of 
belonging is not a workable option. Given its present situation, 
even in the face of glaring obstacles, Quebec has demonstrated its 
commitment to cultural pluralism in a liberal-democratic sett ing. 
Short of a multinational federation, the ambiguous nature of belonging 
and self-understanding in Quebec, and the constant confusion with 
regard to its place in Canada, will persist, to the detriment of Quebec 
citizens vis-à-vis those of other political communities. In the end, 
even in a postnational age it is the nation form that lends legitimacy 
to liberal citizenship. Short of this equation, citizenship comes to be 
impoverished. It is through the recognition of a “nation” that social 
cohesion can be furthered, accountability can be strengthened, and 
the empowerment of citizens can be achieved.
The trend of postnationalism does not signal the end of sentiments 
of att achment to political communities on a more substantive level. 
There remains an element of national identifi cation in legitimate 
liberal-democratic conceptions of citizenship. The top-down 
“forging” of homogeneity through disassociated rights, however, 
can no longer take hold in a vacuum, as national minorities in the 
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contemporary period simply will not allow this to take place. The 
process of generating a satisfactory model that accommodates 
diversity in a multinational democracy can only achieve the stature 
of a “procedural” basis of belonging or patriotism if the process itself 
has been adhered to by all parties. Moreover, the fi nal constitutional 
“product” that defi nes the basic laws of the country, maps the 
confi guration of political relations, acknowledges and recognizes 
national groupings, reforms the system of representation in order 
to accommodate asymmetrical relationships to the central state, 
and enshrines the right to self-defi nition for its constituent political 
communities will begin to achieve justice and stability that at once 
untangles the many complexities of diversity and provides the bases 
for unity.
The sociocultural foundations of this or that nation competing 
within a single territory is an old debate. The Quebec project is about 
allowing all cultures to participate in its construction for future 
generations. The culture is not a fi xture; it is in construction. The 
distinction in Quebec is that there is a strong will that this common 
public culture, its development, should not be hindered by the 
arbiters of central citizenship who give citizens of Quebec a “way 
out” of the project to strengthen pluralism and democracy in order 
to advance their own political agenda. Such an escape would be a 
shortcut, favouring ungenerous relations with Aboriginals, Anglo-
Quebecers, and members of diverse recent immigrant communities 
that have made Quebec what it is today, a diverse nation committ ed 
to liberal democracy.
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CHAPTER 5
CITY STATES AND CITYSCAPES IN CANADA: 
THE POLITICS AND CULTURE 
OF CANADIAN URBAN DIVERSITY
Caroline Andrew
This chapter develops an argument based on the link between 
Canada’s growing urban diversity and the movement for increased 
municipal autonomy on the part of the largest Canadian cities. 
Urban politics and urban culture are intimately connected, and, 
along with the obvious and visible economic dimension to the 
call for increased autonomy for Canada’s largest cities, there is a 
relationship between the urban distinctiveness forged through 
diversity, the potential impact of a developing urban citizenship, 
the dynamics of globalization, along with the resulting politics of 
rescaling, and the calls for greater power for Canadian governments 
within the federal system. Postnationalist politics in Canada will 
see a greater role for cities and one of the driving forces for change 
is the argument that only a greater role for cities can ensure the 
successful management of diversity. Without this argument the call 
for a bett er allocation of fi scal resources could probably be relatively 
easily contained within conventional Canadian intergovernmental 
relations, but the combination of growing urban distinctiveness and 
lack of resources could fuel a more powerful political movement. It 
remains to be seen whether this greater role for cities will be given 
formal political recognition, but even without formal recognition the 
Canadian political landscape could be transformed. In order to make 
this argument, three points need to be developed: the urbanness 
of diversity in Canada; the Canadian record in the management 
of diversity; and the drive for greater municipal autonomy for the 
largest cities, fuelled by the recognition of diff erence, and by the 
development of an urban citizenship and a sense of urban identity.
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In arguing about the increasing diversity of the Canadian 
population it is important to recognize both that, at 18.4 percent 
as of 2001, the proportion of foreign-born individuals within the 
population of Canada is second only to Australia, at 22 percent, and 
that Canada’s diversity seems to be concentrated in the largest cities. 
Toronto’s population was 44 percent foreign-born in 2001, while 
Sydney’s was 31 percent foreign-born (Justus 2004, 43). In 2001, 13.4 
percent of the Canadian population were members of one or other 
visible minority, up from 4.7 percent twenty years earlier (CRIC 
2004a, 2). The central point to be made here is how concentrated the 
immigrant population is and, particularly, the most recently arrived: 
almost 75 percent of those arriving between 1991 and 2001 sett led in 
Toronto, Vancouver, or Montreal (Justus 2004, 43). It is also important 
to recognize that the concentration of immigrant locational choice is 
similar to the trends of the overall patt ern of urban growth in Canada. 
Indeed, Canada overall is marked by decline in the population of 
many areas outside the largest cities and increasing concentration of 
employment within the larger cities (see Bourne 2004).
The other signifi cant change, and a relatively recent phenomenon 
in Canada, is the non-white character of immigration. With the 
obvious exception of the Aboriginal peoples, Canada is a country 
of immigrants, but what is new is the fact that immigration is now 
mainly non-white and from the economic South, creating what 
Canada offi  cially calls “visible minorities.” During the period 1991–
96, for example, the fi ve leading countries of origin of immigrants to 
Toronto and to Vancouver were all countries with mainly non-white 
populations, while among the fi ve leading countries of origin of 
immigrants to Montreal only two (France and Romania, in third and 
fi ft h place respectively) had mainly white populations. The highly 
metropolitan nature of recent immigration and the clearly visible 
nature of this immigration are recreating the largest Canadian cities 
both as increasingly diverse and as increasingly diff erent from the 
rest of the Canada. The category of the largest cities here includes 
Ott awa–Gatineau, not only because of my own local chauvinism, 
but because Ott awa is diversifying very rapidly and is now third 
aft er Toronto and Vancouver in terms of very recent immigration. 
However, whether the category of “largest cities” includes three cities 
or four, the conclusion is similar: these are cities marked by rapidly 
growing distinctiveness. It is perhaps important to add that there 
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have been numerous government programmes, both federal and 
provincial, aimed at regionalizing immigration and/or encouraging 
sett lement in smaller communities, but overall these programmes 
have been relatively unsuccessful (see Frideres 2006).
Having established the urbanness of diversity, it is important 
to refl ect on how one evaluates the Canadian experience in the 
management of diversity. Indeed, before directly looking at the 
Canadian experience, some discussion of vocabulary is necessary. 
“Management of diversity” is an awkward term at best. I use it here 
in the context of a governance perspective, defi ning “governance” as 
those mechanisms of coordination that exist or develop in situations 
where power, resources, and information are widely distributed (see 
Paquet 1999). This approach does not imply that all social, economic, 
and political actors have equal amounts of power, resources, and/
or information, since that is a question to be empirically verifi ed 
in particular contexts. Results can vary across time, across sectors, 
across societies, and across organizations within the same society. 
Governance certainly does imply that the state is not the only actor 
and indeed that the state cannot unilaterally impose its strategies, 
but it does not imply that the state is without power, resources, 
or information. Again, empirical research on specifi c cases can 
determine what is, or was, the role and infl uence of the various state 
bodies.
Nevertheless, “management of diversity” does convey the sense 
both of conscious strategies of social control and also of a technical 
or administrative “problem” to be “solved” by organizing the 
diverse. However, no other term seems appropriate. “Celebration of 
diversity,” for example, certainly suggests that this is not a problem, 
but an asset of considerable value, yet “celebration” is simply not 
an adequate description of the overall ways in which societies act 
and react in relation to social diversity. “Cultural competence” can 
be a desirable att ribute of individuals and of organizations, but it 
loses its focus if it is applied to large and internally heterogeneous 
entities, such as communities or societies. Policy defi nitions by 
content area, such as “immigrant sett lement,” “multiculturalism” 
or “anti-racism,” are simply too narrow and too state-centred to 
be useful defi nitions for what I want to examine here. This leaves 
“management of diversity,” which I hope will be understood in the 
sense of all the mechanisms of coordination involving state, market, 
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and civil-society actors in Canada as they act and react in relation to 
the two characteristics just described: the increasingly metropolitan 
nature of recent immigration and the non-white nature of this recent 
immigration.
Have immigrants to Canada been able to integrate into Canadian 
society? What are the conditions of social inclusion and social 
exclusion, of racism and discrimination, of polarization of incomes, 
of the concentration of residential locations? In part the answers 
to these questions depend on the criteria for judgement. Is the 
comparison to be between Canada and other countries, between 
Canada twenty years ago and Canada now, between conditions of 
genuine social equality and existing conditions, or between att itudes 
and behaviour?
The recent management of diversity in Canada is marked by the 
much older experience of the cohabitation of Francophones and 
Anglophones as the defi ning relationship in diff erence. Not enough 
work has been done to elaborate how the cohabitation of Anglophones 
and Francophones has shaped the way in which diff erence is seen 
by members of both communities, but, despite needing a great deal 
more refl ection, it is very clear that this is a fundamental element in 
the way Canadians think, and act, on diversity. It has meant that the 
Canadian political experiment has had the recognition of diff erence 
as a major defi ning characteristic, which, certainly over the last 
hundred years, has overall been viewed as something to be built 
upon, not eliminated.
The relationship of the Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal populations 
could, and should, also be a fundamental defi ning relationship 
of diff erence, but this has not been true for the non-Aboriginal 
population over most of the twentieth century. This relationship was 
more important in the earlier period of contact and it is becoming 
more important again at the present time. This is particularly true for 
the western provinces and for the larger cities in the West (see Jantzen 
2004 and Eisler 2006). Saskatoon, Regina, and Winnipeg have the 
highest proportions of their populations reporting either Aboriginal 
identity or origin(s) and, perhaps most signifi cant politically, it is in 
Regina that, in addition to having an important Aboriginal-identity 
population, there is the greatest diff erence in median age between 
the youthful Aboriginal-identity population and the total population 
(Jantzen 2004, 84). Even more generally, across Canada the urban 
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Aboriginal population is growing (see Peters 2002) and therefore the 
question of how to defi ne this relationship of diff erence is emerging, 
albeit slowly.
The third defi ning relationship of the recognition of diff erence 
in Canadian society has been the societal experience of managing 
relations between women and men. This is clearly a huge area of 
research (see, among others, Trofi menkoff  and Prentice 1977, and 
Cook, McLean, and O’Rourke 2001) and not something that can 
be discussed at length in this chapter. However, it is important to 
note certain characteristics of this experience. Canada, for example, 
has been one of the leading countries in recognizing the issue of 
violence against women, relatively poor in securing equal pay for 
work of equal value, and depressingly inadequate in addressing the 
intersections of gender, Aboriginality, ethnocultural diversity, and 
class. As I have argued elsewhere (Andrew 2004b, 105), in Canada 
women became citizens as mothers, as part of the vision of maternal 
feminism that their participation in public life was needed because 
they represented diff erent values from men, values of caring, 
nurturing, and concern for the social conditions of poor women and 
poor children. Canadian society continues to favour interventions 
that see women as diff erent and in greater need of protection because 
of a vulnerability that relates to their maternal role.
There is a growing polarization of incomes in Canada, and recent 
immigrants are not integrating as rapidly as earlier generations of 
immigrants in terms of employment and income (see Preston and 
Wong 2002, and Heisz and McLeod 2004). In addition, there have been 
many recent studies showing an increasing spatial concentration of 
poverty in Canadian cities, and a link between poverty and ethnicity 
(see Andrew 2003a). Other studies, including Abu-Laban (2000–01) 
and Smith (2003), underscore the limits to equality, the racism and 
discrimination that were part of the creation of Canada as a white 
sett ler colony and that continue to exist in Canada today.
Leonie Sandercock has analyzed the ways in which the fear of 
diff erence has built a culture of fear in large cities, including those in 
Canada. She writes (Sandercock 2003, 108),
It is important to look harder at the nature of fear in 
contemporary cities in order to arrive at more eff ective and 
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less discriminatory policies for managing our coexistence 
in the shared spaces of streets and neighbourhoods, spaces 
that are increasingly characterized by a social heterogeneity. 
The costs of fear [of outsiders] in a democracy are several 
and serious. They may include the suspension of civil rights 
because people fear terrorists; the building of literal as well 
as metaphorical walls around “our” spaces to keep out those 
who are “not like us,” thus exacerbating social polarization; 
and a dramatic decline in the quality of the urban public realm 
as people retreat to their privatized and fortifi ed spaces. Fears 
have consequences.
As she describes, in the post-9/11 world there is an even greater need 
to break down the culture of fear: “One of the tasks of planners and 
urban intellectuals is to describe these discourses, and to provide 
counterdiscourses” (Sandercock 2003, 124). We have to recognize 
not only that Canada is not immune to worldwide trends but also 
that we have our own indigenous experiences of inequality and 
discrimination.
Both the Ethnic Diversity Survey (Derouin 2004) and work by 
the Centre for Research and Information on Canada (CRIC 2003) 
have provided information about public att itudes to diversity, 
discrimination, and racism. Among visible minority respondents 
to the Ethnic Diversity Survey, 36 percent reported experiences of 
discrimination within the past fi ve years, with somewhat higher levels 
for blacks (50 percent) and those of Japanese origin (43 percent) and 
somewhat lower levels for those of South Asian origin (33 percent) 
and Chinese origin (33 percent). The fi gures were somewhat lower 
for those living in Montreal, compared to residents of Toronto and 
Vancouver (Derouin 2004, 61–62). The CRIC’s study of att itudes to 
multiculturalism and diversity concluded that multiculturalism 
had become a source of pride for the majority of Canadians but that 
diff erences of opinion remained about the extent to which Canada 
was an inclusive society. For example, when asked whether they 
agreed or disagreed with the statement that some people have a 
harder time due to prejudice relating to their ethnic background, 32 
percent of all respondents agreed, but for those identifying as visible 
minorities the proportion was 42 percent.
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When these results are broken down by ethnic origin and 
gender, 38 percent of women, 38 percent of visible-minority men, 
and 48 percent of visible-minority women said they felt that some 
people have a harder time due to prejudice relating to their ethnic 
background. There are indications that this gender gap relates 
to diff erent understandings of social justice issues in general, as 
questions about gender fairness in hiring decisions in the workplace 
also reveal important gender diff erences (CRIC 2003, 9). It could 
be inferred from these results that women are more conscious of 
structural inequality, whether it is based on ethnic origin, or gender, 
or both. This is an important fi nding for the management of diversity, 
and something to come back to in the discussion of urban public 
services and urban citizenship.
More recently Soroka, Johnston, and Banting (2005, 14) have looked 
at social cohesion and diversity in Canada. Their fi ndings highlight 
the complexities of Canadian society. They examine two defi nitions of 
social cohesion, one based on a common identity and shared values, 
the other on dimensions of engagement in the social and political life 
of the country. On the fi rst defi nition the results are defi nitely mixed: 
it is primarily “Quebec Francophones and Aboriginal peoples who 
remain ambivalent about the country, for reasons deeply embedded 
in Canadian history,” but when it comes to a sense of belonging, 
“they are joined by racially distinct newcomers, who are also less 
sure of their place here.” The second defi nition gives rise to a more 
optimistic view: “Our measures of engagement in the social and 
political life of the country fi nd virtually no signifi cant diff erences 
across social communities.” This fi nding is highly relevant to my 
argument here, as it is in the largest cities that the engagement of 
visible minorities and recently arrived immigrants take place. It is 
therefore in these urban sett ings that the conditions for inclusion are 
the most crucial.
There are indications from survey research that Canadians, 
while favourable to immigration, oft en hold views that imply 
that immigrants should assimilate into Canadian society and that 
immigrants, rather than Canadian society, should change. One 
indication of this is that many people feel that no special services or 
adaptations of existing services are necessary (see Abu-Ayyash and 
Brochu 2006).
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However, alongside these ambiguous views about the value 
of immigration is also the reality that ethnocultural diversity has 
changed the lives of Canadians, particularly Canadians living in 
the largest cities. In this way the integration of “new Canadians” 
has not been entirely one-sided, although clearly Canadian society 
has required and wanted new Canadians to change more than it 
has changed. At the same time not only Canada but also individual 
Canadians, particularly urban Canadians, have changed because of 
recent immigration. Certainly, at a very general level there is very 
wide acceptance across Canada of the value of multiculturalism. 
Within the large cities there has certainly been an impact of what 
can be considered the “easy” parts or the “thin” aspects of tolerance, 
the impact on food and on celebration. The choice of restaurants in 
the large cities of Canada has been enormously diversifi ed over the 
past twenty years, and globalization and diversity have transformed 
the variety of foods easily available in large Canadian cities. The 
greater choice of restaurants is clearly linked to immigration, in 
that it represents employment niches for immigrants from countries 
whose cuisines are internationally valued or can be internationally 
marketed. Vietnamese restaurants, now widely available across 
urban Canada, are one such example; so too are Ethiopian 
restaurants. Urban Canadians now have the chance to become more 
sophisticated in their understanding of the varieties of cuisines from 
India and China, and this too is a result of recent immigrants entering 
the Canadian labour market via the restaurant industry.
Another food-linked story relates to collective kitchens in the 
Lower Town neighbourhood in the centre of Ott awa. A traditionally 
poor and Francophone neighbourhood, the Lower Town is now 
also an immigrant-receiving neighbourhood. One collective kitchen 
has among its participants a single poor Francophone man and a 
Lebanese immigrant woman. When they exchanged recipes for 
traditional dishes the Lebanese woman was delighted to learn recipes 
for her son’s school lunches, as he wanted to eat “Canadian,” while 
the Francophone man felt that his life had been expanded by access 
to Lebanese food, and, through it, to a new culture and enhanced 
international experience. For him this clearly raised his status and 
decreased his marginalization in mainstream Canadian society, in 
that being “global” is part of the accepted norm. We do not know 
enough about the impact of these forms of diversity on people’s sense 
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of identity in urban Canada. Clearly this is an easier acceptance of 
diversity than other dimensions, but it is not irrelevant. It does imply 
an opening to diff erence, a willingness to try new things and to 
expand one’s horizons, associated with tolerance and the acceptance 
of diversity.
Celebrations can also be seen as relatively easy ways to participate 
in diversity, but here again there is an impact. The analysis of 
ethnocultural festivals by Paul Bramadat (2004, 91) makes this 
point nicely. By providing a context in which people can challenge 
stereotypes, engage in dialogical identity formation, reappropriate 
popular culture for their own use, and explore foreign yet nearby 
culture and physical terrains, these events continue to serve a useful 
role in the Canadian urban conversation. From municipal celebrations 
of diversity, focusing oft en on the food and drink characteristic of the 
diff erent ethnocultural communities, to the ways in which important 
holidays or festivals are being recognized by, and incorporated into, 
Canadian society, the link between participation and social inclusion 
needs to be bett er understood. The offi  cial calendar in Canada is still 
marked by Christianity—Christmas and Easter vacations are marked 
as public holidays—but there is a growing recognition of Yom Kippur, 
Ramadan, Diwali, Hanukkah, Chinese New Year, and Passover as 
markers of the year. What is most signifi cant about this recognition 
is that the idea of participation in these festivities by those of other 
origins is fully accepted and that they are simply being added to the 
Canadian civic culture. Chinese New Year and Diwali are the two 
that have been most integrated into general celebrations, perhaps 
because they are the most secular of the important holidays.
One story, which may or may not be more generally indicative, 
concerns a class in a primary school in Toronto. All the parents of 
the children in the class received an e-mail in the fall from a group 
of Chinese-Canadian parents, saying that they had hired a person 
to teach the dragon dance to their children in preparation for the 
Chinese New Year celebrations and that these classes would be open 
to all the children in the class. The vast majority of the children, 
all origins combined, participated in the classes and joined in the 
dragon dance, apparently without feeling that this was not a normal 
and natural part of life in Toronto. This kind of successful experience 
of inclusion is also part of the management of diversity.
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These celebrations move us from areas of “easy tolerance” to more 
diffi  cult questions, for example that of religion, which is much more 
sensitive and less easily discussed in Canada. A recent example that 
illustrates the complexity of the questions raised by religious issues 
was the controversy over Sharia law in Ontario. This issue emerged 
in Ontario when, following the election of the Liberal government 
in 2003, the government commissioned a report on the use of 
religious arbitration in questions of family law. Religious arbitration 
had become possible in Ontario aft er an earlier amendment to the 
Arbitration Act and was being practised by the Jewish community. 
Increasing Moslem immigration to Ontario led to the possibility of 
Sharia law becoming practice in Ontario. A huge political controversy 
followed the publication of the report and this led to the premier of 
Ontario stating that Sharia law would not be allowed in Ontario. 
Following this declaration legislation amending the Arbitration Act 
was adopted, stating that Ontario family law governs all families 
in Ontario. At the present time the Ontario Women’s Directorate 
is working with a coalition of groups headed up by the YWCA to 
develop public education for vulnerable women on their rights in 
cases of family law dispute. Without discussing the details of the 
issue, one can say that it raised huge debates involving, among other 
issues, the impact of fundamentalism on gender equality, feelings for 
and against Islam, the role of religious institutions in the resolution 
of family disputes, and public policy in relation to questions of 
religion. While religious pluralism is largely recognized in Canada, 
since 9/11 there have also reportedly been more incidents of racial 
and religious intolerance, particularly towards Moslems but also 
towards Jews. The urban context for these issues is crucial, both 
because of the juxtaposition of diff erent populations and because of 
the way in which some of the important institutions of urban life 
have integrated pluralism.
The services provided by child care centres off er a particularly 
interesting perspective on these issues, not because of their explicit 
goals of working towards the integration of diversity, but because 
the nature of their work means that fi guring out ways to have an 
extremely varied group of small children and staff  coexisting 
harmoniously is a practical necessity. As their workers tend to 
be more diverse than in more formal educational institutions, 
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because employment in them requires less formal education and is 
lower paid, and as the children are highly diverse because people 
with fewer family ties in their place of residence tend to use such 
services—in addition, of course, to family units whose workforce 
participation refl ects a wide range of economic opportunity, from 
single parents to fully professionalized couples—day care facilities 
in large cities tend to take all possible opportunities to celebrate the 
variety of religions and beliefs of the families of their children. Such 
practices highlight the importance of exploring less formalized, more 
innovative models of service delivery, sensitive to diversity. Indeed, 
examining the spaces of living and the provision of urban services 
in terms of the intersections of ethnocultural diversity, gender, class, 
and disability (see Andrew 2003d and 2005) is one way of identifying 
the creation of the “domain of human freedom” celebrated by Warren 
Magnusson (2000, 103).
Various att empts have been made in the largest Canadian cities to 
integrate this understanding of the intersections of diversity into the 
planning process and service delivery models. As Frances Frisken 
and Marcia Wallace (2003, 175) report, “Municipal governments 
and their agencies do have options when it comes to deciding how 
to address the challenges of ethnoracial diversity within their own 
communities, even within a national sett ing that makes them clearly 
subordinate to the provinces.” The fi rst two issues of Our Diverse 
Cities, published by the Metropolis project (Andrew 2004a and 
Frideres 2006) give numerous examples of municipalities taking 
diff erent policy initiatives in regard to the growing diversity of 
their populations. Research is beginning to emerge that identifi es 
the conditions explaining the variability of the policy response (see 
Good 2004). In turn, the ways in which municipalities address these 
challenges infl uence the ways in which the diversity expresses itself 
and, therefore, the relations between diversity and social inclusion.
In arguing that there is a possibility of local initiatives at the 
municipal level, Marcia Wallace and Frances Frisken (2003, 150–51) 
describe the day-to-day elements of successful municipal action: 
overcoming barriers to communication, developing a multicultural 
workforce, securing support from the elected members of the 
council, securing leadership, and, fi nally, building partnership with 
community-based organizations. The importance of community 
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involvement in municipal innovation has been documented not only 
in Canada (see Sandercock 2003, and Klodawsky and Andrew 2006) 
but in a variety of other sett ings, including early twentieth-century 
Germany (see Zimmerman 2003). The proximity of municipal 
institutions to rapidly changing conditions of urban reality is crucial 
to the potential for inclusionary services. As Sandercock (2003, 154–
55) writes eloquently,
There are also beacons of innovation. The City of Vancouver for 
instance, has developed a series of policy responses to its diverse 
population, including the hiring of multicultural planners 
within the City Planning Department and the establishment of 
a multicultural outreach programme. Vancouver funds several 
remarkable local institutions: the Roundtable Community 
Centre, the Collingwood Neighbourhood House, and the Litt le 
Mountain Neighbourhood House. If you visit any of these 
centres, you will witness an incredible diversity of people 
joining together in everyday activities related to family and 
childcare services, sports and recreational programmes, and 
cultural and arts programmes.
The links between the conditions of diversity and the policies and 
services that form parts of the management of diversity create the 
basis for expressions of urban citizenship. James Holston (2001, 326) 
argues that one can think of urban citizenship when three conditions 
exist: “when the city is the primary political community, when urban 
residence is the criterion of membership and the basis of political 
mobilization, and when rights claims addressing urban experience 
and related civic performances are the substance of citizenship.” 
These conditions apply to certain parts of the urban population 
in Canada, notably in the largest cities, where there is a strong 
identifi cation with the city, where political mobilization is in terms 
of the rights of certain groups to maintain or enhance their access to 
the urban spaces of freedom, and where good-quality urban public 
services and inclusive public space are important areas of political 
debate and organization. The earlier examples of local initiatives for 
diversity-sensitive and inclusionary policies make clear that there 
are links between the degree and forms of diversity, the politics of 
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city regions in Canada, and the development of urban citizenship. 
Sandercock (2003, 157) underlines the importance of new defi nitions 
of citizenship, both urban and multicultural, that are more responsive 
to newcomers’ claims on rights to the city, and more encouraging of 
their political participation at the local level. Articulating a vision 
of urban citizenship is, in itself, a step towards a more inclusionary 
city.
How is this linked to the movement for greater urban autonomy? 
At one level it is clear that economic and fi scal considerations are 
fundamental to the push by the big cities for greater recognition of 
their crucial role in Canada’s economic and social development, and 
of their need for greater autonomous revenue sources, as well as for 
a place in intergovernmental discussions. However, at the same time 
it is also necessary that there be a popular base of support for the 
push for greater autonomy, and this is linked to the sense of urban 
citizenship.
A popular base of support is necessary to convince provincial and 
federal governments of the need to change the intergovernmental 
system. Certainly, the loss of power by Canadian municipal 
governments over the course of the twentieth century was coupled 
to relatively low levels of public support for local initiative (see 
Andrew 2003b). However, recent events have changed some of the 
fundamental elements of municipal–provincial relationships and 
triggered pressures towards demands for increased autonomy for 
the cities. Signifi cant moments of rupture can be detected in which 
city governments and urban populations gain a clear perception that 
their interests are not the same as provincial interests, and that the 
provincial government does not understand the city and therefore 
will not, or cannot, act in ways that are useful to the city’s interests. 
These feelings can be temporary, even momentary, but they may also 
signal the beginning of a fundamental shift  in Canadian politics, 
encompassing an emphasis on citizen participation in planning and 
in decision-making, on democratic government at the local level, 
and on governance involving the direct participation of civil society 
in decision-making in the city.
In Toronto, for example, a moment of rupture came in 1995 with 
the victory of the Conservative Party, under Mike Harris, in elections 
to the Legislative Assembly of Ontario, on a clearly anti-Toronto 
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and anti-diversity platform. In April 1997, Harris’s government 
adopted legislation for the amalgamation of Toronto with fi ve 
neighbouring boroughs, despite negative results in referendums on 
this issue in all the municipalities and accompanying mobilization 
against the amalgamation. Paradoxically, however, the province’s 
creation of a single municipal government covering the former 
territory of metropolitan Toronto as of January 1, 1998, has created a 
government with even greater political weight in negotiations with 
the provincial government. The creation of the new city fuelled the 
Charter movement in Toronto, whose proponents argue that the city 
needs substantially greater powers in a wide variety of areas, such as 
health, social services, immigration, culture, training, and economic 
development, and it has also led to the creation of the Toronto City 
Summit Alliance by business interests, following the Toronto Summit 
in 2002, an alliance concerned to create a broad consensus platform, 
including important issues related to immigrant sett lement as well 
as those relating to the cultural vitality of Toronto.
Indeed, the Toronto experience has been very much that of 
governance, of linking the city government to the major groups 
both of the market and of civil society. That this drive for greater 
autonomy has a popular base is illustrated by a survey conducted in 
2003 (see table 5.1).
Table 5.1: Revenues of diff erent levels of government: Opinion 
survey results for three Canadian cities, 2003 (%)
Toronto Montreal Vancouver
Municipal government has too 
litt le revenue
62 51 40
Provincial government has too 
litt le revenue
46 46 49
Federal government has too litt le 
revenue
24 16 27
Source: CRIC 2004b, 13.
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In Montreal, too, there has been a moment of rupture, also around 
issues of municipal amalgamation. The moment of rupture is more 
complex as it relates both to the provincial decision to amalgamate 
Montreal with neighbouring municipalities, and then to the victory 
of the Liberal Party in 2003 on a “demerger platform,” followed 
by the indecision of the provincial government on the conditions 
of demerger. The issue became even more complicated because 
of the division between linguistic groups: in mid-October 2003 a 
survey indicated that 61 percent of Anglophones felt that demerger 
would have a positive eff ect on the economy, compared to only 30 
percent of Francophones (see Andrew 2003c). Montreal had suff ered 
a period of economic stagnation from the 1970s to the 1990s and, 
because of the resulting concern about economic vulnerability, there 
was a variety of reactions to the threat of demerger, including moves 
to decentralize responsibilities to the arrondissements (the boroughs 
or wards within the city), in the hopes of preventing demerger, as 
well as the convening of the Montreal Summit, and the creation of 
a Montreal Charter of Rights and Responsibilities, to reinforce local 
participative democratic government. Now that demerger has been 
successful in most of the western parts of Montreal, it is not clear 
what will emerge as the policy of the new City of Montreal, or in 
relation to the distribution of power between the City of Montreal, 
the newly formed Agglomeration Council (which brings together 
the demerged cities with the City of Montreal) the Montreal 
Metropolitan Community (the city region), and the arrondissements 
with their directly elected mayors. In this context state-centered 
urban management policies will likely dominate. The impact of this 
trend on public support for greater municipal anatomy is unclear at 
the present time.
There are, however, increasing signs of a recognition that 
municipal governments in the large urban centres are, and should 
be, playing important roles in response to major policy challenges, 
but are neither adequately equipped nor suitably situated in the 
Canadian political system to adequately fulfi ll these roles. As Neil 
Bradford (2005, 14) writes,
The contributions of capacious and creative municipal 
governments are potentially many in local governance: 
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convening the partners and coordinating their eff orts; 
tapping local knowledge to help ensure the balance between 
the targeted and aspatial policies of the diff erent levels of 
government; monitoring and reporting on changing social-
economic indicators in local places; planning the physical 
layout of cities, and the scope and location of services in socially 
sustainable ways; providing access points for citizen impact 
and reaching out to marginalized or subculture groups; and 
developing accountability frameworks responsive to unique 
local conditions.
In underlining the gap between the municipal potential and the 
existing Canadian situation, Bradford continues:
To make any or all of these contributions, however, local 
authorities require appropriate recognition and institutional 
capacity. At present, in Canada, municipalities are on the 
front lines in responding to national problems, but still on the 
sidelines when it comes to intergovernmental policy debates 
and fi scal negotiations. This disjuncture is not helping to 
reposition Canadian urban centres as global leaders in place 
quality.
As there have been other shift s in intergovernmental relations in 
Canada, why should we see the current shift s as transformative? 
They may indeed be temporary shift s, and the call for greater power 
and autonomy for the largest Canadian cities may disappear. Yet 
this seems unlikely. The success of this movement depends on the 
existence within the urban centres of Canada of broad-based feelings 
of urban belonging and clear expressions of urban citizenship. It is 
in the large cities that the intersections of diversity work themselves 
out in order to claim greater resources for the improvement of 
services and for the creation of public spaces of debate around issues 
of equitable access to urban space. The management of diversity 
in the Canadian context is both a major concern of the municipal 
governments in the largest urban regions and something that is being 
realized at the municipal level, particularly with the recent eff orts by 
the largest cities to enhance citizens’ participation and democratic 
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governance. For these reasons postnationalist politics in Canada will 
be, to an important degree, the politics of large municipalities, of 
urban citizenship, and of feelings of belonging that develop through 
the experiences of managing diversity.
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IDENTITY, LANGUAGE, AND PROTEST 
IN IRELAND, SCOTLAND, AND WALES
Niamh Hourigan
European national broadcasters have historically operated in political 
and cultural contexts where constructions of national identity and 
the related symbolic signifi cance of national languages are heavily 
embedded in the structure and output of national services, such as 
the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in the United Kingdom 
or Radio Telefís Éireann (RTÉ) in the Republic of Ireland. Successful 
campaigns for indigenous minority-language television services 
have involved forcing or persuading national governments to 
recognize that national broadcasting institutions are not meeting 
the cultural or linguistic needs of ethno-linguistic minority language 
groups, such as speakers of Irish, Welsh, or Scots Gaelic. However, 
once this gap in existing services has been publicly acknowledged, 
the process of developing new television services that cater to the 
needs of minority-language speakers begins.
The process of policy negotiation that underpins the establishment 
of a minority-language television service involves combining the 
expertise of broadcasting professionals from national and regional 
networks, politicians, civil servants, and language activists. While 
minority-language activists oft en publicly dominate the latt er stages 
of television campaigns, they are very rarely in control of the process 
of policy negotiation that occurs aft er the offi  cial decision to establish 
the service has been taken. In many cases the structure and output 
of the minority-language television service that emerges out of this 
process of deliberation is very diff erent from the television channel 
originally envisioned by language campaigners.
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In Canada and Australia the need to cater to diverse language 
communities has also posed many challenges for language activists 
and broadcasting policy-makers. The Australian public-service 
broadcaster, the Australian Broadcasting Commission, has created 
a binary model. Its main service, known simply as ABC, serves 
the “national” community and its output is shaped by prevailing 
defi nitions of national identity. According to Gay Hawkins (1999, 
177),
In the history of ABC, duty to the Australian people or the 
nation has been a central component of the institution’s 
political rationality. This assumption of the people as a given, 
continuous and fi xed in time, has been invoked not only to 
justify and explain the necessity and object of the broadcasting 
service (the people are the immanent subjects of national 
broadcasting policy), but also as a central rhetorical strategy in 
various narratives of nation emanating from ABC.
ABC’s sister service, the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS), is a 
channel dedicated to all other diverse linguistic and cultural groups 
in Australia, including Aboriginal and migrant minority-language 
communities, and thus represents a national alternative broadcasting 
space. SBS also, as Gay Hawkins comments, broadcasts
shows that are experimental, intellectual and esoteric, that have 
restricted appeal—that in television terms, constitute diversity 
and quality. In this way, SBS speaks not just to those named as 
“other” but also to those desiring bett er or intelligent TV, to 
those who could be identifi ed as a taste community rather than 
a community of diff erence.
The att empt by SBS to blend its responses to the needs of diverse 
groups has generated some controversy, with representatives 
of minority-language groups arguing that minority-language 
programming is losing out to programming with a cosmopolitan 
orientation.
The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) has adopted an 
approach similar to that of European broadcasters by establishing 
specifi c services dedicated to individual language groups, such as 
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Radio-Canada Télévision for Francophones (although this has been 
less successful than the private French-language alternative TVA), 
as well as supporting community broadcasting initiatives, resulting 
in the establishment of new local services such as the Aboriginal 
Peoples Television Network (APTN). Partly because Canada is 
offi  cially bilingual (English and French), rather than multilingual, 
indigenous and immigrant communities have had to fi ght much 
harder to establish minority-language television services oriented 
towards their needs.
Despite a range of policy initiatives to protect linguistic diversity 
in both countries, however, each of these solutions to the demand 
for minority-language television has generated controversial policy 
confl icts at regional and national level. A number of contributors to 
this volume have explored the more abstract questions relating to 
contemporary cultural diversity. This chapter focuses principally 
on the applied cultural confl icts that can arise from the challenges 
of reconciling the needs of indigenous ethnolinguistic communities 
within Britain and Ireland with the dominant English-language 
culture. The emergence of campaigns for television in the Welsh, Scots 
Gaelic, and Irish languages is examined in detail here, in the light of 
continuing att empts to challenge prevailing defi nitions of national 
identity in these countries. The broadcasting services resulting 
from these campaigns are reviewed in order to ascertain how they 
correspond to the original demands of activists. The construction of 
identity within the output of the resulting television services, S4C, 
TG4, and CCG, is then scrutinized in order to discover how these 
cultural initiatives have aff ected discourses of collective identity 
within each indigenous minority-language community. Finally, 
att empts to acknowledge indigenous linguistic diversity in Britain 
and Ireland are contrasted with broadcasting initiatives in Canada 
and Australia that aim to highlight the commonality of experience 
between indigenous and immigrant linguistic minorities.
IDENTITY AND MINORITY-LANGUAGE TELEVISION 
IN IRELAND, SCOTLAND, AND WALES
The concept of identity has become a central theme in analysis of 
confl ict and change in advanced industrial societies. Stuart Hall 
(1990) has argued that identity should be viewed not as a fi xed state 
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but as a process of becoming: “Perhaps instead of viewing identity 
as an already accomplished fact, with the new cultural practices 
it represents, we should instead think of identity as production 
which is never complete, always in process and always constituted 
within, not outside, representations.” National identities represent 
a specifi c form of collective identity. Anthony Smith (1991) argues 
that any att empt to forge a national identity is a political act with 
political consequences. The construction of national identities in 
Europe has oft en historically involved the elevation of one language, 
one religion, and one set of traditions. By elevating one culture 
and language, national elites frequently neglected or stigmatized 
minority languages and cultures. This stigmatization operated as an 
eff ective instrument of oppression. Donatella Della Porta and Mario 
Diani (1999) comment:
The ability to impose negative and stigmatised defi nitions of the 
identity of other groups constitutes, eff ectively, a fundamental 
mechanism of social domination. If a group is perceived by the 
rest of society to be the bearer of values and experiences which, 
if not deviant, are certainly backward, dysfunctional, and 
potentially harmful to the common good, and if its members 
are not able to spread alternative representations successfully, 
then members’ capacity for collective action will be extremely 
limited.
Identity questions are linked to language concerns at a number of 
levels. Language can create a key boundary between communities 
within a nation state. European national governments have 
traditionally sought to extinguish any such boundaries within their 
own borders. Minority and regional language groups have oft en 
been ignored or oppressed because they represent a challenge to 
the notion that a single national language represents the linguistic 
reality of the population and thus provides a coherent basis for a 
unifying national identity.
In successive editions of his book Imagined Communities Benedict 
Anderson (1991) has developed the link between language and 
national identity to include an analysis of how media, and newspapers 
in particular, have contributed to the “vernacularization of national 
languages.” In tracing the construction of imagined communities, 
Anderson comments,
Ireland, Scotland, and Wales 141
Print capitalism created languages of power of a kind diff erent 
from the older administrative vernaculars. Certain dialects 
were closer to each print language and dominated their fi nal 
forms. Their disadvantaged cousins, still as assimilable to the 
emerging print-language, lost caste, above all because they 
were unsuccessful (or only relatively successful) in insisting on 
their own print-form.
The elevation of these single national languages was intensifi ed by 
the arrival of the new media of radio and television. The American 
media theorist Monroe Price (1995) comments, “If print made people 
aware, however dimly, that there were millions of others sharing the 
same experience and reading the same material, television had an 
intensifi ed impact.” For most of the twentieth century, television 
in Europe was controlled by national broadcasters appointed by 
national governments that were quite open about their aspirations to 
support national identities. According to David Cardiff  and Paddy 
Scannell (1987), the BBC, for instance, was directed to “forge a link 
between the disparate listeners and the symbolic heartland of national 
life.” This complex relationship between national broadcasters 
and governments had two major eff ects on indigenous minority-
language communities. First, these communities and their cultures 
were marginalized, ignored, or, worse, stigmatized within the output 
of national broadcasting services. In this way national broadcasting 
services became part of the eff ective “tools of domination” used 
against minority groups within nation states. Second, the creation 
of associated national broadcasting elites had an adverse eff ect on 
political leaders and elites within indigenous minority-language 
communities, who were oft en among the dissidents ritually screened 
out by national broadcasting professionals.
Demand for television broadcasting services in indigenous 
minority languages did not become prevalent in Europe until the 
1970s. While concern about the absence of minority languages 
from radio was voiced during the 1920s and 1930s, the advent 
of television eff ectively increased the invisibility of indigenous 
minority languages on the broadcasting spectrum. A number of 
national European broadcasting services made token gestures to 
the broadcasting needs of these communities by providing short 
programmes, usually at weekends, generally focusing on religious 
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issues or traditional customs. However, minority-language activists 
gradually began to perceive the broadcast media as both a huge 
potential threat and an important tool. The use of pirate radio by 
protest groups in the 1960s, particularly the student movement 
in the United States and Europe, highlighted the liberating and 
empowering qualities inherent in radio and television. Ironically, 
the recession of the 1970s improved the relative economic position 
of European indigenous linguistic minorities, as it hit many urban, 
traditionally industrialized areas while the rural areas, where many 
indigenous minority-language communities were concentrated, 
were left  relatively untouched. The narrowing of the economic gap 
gave these language movements more confi dence in asserting their 
demands for broadcast media within European nation states.
The late 1960s and 1970s proved to be a time of turbulence for 
the larger minority-language groups, such as the Welsh language 
community. During the late 1980s and the early 1990s smaller 
language groups, such as Scots Gaelic speakers, became increasingly 
radical in campaigning for a television service. A number of external 
factors contributed to the growing success of campaigns during this 
period. The growth in satellite communications technology and the 
increasing popularity of the community broadcasting movement 
meant that national broadcasting institutions had themselves 
become subject to increasing fragmentation and regionalization. The 
lack of central cohesion in a number of nation states and the presence 
of the European Union (EU), which actively supported regionalism, 
allowed indigenous European linguistic minorities to assert their 
demands more confi dently.
There are a number of signifi cant reasons that prompt language 
groups to campaign for television services. Ned Thomas (1971) has 
argued that, unlike a stable rural community, the modern language 
community is so diverse that it requires broadcast media in order to 
remain cogent and cohesive. Television can also provide a language 
community with an open channel for discussion, allowing confl icts 
to be resolved and a sense of identity as an “imagined community” 
to be forged. W. R. Howell (1992) has focused on the element of 
prestige that media can confer on minority languages. This is 
particularly important in the linguistic development of children, 
as they tend to att ach a high degree of credibility and legitimacy to 
what is broadcast on television. Television services oft en generate an 
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associated young elite who by their presence increase the likelihood 
of the language being perceived as fashionable. Commenting on the 
Welsh experience, John Davies (1994) states,
Never before had there been a numerous group of people, fairly 
young, employed in a well-paid, glamorous profession and 
working through the medium of Welsh. The Cuppies (Welsh-
speaking Yuppies) came into existence almost exclusively 
because of media expansion and their lifestyle was the subject 
of envy.
In a review of minority-language media in western Europe, Mike 
Cormack (1998) highlighted a number of historical and structural 
factors that have had a direct infl uence on the success of these 
campaigns. The demand for television services appears to be 
particularly eff ective when the community involved constitutes an 
ethnic as well as a linguistic minority within the state. The political 
status of the linguistic group within the broader nation state is also 
a key factor. During their media campaigns neither the Welsh nor 
Scots Gaelic groups could appeal to a devolved regional political 
administration for support. Activists were regarded as indigenous 
minority-language speakers within a broader nation state, the 
United Kingdom, although they obviously constituted a much 
larger group, in relative terms, in the stateless nations of Scotland 
and Wales. In contrast, the Irish language is designated as the 
fi rst national language of the state in the Irish Constitution, so the 
government was offi  cially dedicated to the protection and support 
of the language during the course of the campaign. However, as only 
a small minority of Irish citizens use the language on a daily basis, 
Irish speakers do not enjoy many of the privileges usually associated 
with national languages.
Finally, the symbolic status of the language can aff ect the success 
of these campaigns. Languages such as Welsh and Irish have been 
directly linked to political nationalism, whereas the relationship 
between the Scots Gaelic language and Scott ish nationalism is more 
problematic. Scotland’s second minority language, Lowland Scots, 
has closer links to the Scott ish nationalist movement. One Scott ish 
television executive, Rhoda MacDonald (1993, 13), has stated 
that “you couldn’t possibly support Plaid Cymru [the principal 
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nationalist political party] in Wales and not speak Welsh. We all 
know the political connections with the language in Ireland. Gaelic 
is not like that. The Scott ish nationalists don’t insist that Gaelic is 
their everyday language.”
In reviewing the Welsh, Irish, and Scots Gaelic campaigns for 
minority-language television it is essential to examine the operation 
and outcome of each protest movement, as well as the broader 
engagement of activists with the processes of identity at a regional 
and national level. These campaigns represented a targeted challenge 
to the policies of national governments around the management of 
diversity within the broadcast media. Each campaign had a profound 
impact on the cultural policies of the British and Irish governments 
in relation to the management of the needs of culturally and 
linguistically distinct groups.
CAMPAIGNS FOR TELEVISION SERVICES IN WALES, 
SCOTLAND, AND IRELAND
Welsh is by far the most strongly placed of the Celtic languages, as 
there are approximately 500,000 speakers of the language within the 
borders of Wales. Welsh speakers were among the fi rst European 
linguistic minorities to become aware of the potential eff ects of 
broadcast media on their language. As early as 1927 the Welsh 
Board of Education stated that “we regard the present policy of the 
British Broadcasting Corporation as the most serious menace to the 
life the Welsh language” (quoted in Davies 1994). The roots of the 
campaign for the Welsh-language television service Sianel Pedwar 
Cymru (S4C) can be traced to a lecture given in 1962 by the writer 
Saunders Lewis, who prophesied the demise of the Welsh language. 
This resulted in the formation of the Welsh Language Society, which 
began to campaign for a Welsh-language television service in 1966. 
It was primarily a student movement, but it enjoyed the support 
of many groups within Welsh society, including religious and 
nationalist organizations.
Activists used a variety of confrontational tactics during the 
campaign, such as occupations of television studios and the 
destruction of broadcasting masts. These tactics were characterized 
as “symbolic acts of damage.” There were also violent protests about 
the investiture of the Prince of Wales in 1969. During the early 1970s 
activists began to systematically refuse to pay their television licences, 
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and by 1973 a number of activists had been imprisoned for failing to 
pay the fi nes imposed for refusing to pay their licences. Before the 
general election in 1979 both the Labour and Conservatives parties 
promised that legislation for the establishment of a Welsh-language 
television service would be put before Parliament in the following 
year. However, aft er Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
took offi  ce she reneged on the commitment, prompting the leader of 
Plaid Cymru to threaten to go on hunger strike. The threat proved 
to be the catalyst for a wave of renewed protest throughout Wales. 
Under this pressure the Conservatives capitulated and S4C was 
established in 1982.
Scots Gaelic has never enjoyed the numerical weight in Scotland 
that characterizes the Welsh language in Wales. Speakers of the 
language are found primarily in the peripheral regions of the 
Highlands and Islands. During the late 1970s the activities of the 
Scots Gaelic language movement were rather subdued in comparison 
to the confrontational tactics that characterized language activism in 
Ireland and Wales. However, this changed dramatically in the early 
1980s. J. MacLeod (1993) comments,
A decade ago, weary of unsuccessful pestering for a more 
aggressive approach to arresting the Gaelic decline, there 
came schism. Younger, hard-headed individuals broke away 
to form Commun nan Gaelic (CNAG) under the direction of 
a formidable Lewisman, John Angus MacKay, [and] it began 
campaigning for Gaelic to enjoy the same status wrought for 
Welsh in Wales.
This new organization spearheaded the campaign for the provision 
of Gaelic-language television programmes. With a much smaller 
base of speakers (65,000), the Scots decided not to campaign for 
a separate channel. Activists felt that such a campaign would not 
enjoy popular support. Gaelic-language activists instead proposed 
that a fund be established to fi nance the production of programmes 
in Scots Gaelic to be broadcast on Scotland’s three existing terrestrial 
channels. Scots Gaelic campaigners adopted a conciliatory approach 
to the Conservative government, stressing the economic benefi ts of 
the project for Highland development. An economist was employed 
to quantify these benefi ts and activists also argued that provision 
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of funding might improve the performance of the Conservatives in 
Scotland at the next election. This conciliatory approach won over 
the British Government, which established the Gaelic Television 
Fund (CTG, later renamed CCG) in 1990.
Despite the constitutionally guaranteed position of the Irish 
language in the Republic of Ireland, its speakers remain a minority 
within Irish society, and language policy is rarely defi ned separately 
for English-speaking and Irish-speaking (Gaeltacht) regions. There is 
some dispute about the offi  cial numbers of Irish-language speakers 
in the Republic of Ireland. According to fi gures from the Central 
Statistics Offi  ce, in 2004 1.6 million people, in a population of 4.1 
million, could speak Irish, but only 350,000 used the language on 
a daily basis, while 155,000 used it once a week. Gaeltacht districts 
have been regarded as language centres for learners from the cities 
rather than as districts in need of special cultural safeguards. Irish-
language activists have found themselves in the unusual position 
of being “trapped on a pedestal” within a state that is formally 
committ ed to upholding their linguistic identity but does not, in 
their view, recognize their linguistic distinctiveness and needs in 
practice.
The campaign for Irish-language television lasted for twenty years, 
from 1975 to 1995, and involved a wide variety of groups. There 
were substantial divisions between these movements concerning 
the type of television service being sought. Some activists favoured 
a completely separate minority-language service similar to S4C. 
Gaeltacht activists sought a local-access service for Gaeltacht 
districts. Other groups believed that the task of broadcasting in the 
fi rst national language should remain within the remit of the national 
broadcaster, RTÉ.
The Irish language television campaign was established initially 
by the media committ ee of the state’s pre-eminent Irish-language 
organization, Conradh na Gaeilge. Activists were heavily infl uenced 
by the experiences of Welsh-language media activists and adopted 
their own campaign of studio invasions and licence fee defaults. 
However, in 1986 the Irish government closed the legislative loophole 
that had provided some justifi cation for the licence default campaign 
and the use of this form of protest decreased. In 1987 Gaeltacht 
groups took up the cause of Irish-language television and established 
a pirate television service in Connemara. The success of this “pirate 
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television” tactic prompted Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Charles 
Haughey to allocate 500,000 punt (Irish pounds) to investigating 
the feasibility of creating a new Irish-language television service. 
However, Irish-language activists were quick to indicate that they 
would never accept the model of local-access television being put 
forward by Gaeltacht campaigners. The funds remained unspent for 
the next two years as government offi  cials became aware of the extent 
of the confl ict between Gaeltacht and Irish-language campaigners 
over the television issue.
In 1990 an umbrella organisation, FNT, was established in order 
to unite the two factions of the campaign. It proposed a compromise 
model of Irish-language television combining elements of the 
Gaeltacht access model with dimensions of the nationally oriented 
service favoured by Conradh na Gaeilge. FNT received considerable 
support from the Labour politician Michael D. Higgins, who, in 
1993, became minister for arts, culture and the Gaeltacht. He quickly 
created two committ ees, which included campaign activists, to 
investigate the viability of establishing an Irish-language television 
service. On the basis of the fi ndings of these two committ ees he 
formulated a memorandum, which was approved in 1993. Teilifi s na 
Gaeilge, or TG4 as it subsequently became known, was established 
in 1996.
S4C, CTG, AND TG4: MINORITY-LANGUAGE 
IDENTITIES IN PROCESS
The campaigns for minority-language television services in Ireland, 
Scotland, and Wales can be viewed as among the purest forms of 
cultural politics in relation to debates about the management of 
diversity within European societies. Members of these communities 
sought to create their own electronic spaces where they could control 
defi nitions of reality and shape explorations of cultural identity. 
Having examined the emergence and operation of the Welsh, 
Scots Gaelic, and Irish campaigns, it is necessary to trace how the 
subsequent establishment of minority-language television services 
corresponded to the original demands of campaigners.
Welsh-language activists had been specifi c in demanding a service 
completely separate from the national British channels operated by 
the BBC, Independent Television (ITV), and Channel Four. The new 
Welsh service would be oriented to the needs of the Welsh-speaking 
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population rather than operating as a “shop window” for Welsh 
culture aimed at the greater British population. As a result of this 
mandate S4C was established to operate as a Welsh opt-out from 
Channel Four. As S4C’s main audience is bilingual in English and 
Welsh, it made litt le sense to broadcast dubbed or subtitled versions 
of major U.S. or British productions that could be viewed in English 
on other channels. As François Grin and François Vaillancourt (1999, 
32) comment, this decision “forced S4C to engage early on in the 
commissioning of new programmes, giving it a distinct identity that 
other television services, even in major European languages, do not 
necessarily provide.”
Many activists involved in the campaign for Welsh-language 
television had envisioned the establishment of an independent Welsh 
news service as an essential mechanism whereby the distinctiveness 
of Welsh ethnolinguistic identity could be developed. However, 
when S4C began operating it became clear that this enthusiasm for 
independent news was not shared by S4C’s management. It was 
agreed that BBC Wales would provide the channel’s daily news 
bulletins. During the fi rst year of S4C’s operation a debate raged 
among former campaigners and broadcasting offi  cials about the 
legitimacy of this service. David Bevan (1984) comments,
Among some reviewers, however, considerable reservation has 
been expressed about the eff ectiveness of certain programmes 
as vehicles for the transmission of cultural identity. Much of this 
has focused on the main evening news programme, Newyddion 
Saith, which has come under severe att ack from some Welsh 
speakers. In the review and correspondence columns of the 
Welsh-language press there have been frequent complaints 
about the programme, which was designed to play a pivotal 
role in developing the Welsh identity of S4C. It has provided 
largely a recycling of the main British and international news 
stories carried by the network channels of the BBC on their 
early evening news programmes, which many viewers have 
already seen.
The tension between traditional and modern images of the Welsh-
language community on S4C also caused controversy. During 
the campaign some activists had emphasized the importance of 
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minority-language television as a forum where traditional elements 
of Welsh-language culture, such as music and folklore, could be 
celebrated. However, when S4C was established greater emphasis 
was placed by management on the creation of a modern image of 
the Welsh-speaking community. This att empt to modernize Welsh-
language identity received substantial policy support from Welsh 
cultural agencies. Grin and Vaillancourt (1999, 29‒30) noted that 
television is a tool particularly suited to modernizing a minority 
language culture: “It has powerful symbolic implications, in that 
it contains potential for establishing the legitimacy of a minority 
language in the sphere of modernity—a key strategic area, since the 
revitalisation eff orts are typically bogged down by the association 
between a minority language and the ‘traditional sphere’.”
Audiences within the Welsh-language community did not 
automatically accept this modernized reconfi guration of Welsh 
language identity. Programme-makers at S4C encountered problems 
in gett ing younger and older groups to accept youth-oriented images 
of Welsh-language culture conveyed through soap opera, game 
shows, and young people’s programmes. Commentators identifi ed 
programming for teenage audiences as one of the weakest areas of 
S4C’s output. In a study of young Welsh speakers, H. Gruff udd (1996) 
found that only 10 percent of young people could name a Welsh-
language programme providing rock music, and only 5 percent a 
programme of Welsh light entertainment, and, signifi cantly, some 
respondents derided these programmes as “pale and unconvincing 
imitations of Anglo-American pop.” At the same time older language 
activists insisted that the youthful orientation of S4C resulted in 
extensive lexical borrowings from the English language and a 
dilution of the “purity” of the Welsh language. For instance, the 
current aff airs programme Heno, which used more “street Welsh,” 
was criticized by traditionalists, who condemned S4C for, in their 
view, lowering its language standards.
However, assessments of the achievements of S4C on a broader 
cultural level were more positive. Kevin Williams (1997) comments,
The importance of S4C’s contribution to the cultural 
regeneration of Wales cannot be overestimated. Sitt ing in the 
middle of Wales’s media landscape, it has helped to galvanize 
other areas of Welsh cultural life. It has provided confi dence 
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to Welsh-speaking endeavours, either by television events or 
giving outlets to artists to express themselves. The channel has 
directly and indirectly, through fi nancial and non-fi nancial 
means, enabled the laying down of a platform to support 
cultural production in Wales.
However, as regards identity politics Geoff  Jones (2002) has argued 
that the establishment of S4C has removed much of the energy 
from Welsh nationalism, which has traditionally been embraced 
most enthusiastically by the middle classes. Jones notes that “the 
nationalist movement which developed between the two world wars 
was a petit-bourgeois movement, more concerned with preserving 
and developing Welsh culture, a culture specifi cally defi ned by 
the Welsh language.” He notes that nowadays “fl uent Welsh is a 
passport to the cushy jobs in the media and cultural industries.” 
The creation of these “cushy elites” appears to have diff used the 
intensity of demands for Welsh political independence. In contrast 
to the confrontational dynamic of the television campaign during 
the 1970s, commentators noted the mild and gentle nature of Welsh 
nationalism during the debate about political devolution in 1997. 
Jonathan Freedland, a columnist on the London newspaper The 
Guardian, noted,
There is no Welsh equivalent of the Braveheartism on show 
north of the border, litt le of Scotland’s defi ant urge to cast off  
the yoke of English rule … because they have a national tongue, 
eff ectively lacking in Scotland, people are relaxed about the 
other trappings of nationhood. Mind you, it’s also true that the 
language campaigners have got most of what they want, from 
simultaneous translation in Welsh council chambers to S4C, 
the all-Welsh TV channel. Once a boiling issue, the heat has 
now all but gone.
Thus the establishment of S4C has served to underline the 
distinctiveness of Welsh ethnolinguistic identity within British 
broadcasting culture. Middle-class activists who campaigned for 
the television service have achieved, by and large, the recognition of 
separateness that they desired during the 1970s. Paradoxically, this 
success has diminished the intensity of demands for greater political 
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autonomy among Wales’s middle classes. Following the radical 
revision of the Labour Party’s policies under Neil Kinnock, John 
Smith, and Tony Blair during the 1990s, the working classes in South 
Wales have begun to vote in greater numbers for the nationalist party 
Plaid Cymru. Signifi cantly, this increasing popularity in working-
class areas has prompted the party’s leadership to move away from 
the language issues traditionally associated with its middle-class 
supporters. Indeed, Plaid Cymru began to pull away from language 
issues during the devolution debate in 1997, while, as Geoff  Jones 
(2002) comments,
over the last century the question of the Welsh language has 
been the touchstone of nationalist thinking. But it is clear that 
in the foreseeable future not more than a quarter of Welsh 
people will be fl uent in Welsh. Plaid Cymru acknowledged 
that fact, and the need to widen their appeal in South Wales, 
by changing their name in 1998 to the bilingual form Plaid 
Cymru/The Party of Wales.
However, while the service has not had a galvanizing political impact 
on the Welsh-language community, its managers have developed a 
controversial mission to modernize the image and cultural identity 
of the Welsh-speaking community in Wales.
The Gaelic Television Fund (CTG/CCG) was established to 
fi nance the production of Scots Gaelic television programmes for 
the schedules of Scotland’s three main terrestrial television services. 
Because of this structure CCG programmes were designed to serve 
as a “shop window” for Scots Gaelic culture, aimed at the broader 
Scott ish population as well as Scots Gaelic speakers. In justifying 
this majority-oriented approach to Scots Gaelic broadcasting, Rhoda 
MacDonald (1993) commented,
Yes, it may sound trite, but I want Gaelic to become trendy. I 
want the trendy West Endies in Glasgow to start clamouring 
for a Gaelic playgroup. It’s already happening. I know that 
may be a dangerous path because trends pass, they become 
fads. But there are many people who are now embarrassed that 
they don’t speak Gaelic.
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Making Scots Gaelic fashionable was part of the latent ambition 
among Scots Gaelic speakers to encourage a greater number of Scots 
people to embrace the language as a central tenet of Scott ish national 
identity. Mike Cormack (1994) characterized the mission of the CCG 
thus:
It represents an att empt by a relatively small and cohesive 
group of Gaelic-language activists to do two things: to alter 
the Gaelic community’s self-perception and to alter the broader 
Scott ish public’s view of Gaelic. To put it another way, they 
are att empting to reconstruct the collective identity of the 
Gaelic community and, at the same time, alter the position of 
the language within popular defi nitions of Scott ish identity. 
Indeed, the generally negative reactions to the whole enterprise 
evident in the Scott ish tabloid press are best read as a refusal to 
accept this broader redefi nition of Scott ish identity.
The “shop window” dimension of Scots Gaelic broadcasting had 
a direct impact on the news service. Those CCG-funded news and 
current aff airs programmes that received high audience ratings 
exhibited a tendency to focus on the more positive elements of Gaelic 
culture. Cormack notes,
In the daily Gaelic news programme a reverse of the more usual 
news values appears, with only good news about Gaelic being 
reported. This is not as one-sided as it may seem, since the bad 
news about Gaelic emerges only slowly in long-term trends, 
whereas the good news appears in the form of specifi c events 
and initiatives … To say that there is an unduly optimistic view 
of the language being promulgated in these programmes is not 
to imply that a conspiracy is taking place, since it is simply 
the consequence of the fact that programmes are planned, 
commissioned, made and watched for the most part by people 
who want the language to survive, and are optimistic about 
the chances of this happening. However, this does mean that a 
rather inaccurate view of the current situation is given.
This rose-tinted view in Scots Gaelic news programmes appeared 
to be shaped by a self-conscious need to portray a positive image of 
Scots Gaelic culture to the English-speaking majority.
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CCG programmes mirrored the Welsh strategy in att empting to 
create a more modernized image of Scots Gaelic speakers. The CCG 
committ ee encouraged the inclusion of young people as presenters 
and panellists on entertainment and current aff airs programmes. 
There were also att empts to portray Scots Gaelic as a living language 
in urban sett ings where it was not spoken. The learners’ series 
Speaking Our Language even featured scenes taking place in Glasgow. 
As Cormack (1994, 119) notes, “The series showed rather surreal 
images of Glasgow shop assistants, waiters, estate agents, and 
passers-by all speaking Gaelic as if it was the only language spoken 
in the city.” Critics have argued that the more traditional elements 
of Highland life were in fact systematically screened out of CCG’s 
portrayal of the Scots Gaelic community and some viewers were 
dissatisfi ed with the lack of att ention to the more traditional aspects 
of Scots Gaelic life. As J. McLelland, writing in The Scotsman in 1993, 
lamented, “So much for television’s representation of Gaelic culture 
… What a showcase this is, what a waste of time and money! Where 
are the songs, poetry and stories of Gaeldom?”
Initially, the overall audience response was very positive. In 
1993 the huge audience ratings initially achieved by CCG-funded 
programmes prompted some commentators to argue that the Scots 
Gaelic model represented a more effi  cient mechanism for minority-
language broadcasting than the Welsh model of a separate channel. 
Rhoda MacDonald (1993, 13) claimed that, “S4C, the Welsh language 
channel has very low viewing fi gures compared to us. Its highest-
rated programme has 120,000 viewers. Our Gaelic programmes 
regularly att ract up to half a million viewers in our transmission area 
alone.” However, as audience ratings declined dramatically during 
the late 1990s two problems with the structure of the CCG became 
evident. First, funding administered through the Treasury was 
vulnerable to government budget cuts: programming was reduced 
substantially in 1998 due to fi nancial constraints. Second, because of 
the CCG’s position as a fi nance-provider rather than commissioner, 
members of the committ ee had litt le control over the time slots in 
which programmes were broadcast. Aft er initial enthusiasm the BBC 
and ITV both relegated Scots Gaelic programmes to less prestigious 
late-night and weekend slots. In 2001 the Education, Culture and 
Sport Committ ee of the Scott ish Parliament found that,
154 Niamh Hourigan
viewing fi gures for some of these early programmes were high 
and there was evidence that they were att ractive to non-Gaelic 
speakers. However, the reduction in peak-time transmission, 
particularly on [the ITV channels] STV and Grampian, 
has eroded this positive eff ect. The use of very late-night 
transmission (which was, before the advent of CTG, the norm 
for Gaelic programmes) adds to the ghett oization of Gaelic 
programming.
The ghett oization that Scots Gaelic broadcasters feared and that 
had initially prompted them to seek slots on mainstream channels 
occurred anyway.
The overall impact of CCG-funded programmes in Scotland 
has been less profound than the impact of S4C on Welsh-language 
culture. The structure of the CCG fund, which emphasized the 
spread of Scots Gaelic programmes throughout the schedules of 
mainstream channels, has not created the appropriate conditions for 
a Scots Gaelic electronic discursive space. Att empts to reconfi gure 
the position of Scots Gaelic language in relation to Scott ish national 
identity have been largely resisted, particularly by the working classes 
in the Lowlands of Scotland. This identity project seems to have 
been based on a desire to extend the parameters of the Scots Gaelic 
community and, in doing so, increase the power of Scots Gaelic-
speaking elites. However, the Scots Gaelic language is an unsuitable 
source for this cultural project, as regional and sectarian cleavages 
remain pervasive in shaping collective identities in Scotland.
Despite the failure of the CCG project Scott ish political nationalism 
was on the rise throughout the 1990s, but Scott ish nationalists look to 
Lowland Scots culture rather than Scots Gaelic culture as a source of 
collective identity. Hollywood fi lms such as Braveheart and elements 
of Scotch culture such as the Highland Games or the poems of Robert 
Burns have played a greater role in the Scott ish nationalist revival 
than Scots Gaelic culture. Therefore, while CCG programmes may 
have contributed to a greater awareness of Scott ish identity, the Scots 
Gaelic language has not been recognized as a central tenet within 
this dynamic form of Scott ish nationalism.
Unlike the Welsh or Scots Gaelic communities, the Irish-language 
community does not have a specifi c regional or class base. Irish-
speaking regions are spread throughout Ireland’s western coastal 
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areas, and an increasingly large proportion of the Irish-speaking 
community is based in Ireland’s burgeoning cities and towns. Given 
the widespread comprehension of the Irish language within the Irish 
population, TG4 is the only one of the three services under review here 
that potentially had the capacity to operate as an alternative national 
television service. TG4 management decided to take advantage of 
this opportunity and market the Irish-language television service 
as a national channel using the slogan Súil Eile, meaning “another 
eye” or “another perspective” in English. Management viewed 
Irish-language broadcasting as off ering another perspective on 
national identity, rather than providing a resource for a minority 
language culture. This perspective is at odds with the ideological 
position of Gaeltacht activists involved in the campaign for TG4, 
who characterized their protests as a part of a campaign for minority 
rights.
The aspiration to provide an alternative service to the national 
community was refl ected in the content of TG4’s programme output. 
Commissioners developed programmes focusing on elements 
of Irish social and cultural experience that had not been explored 
by the national broadcaster, RTÉ. For instance, the TG4 soap Ros 
na Rún was the fi rst drama on Irish television to feature an open 
homosexual relationship. Programmes also dealt with “New Age” 
spirituality, vegetarianism, and the dance music scene in Ireland, and 
featured urban themes such as drug use, fashion, and architecture. 
TG4’s management developed a number of highly successful 
music programmes, which combined English-language pop music 
with Irish-language presentation. These programmes could be 
characterized as an extension of the modernization strategy adopted 
by S4C and CCG, but Irish-language broadcasters took this process 
to a more advanced level, att empting to modernize both the image of 
the Irish-language community and the entire sphere of broadcasting 
in Ireland. Cathal Goan, the fi rst director of TG4 and now director 
general of RTÉ, along with Pádraic Ó Ciardha, played an enormous 
role in shaping the structure and output of the new service. He told 
the author in an interview in Dublin (April 22, 2002), “From my 
perspective, how we set about engaging with the particular language 
circumstances and att itudes to language in Ireland would have to be 
secondary to a commitment to a kind of broadcast culture which 
wasn’t absolutely about the language.”
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TG4’s programme content has thus tended to prioritize lifestyle 
issues and alternative cultural perspectives over more conventional 
forms of political and cultural debate. It is possible to argue that the 
programme output of the service has represented the fi rst att empt 
to explore and refl ect the experiences of the “new middle class” 
in Irish society, a group relatively ignored within the output of 
RTÉ. The rise of a new middle class in Europe has been linked to 
changes in the postwar period when young people, assured of the 
satisfaction of material needs, developed non-material needs such as 
self-actualization and participation. This has been coupled with an 
erosion of more conventional values relating to work and career, and 
the decline of the traditional work ethic. Members of the new middle 
class oft en work in the new knowledge-based occupations and have 
less loyalty to traditional middle-class institutions. Lifestyle is oft en a 
means of political and cultural expression for members of this class.
The late 1990s was a remarkably opportune period to embark on 
this cultural project. The renewed prosperity of the Irish economy, 
coupled with religious scandals and immigration from Africa and 
eastern Europe, contributed to the rapid transformation of Irish 
society. The impact of these profound social and cultural changes 
on identity processes in Ireland had not been explored to any great 
extent within the programme content of RTÉ. Programming on 
the national broadcaster during the late 1990s refl ected the ageing 
profi le of its workforce, as well as severe budgetary constraints. 
Indigenously produced programming was remarkable for the 
paucity of ideas and originality in content or structure. The national 
broadcaster relied heavily on material imported from Britain and the 
United States, and home-produced programmes were oft en weak, 
low-budget imitations of Anglo-American programme concepts. 
TG4 broadcasters took advantage of this weakness to challenge 
RTÉ within the national electronic discursive space. They sought to 
provide programming that refl ected newly prevalent dimensions of 
Irish cultural experience. An innovative schedule of original home-
produced programmes was marketed to the majority-language 
audience through a series of poster, television, and radio campaigns 
on English-language media outlets. Yet, to the disappointment 
of many Irish language speakers, TG4’s aspirations to create an 
alternative national service did not extend as far as the news service, 
which, like its CCG and S4C counterparts, became fully integrated 
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into the national broadcaster’s news service. Many campaigners were 
deeply disturbed by this structure, arguing that independence from 
RTÉ was essential to the creation of an Irish-language public sphere. 
However, as management regarded Irish speakers as a national group 
rather than a linguistic minority, the creation of an independent news 
service was not prioritized within TG4’s broadcasting policy.
TG4’s launch in 1996 was successful and the service received high 
audience ratings. However, reception problems and a slump in 
audience fi gures during the fi rst six months of transmission caused 
some critics to predict that the new television service would fail. 
Aft er the fi rst year of broadcasting TG4’s audience had stabilised at 1 
percent of the national audience. It became clear to management that 
the Irish-language service would not be able to sustain its claim to 
government funding if audience ratings did not improve. A number 
of key alterations were made to improve the performance of the 
service: these included the change of name from Teilifís na Gaeilge 
(TnaG) to TG4. This name change identifi ed the service as Ireland’s 
fourth national television channel and forced cable companies to 
place it in a more prominent position among their services. In 2002 
TG4’s audience share stabilized at 4.5 percent, an audience level that 
allowed management to sustain their claim to funding (although it 
has since fallen to around 3 percent).
Cathal Goan, in the interview already cited, described the service 
as the most successful language revitalization initiative undertaken 
since the foundation of the Irish state, and added, “That doesn’t mean 
that it guarantees the Irish language’s future, but it gives it a position 
of acceptance as a modern contemporary tool of communication 
and expression.” However, Gaeltacht campaigners argue that the 
establishment of an alternative national service should not have 
been the priority of TG4’s programme-makers, but, rather, they 
should have focused on providing an accurate refl ection of the daily 
experience of the farmers and fi shermen who inhabit the Gaeltacht 
regions. From the perspective of these campaigners, the aspiration 
of management to provide a national rather than a minority-
oriented service represented a continuing denial at state level of the 
distinctiveness of the Gaeltacht experience. Donnacha Ó Ealaithe, 
one of the Gaeltacht campaigners for the service, commented in 
an interview with the author in Galway (June 12, 1996), “In case of 
misunderstanding, I want to explain to people that, although we are 
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not against RTE 3 [his term for TG4], that is not what we are seeking. 
We want local television for the people of the Gaeltacht, as we got 
Raidio na Gaeltachta.”
It is clear that TG4’s eclectic mix of drama and lifestyle programmes 
does not appeal strongly to the ageing rural population of the 
Gaeltacht. Goan admitt ed when interviewed, “Some people have 
said to me that there have been casualties along the way, that we 
have ruthlessly abandoned tradition in order to pursue a modern 
audience.” However, he argues that this nationally oriented approach 
was necessary in order for the service to create a suffi  cient audience 
to survive and sustain claims to government funds. Goan concluded, 
“This wasn’t a service which would be judged on its own terms, it 
would be judged in a media market mostly by people who were 
not either conversant with what we wanted to do or the language 
in which we wanted to do it.” It appears, therefore, that TG4’s 
management succeeded in creating an alternative national service 
within the Irish mediascape where new voices and alternative views 
are being heard, but that this discursive space does not necessarily 
provide an accurate refl ection of the daily experience of many Irish 
speakers, particularly members of Gaeltacht communities.
AUSTRALIA AND CANADA: CONTRASTING 
FRAMEWORKS
Although there are continuing controversies about the structure 
and output of the three Celtic-language television services, the 
positive outcome of these campaigns indicates the degree to which 
indigenous linguistic minorities were privileged within Ireland, 
Scotland, and Wales, and indeed the EU more generally. In countries 
such as Canada and Australia, broadcasting initiatives that involve 
recognition of linguistic diversity have oft en begun with a focus on the 
needs of immigrant language communities, such as those speaking 
Italian, Greek, Hindi, Punjabi, or Chinese, as part of an embrace of 
multiculturalism. In contrast, within the EU there remains a signifi cant 
diff erence in status between indigenous and immigrant languages. 
The latt er are, for example, explicitly excluded from the European 
Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (1992). Immigrant 
language groups are also prevented from applying for funding 
under the EU’s extensive minority language initiatives, administered 
through the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages and the 
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associated Mercator group of organizations, which focus on the 
media, education, and legislative initiatives. Immigrant language 
policy is generally the preserve of national governments within the 
EU, where the emphasis is generally on assimilation rather than 
minority language rights. Apart from community broadcasting 
initiatives, immigrant television in Europe is dominated by att empts 
to access television services from countries of origin through cable 
or satellite services, with very litt le representation of immigrant 
languages by public-service broadcasters (see Ogan 2001).
As countries of sett lement, Canada and Australia have adopted 
more inclusive approaches to the management of linguistic diversity 
on television, avoiding any general privileging of indigenous over 
immigrant communities. SBS, Australia’s publicly owned “diversity” 
channel, began television broadcasting in 1985 under the slogan 
“Bringing the world back home.” It has statutory obligations to 
address primarily the needs of immigrant communities and also at 
a lesser level, the needs of indigenous Aboriginal language groups. 
It provides an important supplementary service to community 
broadcasting initiatives that off er dedicated minority-language 
services. SBS represents an acknowledgement that there is some 
commonality of experience between immigrant and indigenous 
linguistic minorities, while acknowledging the specifi c challenges 
of providing a service that represents the diverse interests and 
experience of indigenous peoples.
Within the Canadian television industry there have also been 
several initiatives aimed at combining the resources, broadcasting 
expertise, and policy skills of indigenous and immigrant minority-
language broadcasters in order to create a “diversity” sector. In 
2004 an Agreement of Cultural Alliance was formalized between 
OMNI Television, the Rogers Corporation network serving migrant 
communities, and the Aboriginal Peoples Television Network. 
Jean LaRose of APTN noted, “Aboriginal peoples in Canada and 
ethnocultural Canadians have a lot in common and frequently face 
the same barriers in the broadcasting industry,” while Leslie Sole 
of OMNI added that “although markedly diff erent in history, these 
audiences have a real need for positive refl ection, access to television, 
and inclusion into the Canadian media landscape” (see APTN 2004, 2). 
A “Diversity in Broadcasting” website, which features contributions 
from immigrant, indigenous, and French-language services, has also 
been established (at www.cab-acr.ca).
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Given the potential of these projects to provide shared fi nancial 
resources and collective policy expertise, it is signifi cant that 
initiatives focusing on “diversity” broadcasting have not appealed 
to indigenous minority-language groups in Ireland, Scotland, or 
Wales. There is no evidence of any signifi cant political or cultural 
collaboration between immigrant and indigenous language groups 
in these countries, although several policy-makers have argued that 
these communities have much to learn from each other’s experiences. 
The report of the Linguistic Minorities Project (1985, 12) noted a 
research gap which currently remains, observing, “The Project has 
been struck by how litt le contact there still is between researchers 
and practitioners working in bilingual areas and school systems, 
even between England and Wales. Many of the newer minorities in 
England could benefi t from the Welsh experience and expertise.”
A clue to this lack of collaboration lies in the language hierarchies 
of Canadian society, which provide a clear example of why minority-
language projects framed in terms of “diversity” can be problematic. 
While immigrant and Aboriginal languages are central to the 
construction of the “diversity” sector in Canada, it is clear that these 
languages do not enjoy the political, cultural, or economic status of 
French. Although the French-speaking community is technically 
a linguistic minority in Canadian society, French has offi  cial equal 
status with English under the federal policy of bilingualism, which 
has resulted in the establishment of a comprehensive range of services 
and a high level of political recognition and legal protection. Thus, 
the status of offi  cial language clearly generates much more of what 
Pierre Bourdieu describes as “linguistic capital” than for a language 
that is categorized as part of a group of (indigenous or immigrant) 
languages benefi ting from general diversity initiatives. Bourdieu’s 
concept of “linguistic capital” helps to clarify how the social status of 
a language has a direct impact on the livelihoods and opportunities 
available to speakers of the language. As he argues (Bourdieu 1991, 
18–19),
The more linguistic capital speakers possess, the more they 
are able to exploit the system of diff erences to their advantage 
and thereby secure a profi t or distinction … the speaker’s 
assessment of the market conditions and the anticipation of 
the likely reception of his or her language products operate as 
internalized constraints on the very process of production.
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Given the intensity of the protests that characterized the campaigns 
in Ireland and Wales, in particular, it is clear that language activists 
were seeking to improve the cultural, political, and economic 
status of their respective languages as much as possible. Activists 
wished to challenge, expand, and reframe prevailing defi nitions 
of national identity to include them at offi  cial levels, rather than 
accept initiatives framed in terms of a generalized openness towards 
diversity. Therefore, by allying themselves with immigrants, who are 
already marginalized within the EU, indigenous minority-language 
activists in Ireland, Scotland, and Wales would have been risking a 
downgrading of status by creating a binary opposition between those 
framed as part of the “national” and all other diverse groups. Instead 
these communities were seeking to rework the construction of the 
“national” in order to include their linguistic and cultural identities, 
and thus dramatically improve the status of their languages.
CONCLUSION
Activists involved in campaigns for minority-language television 
services in Ireland, Scotland, and Wales regarded the creation of such 
services as mechanisms whereby a number of key processes could be 
achieved. They argued that the political, cultural, and symbolic status 
of their respective minority languages could be improved, and that 
new discursive spaces could be created where the distinctiveness of 
their minority-language identities could be explored. However, an 
examination of the structure and output of these services indicates 
that the outcomes of the campaigns have been much more complex 
than activists originally envisaged.
First, the input of civil servants and broadcasting professionals 
dramatically altered the structure of these services, moving them 
away from the broadcasting models put forward by activists during 
media campaigns. A key lesson emerging from the Celtic-language 
television campaigns is that language activists must remain engaged 
in the process of policy negotiation aft er the initial offi  cial decision 
to establish a service has been taken, in order to ensure that the 
resulting institutional structure refl ects their original demands. For 
instance, the creation of independent news services, which activists 
characterized as a high priority during the campaigns for S4C, CCG, 
and TG4, took second place to the emphasis placed by broadcasting 
professionals on the creation of more modernized images of minority-
language communities.
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Second, diff ering constructions of the relationship between 
minority-language identities and national identities had an 
enormous impact on the structure and output of these services. The 
Welsh-language service S4C was structured very clearly around 
the needs of a group who viewed themselves and were viewed by 
others as a minority-language group within British society. Scots 
Gaelic speakers also viewed themselves as a linguistic minority, 
but the aspiration among activists to extend the boundaries of their 
collective identity in relation to Scott ish national identity led to a 
number of problems regarding the legitimacy and realism of the 
Scots Gaelic language world as constructed within CCG project. The 
Irish language is already claimed as the fi rst national language of 
the Irish state, although it is spoken by a minority of Irish citizens. 
It can be argued that the diffi  culties faced by TG4 management in 
portraying the cultural world of the more disadvantaged sectors 
of the Gaeltacht community also led to problems regarding the 
legitimacy and realism of some programming, although the service 
has proved relatively successful in appealing to parts of the broader 
Irish population.
Analysis of minority-language politics oft en suggests that protest 
groups representing emerging linguistic minorities are hostile to 
national identities and to the national cultural groups that draw 
on these discourses. However, a review of the experiences and 
problems faced by activists and policy-makers engaged in debates 
about minority-language television indicate that this presumption 
cannot be sustained. It is clear that once Welsh speakers felt that 
the cultural boundaries of their language community were being 
respected and acknowledged by the broader national community, 
the intensity of their hostility towards British national identity and 
national institutions diminished. Scots Gaelic broadcasters were 
seeking to reconfi gure their position within defi nitions of Scott ish 
national identity rather than to undermine its status or legitimacy. 
The activities and output of TG4 serve to underline the position of 
Irish as the fi rst national language rather than allow the language to 
be claimed as a cultural badge by any one minority group. Minority-
language activists are thus not necessarily hostile to national 
identities. Rather, they are seeking to renegotiate their own position 
in relation to national identities, in order to explore and highlight the 
signifi cance and distinctiveness of their cultural experiences.
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Finally, the experience of Canadian and Australian minority-
language television projects presents evidence of a contrasting 
approach, where there has been a greater recognition of the 
commonality of experience between immigrant and indigenous 
linguistic minorities. However, the contrast also highlights the 
diff erence in status or “linguistic capital” between language 
communities served by “diversity” initiatives and language 
communities, such as the Francophone community in Canada, 
which seek to obtain greater offi  cial and institutional status for their 
language.
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CHAPTER 7
HOWARD’S WAY OR DEANE’S WAY: 
CULTURE WARS IN CONTEMPORARY 
AUSTRALIA
David Headon
Over the past ten years at least, a period largely defi ned by the prime 
ministership of John Howard, but arguably extending back through 
twenty years of pronounced economic change and social uncertainty, 
Australia has experienced sustained and oft en bitt er debates 
over that most slippery of terms, “national identity.” Sustained 
“culture wars” have been engaged over questions of tolerance 
and inclusiveness, and the management, or mismanagement, of 
the diversity that has developed since the 1960s, associated with 
multiculturalism, the recognition of minorities, and the prospect 
of reconciliation with indigenous peoples. The rhetoric of “values” 
has been central to these confl icts, as politicians have sought an 
essentially moral legitimacy by appealing to anxieties about identity 
in place of older loyalties (McKnight 2005, 136). Such rhetoric is not 
peculiar to Australia, of course. As a response to the “big angst” 
diagnosed by social researchers in the 1990s and the loss of cohesion 
detected by sociologists more recently, such conviction politics has 
been widespread, pitt ing the concept of an embatt led “ordinary,” 
“decent,” or “family-centred” citizenry against a global market, a 
profl igate welfare system, cosmopolitan elites, or special interest 
groups (see, for example, Mackay 1993 or Pusey 2003). In Australia, 
however, this rhetoric has had distinctive registers, refl ecting 
confl icting interpretations of the nation’s history as one source of 
such legitimacy. Both this rhetoric and its context relate directly to 
the themes of this collection. The focus of this chapter is principally 
on the ways in which the management of diversity has, for leaders 
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such as John Howard, been supplanted by the reclaiming of “values” 
in a powerful political discourse.
The period 2003–04 was one of especially intense skirmishing, 
and it saw the combatant sides become even more strident and 
personal in their conduct. I fi rst survey the signifi cant moments and 
characteristics of these clashes, and, second, in order to understand 
these events I cast back to the early 1980s, when a controversial 
Australian history professor, Geoff rey Blainey, injected the issue of 
Asian migration into the debate over the limits within which social 
diversity could be accommodated. I then analyze the early 1990s, 
the seminal years leading up to John Howard’s fi rst election victory, 
in March 1996, when, in a series of cunning public speeches, the 
leader in waiting began to articulate the fundamental diff erence 
in approaches to Australian history and culture between him and 
his arch-rival, the then Labor prime minister Paul Keating. Fourth, 
I discuss Howard’s growing confi dence as, by the end of 2006, he 
had become Australia’s second longest-serving prime minister, in 
the process becoming more intent on pursuing an aggressive and 
internally-divisive social and cultural agenda.
Much of this chapter is concerned with the capture and control 
of this agenda, and with exploring why the rhetoric of “values” has 
become so dominant in Australian politics, forcing aside themes 
of distribution, access, and entitlement. Yet it is, obviously, not 
uncontested ground. I want to indicate something of the admitt edly 
limited expressions of alternative perspectives in recent years. Between 
1996 and 2001 it seemed that the only voice of any consequence 
heard in continuous opposition to Howard’s ascendancy was that 
of the Labor-appointed and popular governor general, the former 
High Court judge Sir William Deane. The sharp contrast between 
Howard’s cultural philosophy and Deane’s provides insight into the 
deterioration in the conduct of Australian cultural debate in recent 
years, while also indicating the terms in which fresh perspectives 
might be presented.
The batt le lines, as a host of historians, journalists, and cultural 
commentators keep insisting, have been clearly drawn. Reminiscent 
of the highly charged era under Prime Minister William (Billy) 
Hughes during the First World War and its aft ermath, Australia 
today is a country divided. Adversarial cultural agendas, none 
of them constructive, are the order of the day. How might this be 
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explained? Something of the fl avour of Australia’s culture wars can 
be gained from John Howard’s closing address to the Liberal Party 
National Convention, held in Adelaide, South Australia, in June 2003. 
Refl ecting with evident satisfaction on his (then) seven and a quarter 
years in offi  ce, he listed as one of several “massive achievements” 
the fact that Australians had changed the way they saw themselves. 
Those seven and a quarter years had been, he said (Howard 2003),
a period that has given our nation a greater degree of self-
confi dence. We have ended that long, seemingly perpetual 
symposium on our self-identity that seemed to occupy the ten 
years between the middle of the 1980s and the defeat of the 
Keating Government in 1996. We no longer navel-gaze about 
what an Australian is. We no longer are mesmerized by the 
self-appointed cultural dieticians who tell us that in some way 
they know bett er what an Australian ought to be than all of 
us who know what an Australian has always been and always 
will be.
A phase of doubt—in which Australians had been taunted by 
Howard’s predecessor that they must somehow recast themselves 
or risk descent into being (in a memorable Keating jibe) citizens of 
a “banana republic,”—was over. Those who had perpetrated this 
assault on “ordinary” Australians’ expectations and entitlements, 
primarily the minority elites based in the universities, had been 
defeated.
Many convention att endees departed the hall convinced by 
their leader’s boast of apparent triumph and, in some ways, their 
confi dence was justifi ed. A litt le over a year later, on October 9, 2004, 
Howard’s Liberal–National coalition government was elected for a 
third term, gaining majorities in both the House of Representatives 
and the Senate, and thus securing a rare and powerful mandate to 
pursue the policies it had taken to the electorate, principally centring 
on border security, further deregulation of the labour market, and a 
commitment to stand with the United States in the “war on terror.” 
Yet the “dieticians” were far from silenced.
By the end of 2003 a parallel and in some ways primary area of the 
cultural wars, a more specifi c series of “history wars,” had reached 
new extremes of caustic commentary. This was a confrontation 
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between the so-called “black armband” historians, who portrayed 
a nineteenth-century frontier of violence infl icted on indigenous 
Australians in the course of their dispossession, and those who 
opposed such an interpretation, insisting instead on an “heroic” 
narrative of the spread and success of colonial sett lement, laying the 
foundations for a nation of, in Howard’s words, “fair play, generosity 
of spirit, and independence.” This, clearly, was not simply a dispute 
over the nineteenth-century historical record. It touched on the terms 
in which the boundaries to late twentieth-century social diversity 
might be drawn and policed.
One indication of the extremity associated with the history 
wars was that in mid-December 2003 the weekend supplement to 
the national newspaper The Australian invited four well-known 
historians and journalists to respond to “the bitt er debate” on such 
issues, especially as it escalated aft er the publication of the fi rst 
volume of The Fabrication of Aboriginal History by Keith Windschutt le 
(2002). Windschutt le’s vitriolic assault on the veracity of the sources 
cited by two “other side of the frontier” historians, Henry Reynolds 
and Lyndell Ryan, reached back to a series of articles in Quadrant, 
a leading right-wing Australian journal, and his book The Killing of 
History (1994). In 2003, however, the debate att ained a peak of public 
interest. Windschutt le’s method was to expose inaccuracies in his 
opponents’ research. They had got their facts or footnotes wrong, or, 
worse, had distorted them, and therefore their arguments about the 
extent of frontier violence collapsed. For Windschutt le an Aboriginal 
death had to be precisely documented to be “authentic.” The four 
commentators in the Weekend Australian variously referred to the 
prevailing debate as a “batt leground,” to “crusaders,” a “thoroughly 
nasty” debate, “pitiless” commentary, and Windschutt le’s “scalp-
hunting.” Debra Jopson (2003), a respected journalist on the Sydney 
Morning Herald, quoted one “veteran indigenous activist,” who 
did not wish to be named, as saying that “Aborigines decided not 
to engage in the ‘vicious, internecine academic debate’.” White 
Australians were seen by some to be fi ghting among themselves.
The debate was not confi ned to the press. Other contributions to 
this scholarly free-for-all included essays collected from prominent 
academics by Robert Manne, a former Quadrant editor turned 
confi rmed adversary of John Howard, and published in Whitewash: 
On Keith Windschutt le’s Fabrication of Aboriginal History (2003). A 
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similar intervention, titled The History Wars, came from the historian 
Stuart Macintyre, with a foreword by a former High Court chief 
justice, Sir Anthony Mason (2003, vii–viii), who urged Australians to 
form a view on the “competing visions” of “high-profi le historians 
… in terms of an Australian heritage and Australian culture.” This 
familiarity, wrote Mason, was essential to an understanding of “the 
batt leground of the History Wars,” a batt leground that was scarred 
by “invective and verbal violence” and supplied “competing visions” 
of Australian history to be readily “appropriated by the Labor Party 
and the Coalition parties … as persuasive means of articulating their 
political and electoral goals.”
Fulfi lling Mason’s observation, Paul Keating offi  cially launched 
The History Wars in a combative mode. As treasurer in Bob Hawke’s 
Labor government (1983–91) Keating had been integral to the 
oft en dramatic implementing of a series of economic and fi nancial 
policies intended to open Australia to the promises (and threats) 
of globalization, including, famously, engineering “the recession 
we had to have” as a means of competitively integrating Australia 
into world markets. Aft er wresting the prime ministership from 
Hawke in 1991, however, Keating had largely eschewed unpopular 
economic issues, and his own public image in association with them, 
in favour of his sense of the “big picture,” encompassing the push 
for a republic and a new national fl ag, the embrace of Australia’s 
position in the Asia–Pacifi c region, the recalibration of Australia’s 
connection to the United Kingdom, and, perhaps most importantly, 
reconciliation and Aboriginal land rights. In placing The History 
Wars in context, then, Keating was, like his audience, keenly aware 
of Howard’s stonewall response to these and other cultural issues. 
Keating opened with broad generalizations, but he soon resorted to 
the sort of intense personal att acks for which his performances in 
Parliament had been renowned. Why, he asked, were Howard and his 
followers “so resistant to novelty and to progress”? He continued,
They are more than conservatives. They’re reactionaries … 
They absolutely insist on their view and the lessons they see 
in our history. Yet in their insistence, their “proprietorialness,” 
their “derivativeness,” and their rancour, they reduce the fl ame 
and energy within the nation to a smouldering incandescence. 
What they eff ectively do is crimp and cripple our destiny. 
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It’s like suff ering from some sort of anaemia, robbing the 
political blood of its energy … Their failure is not simply one 
of crabbiness or rancour, it’s a failure of imagination … Their 
timidity not only diminishes their own horizon, it is a drag on 
the rest of us … The undertaking is simply too big for them… 
. at the heart of their wrong-headed campaign is an att empt to 
contain and censor the human spirit, to muffl  e, muzzle, and 
vitiate it.
This was vintage Keating. Yet all his virtuosity could not hide the fact 
of Howard’s three election victories since 1996, or the fact that there 
was a constituency that appeared to subscribe to Howard’s “babble” 
rather than to “the big end of town” interests and cosmopolitanism 
so oft en associated with Keating.
The debate was entrenched. On the day The History Wars was 
launched Phillip Adams of the Australian Broadcasting Commission 
(ABC) interviewed fi ve historians, including Keith Windschutt le 
and Stuart Macintyre, on his infl uential discussion programme Late 
Night Live. The program produced the usual suspects, and the usual 
responses. However, one comment bears repeating. It came from 
John Carroll, a reader in sociology at La Trobe University who had 
been nominated by Howard’s government to chair a controversial 
review of the content of exhibitions and programmes at the National 
Museum of Australia. Carroll, clearly a sympathizer with Howard’s 
version of Australian culture, noted (as quoted in Gordon 2003, 6) 
that “the ‘ding-dong’ batt le over colonial violence is just one aspect 
of a broader uneasiness about national identity.” He recounted that 
the main message in submissions to the review he was chairing had 
been “that people wanted a museum that told the Australian story,” 
even if, as he conceded, they “were not sure what the story was.” 
Addressing this uncertainty, the review report (NMA 2003) took it 
upon itself to declare that there was “more consensus than plurality 
at the core of the national collective conscience” and recommended 
that the museum fi nd more eff ective ways to convey, in an inclusive 
national narrative, the inherent Australian “character traits of 
inclusiveness, a ‘fair go’ ethos, a distrust of extremism, and civic 
common sense.”
This was the required default: diversity is unsett ling, and 
Australians now want to be reminded of the consensus at the core of 
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their society and of their values. It was becoming ubiquitous. Such 
a relentless campaign had to have deep roots. When Sir Anthony 
Mason referred to the “competing visions” of Australian historians, 
he named two in particular, Manning Clark and Geoff rey Blainey, 
and thus underscored the fact the history wars had been threatening 
since the early 1980s. By 2003 a good deal of ammunition had been 
stockpiled on both sides.
Shortly aft er Hawke’s Labor Government was fi rst elected, in 1983, 
Manning Clark’s A History of Australia, ultimately published in six 
volumes between 1962 and 1987, had assumed a new signifi cance. 
Always controversial because of his style and his interpretation, 
which took on epic and prophetic proportions, Clark had come 
to be seen as Labor’s “in house” scholar, a status owing much to 
his well-publicized outrage at the dismissal of Gough Whitlam’s 
government by the governor general, Sir John Kerr, in November 
1975. Clark’s suspicion of the British class system and his rejection 
of life’s “straighteners” had strong support within Hawke’s cabinet. 
A culturally impressionable treasurer, Paul Keating, on a number of 
occasions made the two-kilometre walk from Parliament to Clark’s 
home, working on his cultural consciousness, Jay Gatsby-style.
While Clark soon caught on in the Labor Party, as a scholar who 
was sympathetic to the liberal left  and had shaped an historical 
account that gave legitimacy to an appropriate vision of national 
failings and destiny, Geoff rey Blainey was equally quickly embraced 
by the conservative right.  Blainey was a former student of Clark’s at 
the University of Melbourne, and had also become an original and 
infl uential historian.  A powerful, accessible writer, he had contributed 
to several major themes in Australian historiography; his concept of 
the “tyranny of distance” had been particularly formative from the 
1960s onwards.  Where Clark’s heroes were ultimately tragic, victims 
of the restraints imposed by the “old dead tree” of British infl uence, 
Blainey’s were successful entrepreneurs of “the rush that never 
ended.”  Already a considerable public fi gure, then, in November 
1983 Blainey made a pointed intervention in a simmering debate on 
Asian immigration to Australia that arguably ended the populism-
driven honeymoon period Hawke’s government had enjoyed. 
Blainey concluded a speech at the National Press Club in Canberra 
with a statement that, by his own later admission, was “almost too 
emphatic” (Blainey 1984, 24): “We should continue to welcome a 
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variety of Asian immigrants,” he allowed, “but they should come 
on our terms, through our choosing.” These comments made the 
news, as indeed do almost any such remarks on the always unsett led 
question of the limits to Australia’s embrace of multiculturalism. Yet 
it was not until aft er his St. Patrick’s Day speech at Warrnambool, 
Victoria, in March 1984 that Blainey’s views were disseminated 
widely in papers across the country.
Speaking in an old picture theatre to an audience of about a 
thousand rural Victorians, Blainey (1984, 25) stated categorically 
that the “pace of Asian immigration is now far ahead of public 
opinion.” His concern, as he explained, was not so much with the 
numbers of Asian migrants arriving in Australia as with the strain 
he believed they were placing on the basic sense of Australian 
identity. If such strain was not addressed, he warned, the eff ect 
would be to “weaken or explode” the tolerance of Australians for 
such a challenge of diversity. This was not just a challenge to those 
who administered immigration policy, he argued: they seemed to 
be out of touch already, captured by the powerful sectional interests 
that had generated around and benefi ted through multiculturalism 
since the 1970s. It should instead be “public opinion that decides” 
the balance of Australia’s racial and ethic composition.
In a book brought out later in 1984, All for Australia, Blainey noted 
that his entry into the immigration debate was a “chance” happening. 
The headlines generated by Blainey’s interventions in the fi rst month 
of the immigration debate in 1984 paint a rather diff erent picture 
(cited in Markus 2001, 63):
Asian entry threatens tolerance: Blainey
Cut Asian intake, warns Blainey
Asianization of Australia is not “inevitable,” by Geoff rey 
Blainey
Immigration: time for sensible debate
Blainey stirs a sleeping issue
Blainey’s spark lights racial fi re
The Asian Debate
My critics advocate a surrender-Australia policy, says Blainey
Australia for the Asians, by Geoff rey Blainey
While professing naïveté about the political process, Blainey 
was in fact an artful propagandist and, as always, a master of the 
Culture Wars in Australia 173
memorable phase, though now for political purposes. Professor 
Graeme Davison, in his book The Use and Abuse of History (2000, 
17), suggests that Blainey’s “homely” metaphors—the pendulum, 
the balance sheet, the loaded dice—are as telling as his arguments: 
“They place him in the middle ground when, in fact, there is hardly 
a historian of any substance to the right of him.” To “the tyranny 
of distance” could now be added, according to Davison (2000, 66), 
the “surrender Australia policy” as a way of characterizing levels of 
immigration that undermined national cohesion, the “multicultural 
industry” as a description of the pressure groups that had captured 
government policy-making on this issue, and the “nation of tribes” 
as the destiny bequeathed by “exploded” tolerance.
Exactly when Geoff rey Blainey’s social att itudes made an 
impact upon John Howard’s we cannot be sure, but the historian 
Mark McKenna (1997) has observed that “Blainey’s views on 
multiculturalism, immigration, and history, enunciated in the early 
1980s, bore a striking resemblance to Howard’s 1988 initiative Future 
Directions.” The latt er was a Liberal Party policy document that 
featured a widely ridiculed cover depicting a “Father Knows Best” 
two-child family standing in front of the family home, complete 
with a white picket fence. It was an oddly crude and unconvincing 
document, but Howard was learning. What is more, the cultural tide 
in many countries in the western world countries was starting to turn 
his way. In 1991 The Australian published the fi rst syndicated articles 
critical of “PC” (“political correctness”). In 1993 Robert Manne, still 
editor of Quadrant, applied the phrase to the Australian sett ing and, 
most importantly, in the same year, only a few months aft er Manne 
published his piece about “PC,” Blainey followed up with an article 
said by some Australian social commentators to be a race-inspired 
shot heard round the country. The article, “Drawing Up a Balance 
Sheet of Our History,” is generally credited with being the real start 
of the Australian culture wars. In the article Blainey coined another 
of his indelible phrases, the “black armband” view of history, and in 
the process carefully craft ed an undermining of Clark and those who 
followed him. Blainey stated (1993, 15),
Anyone who tries to range over the last 200 years of Australia’s 
history, surveying the successes and failures, and trying 
to understand the obstacles that stood in the way, cannot 
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easily accept the gloomier summaries of that history. Some 
episodes in the past were regrett able, there were many fl aws 
and failures, and yet on the whole it stands out as one of the 
world’s success stories. It is ironical that many of the political 
and intellectual leaders of the last decade, one of the most 
complacent and disappointing decades in our history, are so 
eager to denounce earlier generations and discount their hard-
won successes. Most young Australians, irrespective of their 
background, are quietly proud to be Australian. We deprive 
them of their inheritance if we claim that they have inherited 
litt le to be proud of.
With this article, published well into the years of Paul Keating’s 
prime ministership, Blainey vigorously stirred a cultural pot that 
John Howard had already set to simmer. In January 1993 Howard, 
then a shadow minister restless under the Liberal Party leadership 
of Dr. John Hewson and seeking ground beyond Hewson’s agenda 
of economic liberalization, had gone public with a clear sense of 
mission (as quoted in Markus 2001, 93):
The broader debate about Australian society involves a 
clash between what can only be called the optimists and 
the apologists. The optimists essentially take the view that 
Australian nationhood has been a success and that, despite 
many fl aws and imperfections, there have emerged distinctive 
Australian characteristics of humanity, fairness, egalitarianism, 
and individual risk-taking. By contrast, the apologists take a 
basically negative view of Australian history and light upon 
every great national occasion, not to celebrate Australian 
achievements, but to att empt the coercion of all of us into a 
collective act of contrition for the past.
Returning to this theme in a speech later that year, now armed by 
Blainey, and with his confi dence and the race barometer rising, 
Howard directly engaged the prime minister (as quoted in Markus 
2001, 93):
Paul Keating’s convoluted and usually erroneous excursions 
into Australia’s past exhibit many of the features of what 
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Geoff rey Blainey has so aptly called the “black armband” view 
of Australian history. Many republicans seek a rewriting of 
Australian history which demonizes the British connection 
and marginalizes the Liberal conservative contribution to our 
institutions and political thought.
Howard was positioning himself astutely. A successful second 
challenge for the Liberal Party leadership in January 1995 provided 
the impetus for a series of telling speeches in later 1995 and in 1996. 
In four “Headland” speeches, delivered between June and December 
1995, Howard spelled out not policies (he was accused at this time 
of being a “policy-free zone”) but a cultural stance defi ned through 
opposition. In the fi rst of these speeches, Howard (1995a, 3–4) made 
a concerted pitch to what would later be termed “Howard’s Batt lers” 
in blue-collar, urban Australia:
There is a frustrated mainstream in Australia today which 
sees government decisions increasingly driven by the noisy, 
self-interested clamour of powerful vested interests with scant 
regard for the national interest. The power of the mainstream 
has been diminished by this government’s reactions to the force 
of a few interest groups. Many Australians in the mainstream 
feel utt erly powerless to compete with such groups, who seem 
to have the ear completely of the government on major issues 
… These trends refl ect a style of government which will change 
profoundly under the Liberal and National parties. Under us, 
the views of all particular interests will be assessed against the 
national interest and the sentiments of mainstream Australia.
Later in the speech, Howard (1995a, 2) even ventured into an 
extended echo of Martin Luther King’s “I Have a Dream” oration: 
“I have in mind our great commitment …”; “I have in mind that all 
Australians should …”; “I have in mind a united community”; “I 
have in mind a nation renewed”; “I have in mind restoring a sense 
of progress …” In these terms, however ironically borrowed from 
King’s vision of a nation premised on diversity, Howard off ered an 
ideal of a united Australia, immune, as he put it in another of the 
“Headland” speeches (Howard 1995b, 2), to the “negative, simplistic 
rewriting of history” off ered by Keating’s “att empted heist of 
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Australian nationalism” with its three component parts: “a sneering 
att empt to paint the Coalition and its supporters as more British than 
the British”; the presentation of republicanism as a higher form of 
Australian nationalism; and the depiction of “the Australian Labor 
Party as the only true party of Australian nationalism.” In place 
of these assertions, and in his own remastering of the historical 
narrative, Howard (1995b, 3) proclaimed instead that,
national identity is, and must remain, in a realm above the 
partisan fray because it enshrines the virtues which unite us 
and give us cohesion. By the rest of the world’s standards ours 
is a remarkably cohesive society. And yet we are all aware of 
the rents and tears in the social fabric. The task for the times is 
repair, practical reform, and nation-building. We can’t aff ord 
the politics of division and should not tolerate them.
Behind these rhetorical manoeuvrings Howard was craft ing an 
appeal to a new constituency, one whose subscription to Keating’s 
“big picture,” with its inherent challenges to the ethnic, racial, and 
cultural orthodoxies of national identity to that point, was fragile, 
and that felt exposed to the dynamics of economic and social change 
in the 1980s and early 1990s. In particular, Howard was aft er blue-
collar Australia, the voters in the burgeoning lower-middle-class 
seats around the country, especially in Sydney and Melbourne. To 
woo such a group he wanted them to feel, in his words (quoted in 
Brett  2003, 202), “relaxed and comfortable.” He needed bait on the 
hook, however, and found it in what Australian literary and cultural 
historians know as the “Australian Legend.” As Judith Brett  (2002, 
203) bluntly puts it, Howard “raided the Australian Legend for the 
Liberal Party.” He plundered, with purpose and for his own ends, a 
radical nationalist tradition, once associated with Labor’s heartland 
and built on the egalitarian solidarity of nineteenth-century workers 
and Great War soldiers. Through 1995 and 1996 his speeches referred 
to “the Australian way,” “Australian values,” “Australian identity,” 
and “Australian character” as the new Liberal touchstones (Brett  
2002, 204). Again, Brett  (2002, 206) is sharply to the point:
Howard’s opponents have oft en been misled by his own 
description of himself as a social conservative and so missed 
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his takeover of the symbolic repertoire of Australia’s radical 
nationalist past to reconnect Australian Liberalism with 
ordinary Australian experience.
Howard took what Brett  (2002, 211) calls “vernacular nationalism” 
into the election in 1996 and won in a landslide. The solidarity of the 
old nationalism, shaped by the collectivism of organized labour, now 
accommodated new elements. A prominent theme was the insistence 
(Howard 1995b, 3) that “we can’t aff ord the politics of division and 
should not tolerate them.” For example, Howard accused some 
school curriculum coordinators of teaching “a racist, bigoted past,” 
even to the extent of regarding as inappropriate the use of words 
such as “invasion” to characterize the European sett lement and 
dispossession of indigenous Australians.
In this context the reputation of Manning Clark, whose public 
utt erances throughout the 1970s and 1980s had haunted Liberal Party 
strategy meetings, was not to be left  unscathed. Three months aft er 
the election the new coalition minister for foreign aff airs, Alexander 
Downer, who was in Washington, DC, to present Georgetown 
University Library with Clark’s six-volume History of Australia, 
instead chose a biography of General Sir John Monash, commander 
of Australian forces in the First World War. Five months aft er the 
election the Brisbane newspaper the Courier Mail commenced an 
att ack on Clark, suggesting that he had been a Communist, had 
received the Order of Lenin, and had served the Soviet Union. Asked 
to comment on these charges, which eventually collapsed for want 
of any credible evidence, Howard (as quoted in McQueen 1997, 
3) referred to “an interesting debate—it’s all part of the process … 
When you think of the way in which some on the Right have been 
retrospectively demonised over the years, it’s not unprecedented.” 
Clearly, there was revenge in mind.
Over the next few years Howard constantly reinforced his message, 
though he was never clearer than in the Sir Thomas Playford 
Memorial Lecture given at the Adelaide Town Hall in July 1996. 
Aft er two slim sentences of introduction he launched his assault:
One of the more insidious developments in Australian political 
life over the past decade or so has been the att empt to rewrite 
Australian history in the service of a partisan political cause. 
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No one should be in any doubt that this process has been a 
systematic and deliberate one. My predecessor as Prime 
Minister regarded the partisan reinterpretation of Australia’s 
past as central to much of the agenda for the future that he 
sought to implement. It distorted the debate over a range of 
policy issues, including our constitutional form of government, 
and the relevance of our traditional associations with particular 
countries and regions. I say that this process of offi  cially 
att empting to rewrite Australian history was an insidious one 
because it was an abuse of the true purpose of history. It read 
history backwards, imposing on the past a patt ern designed to 
serve contemporary political needs. It portrayed a partial and 
selective view of our past as the offi  cially endorsed version of 
our history. And it sought to stifl e voices of dissent from that 
view with abuse and vitriol, rather than reasoned debate.
Howard once said of himself (as quoted in Marr 1999, 49), “I am 
the bloke who ultimately wins the last batt le.” Whether it be due 
to the extent of his determination, the swift ness and audacity of 
his cultural interventions, or broader shift s in political culture, he 
has largely maintained control over his agenda. In March 1997 the 
University of Melbourne held a seminar on “black armband” history 
as a handful of university-based commentators went into print in 
the broadsheets to voice their concerns, but such interventions were 
dismissed as the jeering of “elites,” almost by defi nition antagonistic 
to “ordinary values.” The phrase “history wars” was becoming 
standard in characterizing exchanges on a wide range of related 
questions, with all its implications of a polarization of positions 
rather than the holding of a genuine debate.
Amid this polarization perhaps the only sustained challenge to 
Howard came from a quarter that was surprising but also signifi cant, 
given the narrowing of the space for party-political debate amid the 
high symbolism of “values”-based politics. Sir William Deane, a judge 
of the High Court since 1982, had been appointed governor general of 
Australia in 1995. As “constitutional sovereign,” the representative of 
the British monarch as Australia’s independent head of state, Deane 
ostensibly represented traditions close to Howard’s interests. Yet the 
position of governor general has an ambivalent status in Australian 
political culture, since, depending on personality and context, its 
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holder can be viewed as an unrepresentative, unelected fi gurehead 
or seen as having a vantage point from which to exercise a distinctive 
form of leadership and infl uence. At the time of his appointment it 
seemed clear that Deane would tend towards fulfi lling the latt er role. 
In 1992, in his decision with Justice Mary Gauldron on the Mabo 
case, he had described the dispossession of indigenous Australians 
as “the darkest aspect of the history of this nation,” adding that “the 
nation as a whole must remain diminished unless and until there 
is acknowledgement of, and retreat from, those past injustices.” 
Multiculturalism and reconciliation became prominent themes in 
his early speeches as governor general. However, if these interests 
had fi tt ed comfortably with Paul Keating in his last years as prime 
minister, they were hardly congruent with the agenda of his 
successor.
In his foreword to the fi rst collection of Deane’s speeches Sir 
Gerard Brennan (2002, 9), a former chief justice of the High Court, 
wrote of Deane’s determination in offi  ce to express and represent 
“the values of our society.” Deane himself (2002, 79), speaking at the 
launch of an Indigenous Welfare Report in Darwin in 1997, clarifi ed 
his own att itude to his offi  ce, recalling that,
A predecessor of mine, Sir Zelman Cowen, once commented 
that perhaps the most important task of a Governor General 
is to interpret the Australian nation to itself. That is something 
which, in the period of more than thirteen months since I 
became Governor General, I have earnestly endeavoured to do 
in a non-political way. In particular, I have sought to hold up 
a mirror in which the people of our country can see the extent 
of the two most important problems confronting our nation, 
namely, unemployment, particularly youth unemployment, 
and the plight of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples.
Both Deane and Brennan stressed the need to provide such an 
example in an appropriately apolitical way, but, given Deane’s 
range of social and cultural concerns, the collective Australia he 
sought to interpret was not necessarily a resolved and single public, 
and inevitably the “values” he expressed were not always matt ers 
presupposing consensus. In opening an exhibition, “Belonging: A 
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Century Celebrated,” at the State Library of New South Wales at the 
beginning of 2001, Deane (2002, 13) presented what he called the 
“three strands of our Australian identity”:
The fi rst is the national ethos of mutual acceptance and respect 
which binds us Australians together notwithstanding our 
diverse origins—that multicultural inclusiveness sustains our 
nation. The second of these strands is what I think of as “the 
spirit of ANZAC” … courage and endurance, and duty, and 
love of country, and mateship, and good humour, and the 
survival of a sense of self-worth and decency in the face of 
dreadful odds. It also means mutual dependence … The third 
strand is the generosity and the sense of fair play that are so 
common among Australians.
In virtually all of his speeches in offi  ce Deane found his way back 
to one or all of these themes as they applied to reconciliation and 
multiculturalism, or, more generally, to the plight of Australians 
in need. In their generality there was not much to distinguish such 
“values” from the prime minister’s own mantras, but in their specifi c 
applications there was a deep divide. Through these att empts to 
defi ne a public quite distinct from Howard’s a new dignity was given 
to public offi  ce in Australia and consolidated by the ways in which 
Deane found occasions to take the nation with him. Signifi cantly 
these were not only occasions celebrating a national identity. They 
were also occasions of grief and mourning, at which Deane sought 
to articulate a shared humanity, to bestow dignity and honour in 
hardship, and to celebrate the individuality of lives lost—for example 
at a memorial service for the victims of the canyon tragedy involving 
a group of young Australian travellers at Interlaken, Switzerland, 
or for the victims of the Childers Palace Backpackers’ Hostel fi re 
in Queensland (see Stephens 2006, 237–41). Deane might, on such 
occasions, have still been part of a culture of “values” that defi ned 
commonality rather than diversity, but the responses he evoked 
were those of empathy and refl ection on suff ering, rather than an 
assertion of sameness against diff erence. The potential to explore 
or at least allude to disadvantage, prejudice, and isolation was so 
much the greater. In May 2003, accepting an honorary doctorate of 
laws from the University of Queensland, and no longer bound by the 
proprieties of offi  ce, Deane (2003, 12) spoke plainly:
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There is one challenge for the future leaders of our nation which 
I would particularly emphasise … It is the challenge of justice 
and truth. The challenge never to be indiff erent in the face of 
injustice or falsehood. It encompasses the challenge to advance 
truth and human dignity rather than to seek advantage by 
infl aming ugly prejudice and intolerance. Who of us will easily 
forget the untruths about children overboard? Or the abuse of 
the basic rights of innocent children by incarceration behind 
Woomera’s razor wire? Or the denial of the fundamental 
responsibility of a democratic government to seek to safeguard 
the human rights of all its citizens, including the unpopular 
and the alleged wrongdoer, in the case of the two Australians 
indefi nitely caged, without legal charge or process, in a 
Guantánamo Bay jail? Some may think that these and other 
similar unpleasant things should be left  unmentioned. But if 
our coming generation of leaders refuses to honestly confront 
the denial of truth or responsibility which they refl ect, our 
nation will surely be in peril of losing its way in the years 
ahead.
For all Deane’s calming and clarifying infl uence, there has been no 
real abatement in the culture wars and no equivalent successor.
Re-elected in October 2004, Howard is even more emphatic that 
consensus must replace diversity and even more adroit in seeing 
that his will prevails. In June 2004 he had joined Dr. Brendan Nelson, 
then minister for education, science and training, in outlining an 
“agenda for schools” that placed “values” as a “national priority” 
and required that “every school must … have a functioning fl ag-
pole, fl y the Australian fl ag, and display the values framework in a 
prominent place in the school, as a condition of funding” (Howard 
and Nelson 2004). In an address on the eve of Australia Day, January 
26, 2006, Howard claimed success in the culture wars, or, as he put it 
(as quoted in Gratt an 2006, 5), in “rebalancing national identity and 
ethnic diversity,” and exhorted a “coalition of the willing” to continue 
to rally and save the nation’s classrooms from a “divisive, phoney 
debate about national identity.” In June 2006, in a direct aff ront to 
those whom he and other members of his government regularly 
dismiss as “noisy minorities,” he appointed Keith Windschutt le to 
the board of the ABC, an institution that Windschutt le had att acked 
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as being full of “Marxists and radicals.” In a renewed push to tighten 
up the nation’s borders and its criteria for citizenship, in September 
2006 Howard (2006, 1) affi  rmed that the embrace of Australian values 
was a prerequisite for citizenship, even if “there are small sections 
of some communities, including the Islamic community, that are 
resistant to integration.”
Wearing the mantle of international statesman, Howard was 
welcomed to Canada in May 2006 by the newly elected Conservative 
government of Stephen Harper as a leader who had shown how 
to mobilize new constituencies. A rather more equivocal welcome 
awaited him when he travelled on the same tour to the Republic 
of Ireland, where “history wars” have perhaps wider and deeper 
resonances and the opportunities to explore issues of citizenship 
have been more recently created. Meeting students at University 
College Dublin, he was closely questioned on issues including the 
treatment of gay marriage in Australian law and policy surrounding 
indigenous peoples.
Howard’s victory for “values” encapsulates a certain momentum in 
the “management of diversity” over the past ten years. Nonetheless, 
his claim of victory over pluralism might just prove premature 
given the range of pressures evident in each of the chapters in this 
collection.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION: MANAGING DIVERSITY IN A 
POST-NATIONALIST WORLD
Paul Gillespie
From multiculturalism to interculturalism; from multinationalism 
to plurinationalism; from diversity as an aft erthought to making its 
management a core task of contemporary politics; from identity as the 
politics of diff erence and recognition to a process of civic integration 
determining political entitlements, access, and regulation; from 
homogeneous nations with singular belongings to heterogeneous 
ones having multiple affi  nities within and beyond the nation-state, 
and stretching to the cosmopolitan outer edge of humanity; from 
national to postnationalist or transnational constitutionalism and 
citizenship—such are the intellectual journeys suggested in this 
volume, devoted to the prospects for a postnationalist politics and 
the management of diversity in a selected group of contemporary 
societies. Such journeys are nothing if not ambitious, but that is 
necessary if we are to tackle satisfactorily the issues thrown up by 
a changing world.
Conceptual, political, and journalistic innovation must go together 
if we are to understand these changes. With an increasingly insistent 
drumbeat they bear out the warning delivered by Hedley Bull (1977, 
256) a generation ago, that “our view of possible alternatives to the 
states system should take into account the limitation of our own 
imagination and our inability to transcend past experience.” Writing 
more recently on a kindred subject, the political scientist Alberta 
Sbragia (2003, 2) makes the point that
our very vocabulary is built on the centrality of the nation 
state. We study “international” politics, national and 
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subnational politics, the role of “multinational” corporations, 
“transnational” civil society, and so on. When we build datasets 
we collect national data. The national lies at the core of our 
questions, our assumptions, and our inquiry. The nation state 
is so central to the study of politics that it is nearly impossible 
to move beyond it.
This concluding chapter draws freely on each of my fellow contri-
butors’ ideas and suggests the ways in which they off er a coherent 
approach in a certain framework. Their points of comparison are 
strengthened by being drawn mainly from the Republic of Ireland, 
Canada, and Australia, which have several historical, political, and 
cultural features in common. Comparative research is bolstered 
by a judicious selection of case studies. This book suggests that 
there is much to learn from examining these particular states in 
relation to one another. In dealing with these subjects the particular 
and the universal, or the national and the global, are oft en falsely 
counterposed in the name of liberal cosmopolitanism. In contrast, I 
would argue, with Craig Calhoun (2003a, 540) that “it is not enough 
simply to contrast vernacular to cosmopolitan, the local tradition of 
small places to the larger traditions of broader spaces. It is crucial 
to see that these constitute each other. There is a dialectic between 
cosmopolitan and vernacular that creates them both.”
DEFINITIONS
In such a debate it is important to work with common defi nitions of 
an evolving terminology, or at least to work towards them. This is all 
the more necessary in a multidisciplinary context that overlaps with 
public policy concerns and political debate. The various chapters 
here suggest converging approaches to concepts widely used by 
the authors, such as political identity, diversity, political space and 
time, geography and history, globalization, and postnationalist 
politics. How might we arrive at common defi nitions and fruitful 
formulations of these themes?
Political identity is formulated, by those writers who refer to it, in 
terms of belonging, affi  nity, att achment, loyalty, or allegiance. Alastair 
Davidson sets the scene in his treatment of national identity and 
global migration. He underlines the great increase in international 
migration and travel, involving an estimated one billion overseas 
Conclusion 187
journeys in 2003, the majority of them on business, but also points 
out that most people, if given the chance, still stay at home. The 
experience of migration has been so disconcerting for many of the 
more immobile as to reinforce the traditional sense that home is one 
single, exclusive place of belonging. For the mobile such a defi nition 
makes less and less sense, since they can belong to many places at one 
and the same time. For them hybridity and “in between” identities 
are added on to the older singular ones. Davidson draws on Hannah 
Arendt and Sophie Duchesne to distinguish a heritage approach, 
in which the nation state crystallized an older sense of singular 
belonging and loyalty for those who have a common past, from 
an approach that emphasizes scruples, and a loyalty not to where 
you are from but to where you are going and who you make the 
future with. Heritage identities are exclusive, approaching dual or 
multiple nationalities in zero-sum fashion. Scruples accept that such 
identities can be compatible, complementary, and variously ranked, 
but not necessarily in ways that can be taken for granted. This is an 
important distinction, which comes up repeatedly in related ways 
among the diff erent authors and subjects in this book.
Political identity has been defi ned by Jürgen Habermas (2001, 16) 
as “solidarity among strangers”: in a circular process “democracy 
and the nation state stabilized each other. Both have jointly produced 
the striking innovation of a civic solidarity that provides the cement 
of national societies.” Put diff erently, according to W. J. M. Mckenzie 
(1978, 12), political identity concerns the circumstances in which “I” 
should properly use the term “we” to create a political community. 
Thus political identity relates the self to a wider community of 
strange and diff erent others. The common bonds that bind these 
selves are its subject matt er, whether defi ned as belonging, affi  nity, 
att achment, loyalty, or allegiance. Each of these terms touches on a 
rather diff erent conception of political identity, but it is fair to group 
them together for our purposes, since their meanings tend to co-vary 
in theoretical and political debates on these issues. Helen Irving 
deconstructs them usefully in her discussion of citizenship, arguing 
that “allegiance” is probably the best term to describe the bonds 
linking people within and outside national boundaries.
Diversity is another common theme. It denotes diff erence, not 
sameness, and is therefore closely related to identity. Yet if politics 
is indeed about living with people who are not like us, but with 
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whom we nevertheless have to reach agreement, it follows that its 
starting point should be diversity. For identity politics and, indeed, 
for classical Mazzinian nationalism too, diversity is an aft erthought, 
to be regrett ed as a departure from the principle of affi  nity, not 
celebrated as an affi  rmation of the inherent heterogeneity of any 
political community. From this latt er perspective managing diversity 
needs to be seen as one of the core tasks of modern politics.
Space and time recur as themes in these chapters. Davidson 
underlines how globalization has radically changed their defi nition 
for many millions of people. This has to do with physical travel, but 
also with the compression of space by instantaneous communication 
and with the simultaneity of capitalist economics on a global 
twenty-four-hour timetable. While it is true that mobility is at least 
as old as capitalism, such real-time simultaneity is new. It can be 
traced directly to the ways in which fi nance capital and computer 
technology combined from the 1980s to produce worldwide 
markets. It builds on a much older cultural feature of capitalism: 
the displacement of medieval “simultaneity along time”—identifi ed 
by Walter Benjamin (1973, 264–66) as Messianic, merging past and 
future in an instantaneous present—by “homogeneous empty time,” 
in which simultaneity is, “as it were, transverse, cross-time, marked 
not by prefi guring and fulfi lment, but by temporal coincidence, and 
measured by clock and calendar.” As Benedict Anderson (1991, 26) 
notes, the newspaper and the novel were crucial building blocs of 
national identity understood as an imagined community between 
strangers, since “the idea of a sociological organism moving 
calendrically through homogeneous empty time is a precise analogue 
of the idea of the nation, which also is conceived as a solid community 
moving steadily down (or up) history.” Inevitably, new media, 
or even evolving claims on established media, as demonstrated 
here by Niamh Hourigan, refl ect the changing dynamics of these 
relationships of nation and community.
Space and time are linked to geography and history, and 
through them to the notions of proximity and affi  nity as alternative 
justifi cations for political identity. Just as David Headon charts 
Australia’s “history wars” during the 1990s, when intellectuals 
supporting Prime Minister John Howard challenged the ideas about 
national identity championed by the preceding Labor government, 
in part refl ecting the alleged imperatives of economic liberalization 
and Asia–Pacifi c economic integration, so has geography served 
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as a justifi cation for imperial or large-state legitimacy in European 
history. A Russian saying, that “history is only geography stretched 
out over time” (cited by Lee Blessing 1988), captures this reality very 
well. The proper geographical and historical limits of a united Europe 
have been a central aspect of the debate on its identity since the end 
of the Cold War (see Casanova 2006). The idea that insular territorial 
integrity should dictate national unity also remains a central 
batt leground in Ireland’s geography wars between nationalists and 
unionists (see O’Dowd 1998 and Cadogan Group 2003).
Globalization suff uses the discussion of postnationalist politics 
in these essays. It is neatly defi ned by Davidson as “extending 
the economy to the world.” This catches the movement involved, 
att aching it to the technological changes already mentioned, and 
to the increased levels of mobility and simultaneity evident in 
societies such as Canada, Ireland, and Australia. It is the very scale 
of these changes that justifi es the historically specifi c character of 
contemporary globalization (see Held et al. 1999).
A similarly compact defi nition of the postnational is provided by 
Alain-G. Gagnon and Raff aele Iacovino, who describe it as “a state of 
aff airs that has moved beyond monistic conceptions of belonging.” 
In theology monism, rooted etymologically in the Ancient Greek 
adjective monos (“single”), is the doctrine that only one supreme 
being exists, and that there is no duality between mind and matt er. 
In philosophy monism claims, variously, that there is one true or 
rational way of understanding humanity and leading the good 
life; that human nature is essentially unchanging, and unaff ected 
by culture and society; and that the good, like truth, is inherently 
singular or uniform in nature. Pluralism, in contrast, argues that 
human beings are culturally constituted, vary from culture to culture, 
and share in common only minimal species-derived properties, from 
which nothing of moral or political signifi cance can be deduced (see 
Berlin 1969 and Parekh 2000). As it has been adopted in constitutional 
forms in the European Union (EU), but also in many multicultural 
and ex-colonial societies (see Petersen and Zahle 1995, and UNDP 
2004), pluralism contests the assumption of legal monism that the 
sole centres or units of authority are states (Walker 2002, 337):
Constitutional pluralism … recognizes that the European order 
inaugurated by the Treaty of Rome has developed beyond the 
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traditional confi nes of international law and now makes its 
own independent constitutional claims, and that these claims 
exist alongside the continuing claims of states. The relationship 
between the orders, that is to say, is now horizontal rather than 
vertical—heterarchical rather than hierarchical.
In further refi nements, “plurinational” democracy involves the 
idea that there can be many interlinked and intercommunicating 
demoi in a polity, whether Catalan nationalists playing a role in 
Spanish politics, Scott ish nationalists participating in British and 
European politics, Quebecers involved in Canadian politics, Northern 
Ireland nationalists and unionists involved simultaneously in British 
and Irish politics under the Belfast Agreement, or, indeed, in a EU 
gradually creating a transnational democracy to legitimate itself, 
a process dubbed “demoi-cracy” by Nicolaïdis (2003 and 2004). 
Such fusions are not anomalous or hypocritical, but contributions 
to political renewal and stability. In a globalized world multiple 
and complementary identities are increasingly common political 
conditions. As Gagnon and Iacovino insist, for example, “Quebec is a 
postnational state to the extent that its version of national belonging 
allows room for a plurality of identities and individual rights,” 
rather than the homogeneity that, in their view, became a hallmark 
of Pierre Trudeau’s constitutionalism.
There is room in this discussion and in a wider sett ing for a fi rm 
distinction between “postnationalist” and “postnational.” Monist 
nationalism is more vulnerable to change than the national demoi that 
encapsulate citizenship and democracy as well as modern national 
belonging, making them sustainable and durable institutions even in 
a postnationalist sett ing (see Cederman 2001).
CANADA, AUSTRALIA, AND THE REPUBLIC OF 
IRELAND
In 2000 the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation asked for answers 
to the question “What is the Canadian equivalent of ‘as American as 
apple pie’?” The winning answer was: “As Canadian as possible, in 
the circumstances.” The cultural and political blanketing of smaller 
states by larger ones is an abiding theme of comparative politics. 
It is an experience shared in diff erent ways by the three states that 
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are the main subject matt er of this book. The relations between 
Canada and the United States, between the Republic of Ireland 
and the United Kingdom, and between Australia and the United 
Kingdom, the Asia–Pacifi c region, and the United States are worth 
comparing further in the light of these chapters. All three countries 
are predominantly Anglophone, share a varying history of sett ler 
colonialism that still aff ects relations with indigenous peoples, and 
have, in diff erent degrees, experienced immigration, emigration, and 
diasporic identifi cations arising from their openness to the world.
From the point of view of the Republic of Ireland in recent times, 
the extent of these identifi cations has become even more pronounced, 
and realized more fully, as the country opened up to globalization in 
the 1980s and 1990s, and as negotiations over the future of Northern 
Ireland developed. The Belfast Agreement provides an ambitious 
constitutional experiment including majority consent in Northern 
Ireland to constitutional change, periodic referendums on unity 
between it and the Republic, and a devolved Assembly and complex 
power-sharing arrangements (see Cox, Guelke, and Stephen 2006). 
Equally, if contrarily, the confl ict in Australia between, on the one 
hand, Paul Keating’s espousal of reconciliation with indigenous 
Australians and vigorous republicanism—in part infused with an 
Irish ethnicity tracing its radicalism back to the early days of convict 
sett lement—and, on the other hand, his successor John Howard’s 
appropriation of an Anglocentric and monoethnic imagery in 
refusing to apologize for Australia’s postcolonial, assimilationist 
past, or for harsh treatment of illegal immigrants and asylum-seekers, 
refl ects a rather diff erent assemblage of internal and external cultural 
referents. The issue of Quebec nationalism gives the Canadian case 
yet another infl ection here, as Canada has, it may be argued, begun 
to move away from Trudeau’s model of federalism to the notion of 
“several citizenship centres,” outlined by Gagnon and Iacovino in 
their chapter.
Such confl icts over, and reformulated formulas for, diversity are 
the subject of a burgeoning comparative and policy-making literature 
dealing with multinational democracies (see, for example, Gagnon 
and Tully 2002) and the territorial management of ethnic confl ict 
(see, for example, Coakley 2003). The Human Development Report 2004 
(UNDP 2004) made the protection of “cultural diversity in today’s 
diverse world” its principal theme, putt ing asymmetric federalism, 
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multiple and complementary identities, and legal pluralism at the 
centre of its analysis and policy prescriptions for managing such 
confl icts. While the UNDP was principally addressing confl icts 
that demand more urgent att ention than those in Ireland, Canada, 
or Australia, it is also the case that these modern affl  uent societies 
should at least be able to provide some clear guidance or example in 
exploring the feasibility of such models.
LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE
A common concern about the appropriate levels of governance and 
politics runs through this collection. If it is true that globalization 
has undermined the capacity of nation states to govern eff ectively, 
or at least forced them to reconfi gure their cooperation with other 
states, how is this cooperation best achieved? Within the tensions 
resulting from this transformation subnational regions and cities 
have found new spaces for political action. As a result contemporary 
political theorizing and much political practice are preoccupied with 
these new levels of governance, and how connections should best 
be made, or re-established, between them. Within academic fi elds 
as diverse as political science, legal theory, sociology, history, social 
anthropology, and international relations debate has arisen around 
the idea that pluralism has come to challenge the privileged place 
of national identity as the legitimate order of contemporary liberal-
democratic political communities. From this perspective, managing 
diversity or plurality should be recognized as a, or even the, core 
task of modern politics.
In their survey of the literature on multiple levels of governance, 
Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2003) give examples of the new 
vocabularies involved in several of these disciplines. In EU studies, 
for example, reference is made to “multitiered,” “multilevel,” or 
“network” governance; in international relations, to “multilateral 
cooperation,” “global governance,” and “fragmegration”; in 
federalist studies, to multiple jurisdictions, “multicentred” 
governance, and decentralization; in local government and public 
policy studies, to multiple local jurisdictions, “polycentric” 
governance, and (again) “network” governance. Hooghe and Marks 
(2003, 233) defi ne governance as “binding decision-making in the 
public sphere,” though it is usually taken to mean (Jachtenfuchs 
2001, 246) “the intentional regulation of social relationships and 
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underlying confl icts by reliable and durable means and institutions, 
instead of the direct use of power and violence.” Hooghe and Marks 
also distinguish between largely territorial “general purpose” 
jurisdictions and largely functional or “task specifi c” jurisdictions 
within multilevel governance, although they concede that these 
overlap and interpenetrate one another.
Such a political science perspective helps to make sense of the 
discussion of political levels throughout this book. Gagnon and 
Iacovino reject Quebec’s defi nition as a province like any other 
in the unitary Canadian federation and argue that it is a distinct 
“nation” and that it must fi nd its political identity in a reconfi gured 
multinational democracy. Such recognition would still fi nd it 
inserted in a complex, multilevelled Canadian polity and capable of 
dealing with its own internal heterogeneity, including its Aboriginal, 
immigrant, and Anglophone minorities. There are many interesting 
parallels here with Catalonia, the Basque Country, Scotland, 
Wales, Northern Ireland, and Belgium within the EU. Increasingly, 
multiple and complementary identities, and forms of “asymmetric 
federalism,” are being used as mechanisms to secure recognition. 
Thus Caroline Andrew, elsewhere in this book, draws att ention to 
the “urbanness of diversity” in Canada, which is second only to 
Australia in the proportion of its population that is foreign born, and 
to the fact that Canada’s diversity is even more concentrated in the 
largest cities. She emphasizes the increasing demands for greater 
recognition of the role of big cities but says that this depends on 
the development of “broad-based feelings of urban belonging, of an 
urban citizenship.”
In the Republic of Ireland the decentralization of 10,000 civil 
service jobs away from Dublin, which has become an overbearing 
colossus aft er absorbing more than one-third of the population, 
is arguably more accurately described as a relocation driven by 
populist electoral considerations than as a reconfi guration of power 
relations between centre and periphery. Local government, while 
long established, is fi scally and politically impoverished. Regional 
government is virtually non-existent, having been created merely to 
absorb “cohesion funds” from the EU and redistribute them. There is 
as much variation within patt erns of local and regional governance 
in the EU as between them.
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THE COSMOPOLITAN AND THE NATIONAL
The political challenge faced by many citizens as they navigate 
these changes is whether particularities can be replaced, as “ties 
that bind,” by universal ideas (see Ingram 2000). Nationalism and 
the nation state created many opportunities to forge new ties, as 
is acknowledged by postnationalist theorists such as Habermas in 
developing their accounts of how “constitutional patriotism” could 
perform this function. The category of “people like us,” which 
underlies nationalism, has commonly been legitimated by ties of 
blood, territory, religion, and/or tradition. Iseult Honohan’s chapter 
in this book illustrates the complexities involved in these processes, 
including the ways in which the legal principle of ius sanguinis is 
oft en mixed historically and comparatively with that of ius soli. The 
alternative principle of “people around here” is bett er adapted to 
creating new transnational ties. That can be done by invoking universal 
values applicable to all human beings. The EU’s constitutional treaty 
agreed at Brussels in June 2004 incorporates them for the fi rst time. 
Its diffi  cult process of ratifi cation, by referendums in some member 
states and legislatures in others, has been a real test of whether this 
is a genuine constitutional moment for the EU, or, as Gráinne de 
Búrca (2004) discusses, “a moment of madness,” based on the false 
assumption that a transnational demos is possible, creating multiple 
affi  nities and senses of political belonging. The EU’s constitutional 
treaty has been renegotiated following its rejection in the French 
and Dutch referendums in 2005, in good part because oft en its 
“constitutional” element was intended to replace national structures 
with postnational ones, but external events, not least the changing 
patt ern of trans-Atlantic relations, which might require a search for 
greater foreign policy coherence, will also bring other pressures and 
opportunities to bear on the treaty. 
There are, then, various models or levels against which people 
“like us” or “around here” can be gauged. There is a commitment 
to humanity at large, as in the cosmopolitan standard put forward 
by Martha Nussbaum (2002), which, she argues, must form the 
framework for universal values. It takes the general loyalty of 
each person to the whole of humanity as fundamental, superior 
to ethnic and national att achments. Less demanding accounts 
are exemplifi ed by the work of David Held (1995 and 2004), who 
stresses the importance of multiple and overlapping allegiances, 
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rooted in democratic rights and based on interdependence. A third 
type is captured by a French defi nition from 1738, cited by Richard 
Sennett  (1977): “A cosmopolite … is a man who moves comfortably 
in diversity; he is comfortable in situations which have no links 
or parallels with what is familiar to him.” A fourth type expresses 
essentially a creative bricolage linking the vernacular and the 
cosmopolitan, so that they constitute each other dialectically. Craig 
Calhoun (2003a) points out that the third and fourth types are more 
compatible with diversity than the fi rst two are, although all four 
recognize that memberships of diff erent communities are typically 
multiple and overlapping, and that nations and ethnic groups are 
themselves internally diff erentiated, not homogeneous.
Recognition of such inherent heterogeneity is a bett er starting 
point for an account of managing diversity than either a 
communitarian approach locked into a homogeneous defi nition of 
the national society, or a cosmopolitanism rooted solely in ethical 
universalism. Any project for a postnationalist politics needs to take 
such intellectual debates seriously. Otherwise there is a danger that 
the very term “post-national politics” will signify rejection of the 
particular and vernacular, the ties that have bound people together in 
webs of solidarity, democracy, and identity that make up the nation 
state. Liberal nationalism recognizes the continuing importance of 
anchoring universal values in the actual experience of people with 
national citizenship and state-building (see Auer 2004).
Politics may begin at home, but it has never ended there, as the 
varieties of internationalism, from liberal to socialist, have recognized 
(see Goldmann 2002 and Anderson 2002). Now that politics is being 
comprehensively reconfi gured in the most developed parts of the 
world we need to create a vocabulary adequate to the varying 
experience of citizens, whether they have the “class consciousness of 
frequent travellers” typical of a certain kind of elite (Calhoun 2003b), 
or are among the growing numbers of people in Europe, Canada, 
and Australia who are happy with hybrid identities combining 
several diff erent loyalties, or belong to any of the large minorities that 
remain rooted not only in the national but in the local and particular, 
some of whom fi ll out the ranks of those voting for John Howard and 
similar cultural warriors for singular identities in Canada, Ireland, 
and elsewhere. As Craig Calhoun (2003a, 544) writes, “All actually 
existing cosmopolitanisms … refl ect infl uences of social location 
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and cultural tradition.” So, not all universalists are cosmopolitans. 
Patrick Kavanagh put it like this in his poem “Epic” (Muldoon 1986, 
76):
I have lived in important places, times
When great events were decided, who owned
That half a rood of rock, a no man’s land
Surrounded by our pitchfork—armed claims.
I heard the Duff ys shouting “Damn your soul”
And old McCabe stripped to the waist, see
Step the plot defying blue cast-steel—
“Here is the march along these iron stones.”
That was the year of the Munich bother. Which
Was more important? I inclined
To lose my faith in Ballyrush and Gortin
Till Homer’s ghost came whispering to my mind.
He said: I made The Iliad from such
A local row. Gods make their own importance.
A sharp perspective is given to these questions by Niamh Hourigan 
in her analysis of identity and the preservation or extension of 
Celtic languages in the broadcasting services of Ireland, Scotland, 
and Wales. The language movements she describes have welcomed 
the att ention of new globalized or transnational institutions such 
as the EU, which have empowered them in their struggles against 
nation states that stigmatized or ignored these languages. This is not 
necessarily a rejection of the national but a reappropriation of it.
Helen Irving’s argument that citizenship remains legally anchored 
to the state, however universal rights may be understood to be, 
involves a similar recognition that these various levels continue to 
defi ne one another. She makes a convincing case for distinguishing 
carefully between legal citizenship and the rights and duties it 
involves. These linkages, she argues, are politically contingent rather 
than conceptually necessary.
THE CHANGING FACE OF MULTICULTURALISM
Multiculturalism has been one of the principal frames of reference in 
the debate on managing diversity over the past fi ft een years. It has 
come up in various ways in the chapters of this book, refl ecting the 
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extensive theoretical and political discussion on the issue. Canada, 
Australia, and the Republic of Ireland have had very diff erent 
experiences of multiculturalism, largely because migration has 
aff ected them so diff erently. Millions of Irish people migrated to 
Canada and Australia, over more than 200 years, leaving their own 
distinctive imprints on these societies. It is only much more recently 
that the Republic of Ireland has begun to make the transition from 
being an emigrant society to being an immigrant society, creating 
an urgent need to understand comparative experience. In doing 
so Ireland is having to encounter the policy debates involved (see 
Ingram 2003, and NESC 2006a and 2006b).
Among the most important of these debates is the question of 
whether multiculturalism has in fact reached an intellectual “sell-
by date,” in that it no longer addresses issues of equality as well as 
recognition. This is the case made by, among others, Trevor Phillips, 
who was Chairman of the former Commission for Racial Equality 
in the United Kingdom when he launched a debate on this question 
(he is now chairman of the broader-based Commission for Equalities 
and Human Rights). In an interview with The Times (Baldwin 2004) 
he criticized dogmatic att itudes to racial integration, which, he 
argued, were rooted in the 1980s and did not take account of changes 
in British society since then. As he put it, among African-Caribbeans 
in Britain,
for every person under 30 with two black parents there is also 
one with a white parent. Four fi ft hs of us were born here. Other 
communities are catching up. Some 86 percent of people now 
say that you don’t have to be white to be British. So parking 
Britons in boxes marked with ancestral labels is becoming 
more and more irrelevant.
Phillips emphasized that he supported positive measures to encourage 
integration, especially in view of the fact that “the language barrier 
is a real obstacle to work, friendship, and democratic participation;” 
but, as he wrote later in another newspaper, The Guardian (Phillips 
2004), “Celebrating diversity, but ignoring inequality, inevitably 
leads to the nightmare of entrenched segregation.”
This shift  in focus surprised many observers and provoked a 
passionate debate on the real meaning of multiculturalism, and on 
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whether cultural diversity and the political solidarity needed to 
sustain the welfare state are reconcilable. The latt er question had 
been posed by David Goodhart (2004), editor of the liberal magazine 
Prospect, a few months before Phillips began publicly questioning 
multiculturalism. Goodhart gave it a largely sceptical answer, since, 
in his view, too much diversity aff ects the trade-off  with welfare, in 
what he described as a “progressive dilemma;” his argument was 
contested, or welcomed, in a later issue of his magazine by a number 
of writers, among them Will Kymlicka, Bernard Crick, Amitai 
Etzioni, Nathan Glazer, Nigel Harris, Bhikhu Parekh, and Saskia 
Sassen. Their responses indicate the depth of the theoretical and 
policy debate involved, notably on the centre left , but by no means 
confi ned to it (see also Banting and Kymlicka 2003).
There has been a marked turn in public policy in recent years, 
away from promoting multiculturalism and towards emphasizing 
civic integration for immigrant communities, not only in the United 
Kingdom, but also in the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Finland, 
Sweden, Portugal, Norway, Austria, and Belgium. Christian Joppke 
(2004) argues that this represents a “liberal distemper” over the 
failure of multicultural policies to achieve integration, rather than 
a new nationalist intolerance. It is bett er regarded as a repressive 
“liberalism” with more emphasis on obligation rather than rights 
(Joppke 2007). The actual content of the standards insisted upon 
includes a procedural commitment to universal liberal-democratic 
principles, notably respect for and toleration of religious diversity, 
rather than a new assimilationism. These principles were enshrined 
in the introduction to the EU’s constitutional treaty, while insistence 
on learning the dominant language is a necessary part of expanded 
citizenship. Joppke argues that integration has to be a two-way 
process. This has a utilitarian function, to prepare host communities 
for more immigration in the future. It is economically necessary 
because of the EU’s changing demography, however politically 
diffi  cult it will be to have this reality accepted.
This echoes comparable changes elsewhere. In the United States, 
sociologist and theorist of social capital Robert Putnam has raised 
similar issues in considering a detailed survey of 30,000 individuals 
in forty-two separate communities, which found that trust and 
cooperation are highest in the most homogeneous neighbourhoods 
(see Economist 2004): bonding between “people like us” is markedly 
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stronger than bridging with “people around here,” and the 
more diverse a society is, the more unequal it is. This is valuable, 
theoretically informed empirical social research that can make a 
diff erence in policy-formulation, but it needs careful interpretation.
In the Netherlands, for example, a left -liberal government changed 
the country’s policies in 1998 to provide frameworks and resources for 
newcomers to receive 600 hours of language and civics lessons. This 
was in response to evidence that many second- and third-generation 
members of the Turkish and North African communities had still 
not learned Dutch, and were suff ering widespread unemployment 
and economic marginalization. The entry of Pim Fortuyn’s Populist 
Party into the Dutch legislature in 2002, on a platform of restricting 
immi-gration because, as Fortuyn put it, the country was “full” and 
could not absorb more people, sparked off  a substantial rethinking 
of policy. The centre-right government elected in 2003 has tightly 
restricted immigration and insists that those who have sett led in the 
country must have profi ciency in the Dutch language as well as in 
their own.
Fortuyn came from Rott erdam, where 40 percent of the 600,000 
residents were born outside the Netherlands, many in Turkey or 
North Africa, a proportion that is predicted to rise to 60 percent 
by 2020. Altogether there are some 160 nationalities in the city. The 
modern port was built up by workers from elsewhere in the country 
early in the twentieth century, and was rebuilt, largely by Turkish 
and Maghrebi immigrants, aft er the Second World War. According 
to Bert van Meggelen, an architect and consultant who was director 
of Rott erdam’s “Cultural Capital of Europe” activities in 2001, the 
city’s people badly need to search for a way to live together and 
not seek utopian populist solidarities based on false accounts of its 
history (see Gillespie 2004a). His plea echoes similar ones made in 
many other multicultural centres, and recalls Toronto’s and Sydney’s 
cosmopolitan diversity as exemplary world cities.
That this future may be embraced constructively is confi dently 
argued by the UNDP (2004). Its Human Development Report 
identifi es what it calls fi ve “myths” about cultural diversity and its 
management, drawing on recent research and eff orts to quantify it 
(see also Gillespie 2004b). People’s ethnic identities, fi rst of all, do not 
compete with their att achment to the state. This is because individuals 
can and do have multiple and complementary identities, including 
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ethnicity, gender, class, religion, and race as well as citizenship. 
People can and do choose their identities, and individual choice 
is growing along with human development. This cuts across the 
patt ern of twentieth-century nation-building, when states aimed to 
build culturally homogeneous states with singular identities, oft en by 
extermination, repression, or assimilation, which left  lasting scars, or 
by refusing recognition of diff erences and political participation by 
minorities. Recognizing cultural identities and including them can 
be shown to be a more eff ective way of dealing with the issue. In this 
perspective it is no longer anomalous to discover that individuals 
in multinational polities overwhelmingly say that they feel both 
(as the case may be) Flemish and Belgian, Catalan or Basque and 
Spanish, Canadian and Quebecer, Irish or Scott ish and British, rather 
than choosing one singular identity. They do not see it as a zero-sum 
game.
Secondly, there is litt le real empirical evidence that ethnic 
groups are prone to violent confl ict with one another, creating a 
trade-off  between respecting diversity and sustaining peace. The 
UNDP comes out strongly against these “culturalist” explanations, 
drawing on research showing that other factors, such as economic 
inequality, cultural oppression, and struggles over land and power 
normally underlie such confl icts. Cultural identity can all too 
easily be mobilized in relation to them, but it can also be managed 
harmoniously, if the right approach is taken.
The argument that defending cultural identity necessarily 
involves defending traditional practices is the third myth addressed. 
Multiculturalism, in this perspective, is committ ed to defending 
traditional practices and leaderships, including those that violate 
human rights; but this assumes that culture is a frozen set of 
values, or a singular essence to be discovered, rather than being 
constantly created and adapted to new realities, including by way 
of intercultural dialogue or argument. It also assumes a relativism 
about universal human rights that is not necessary. It is quite possible 
to defend both.
Fourth, it is regularly but falsely argued that ethnically diverse 
countries are less able to develop. Malaysia, for example, with 
a population that is 62 percent Malay, 30 percent Chinese, and 8 
percent Indian, contradicts this, as does Mauritius, which has an 
even more diverse population from African, Indian, Chinese, and 
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European backgrounds, as well as a complex mixture of religions (50 
percent Hindu, 30 percent Christian, and 17 percent Muslim), and 
yet ranks sixty-fourth in the UNDP’s Human Development Index—
the highest ranking of any state in sub-Saharan Africa.
The fi nal myth identifi ed is one of the most enduring in everyday 
politics as well as in social science research: that some cultures are 
more likely than others to make development progress because they 
have inherently more benefi cial values. There is litt le evidence for 
this, whether from historical studies or from statistical analysis, 
however att ractive cultural determinism may be as an explanation for 
the “Protestant work ethic,” “Islamic backwardness,” or “Confucian 
traditionalism.”
RECONCILING DIVERSITY AND UNIVERSALITY
Diversity is concerned with diff erence and variety, and it is 
counterposed to uniformity in debates on political identity. It has 
come to the foreground with the rise of “identity politics” and 
the increasingly critical reaction to such politics over the past ten 
years and more. A common theme of the debate, clearly refl ected in 
this volume, is that, whereas traditional nationalism is predicated 
on singularity, self-sameness, and uniformity, a postnationalist 
politics should be based on multiplicity. This distinction between 
the one and the many is an ancient one in philosophy (see Madsen 
and Strong 2003). Given the irreducible diversity and multiplicity 
of contemporary cultures, it is clear that a major intellectual and 
political eff ort must be made to challenge assumptions of a radical 
incommensurability between national and international life.
Actually existing internationalization, regional integration, and 
cooperation have gone well beyond these assumptions, which 
nonetheless remain remarkably infl uential, because they are still 
reproduced at national level by the circularity between democracy 
and the nation state referred to by Habermas (2001, 16). His two 
questions, posed in the European sett ing, remain central to wider 
debates over coming years. First, why should a civic solidarity 
between strangers “be doomed to come to a fi nal halt just at the 
borders of our classical nation-states?” Second, why should the 
artifi cial conditions that created that solidarity historically not 
be replicated by a process of identity formation beyond national 
boundaries, involving “the emergence of a European civil society; 
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the construction of a Europe-wide public sphere, and the shaping of 
a political culture that can be shared by all European citizens”? More 
conceptual, political, and comparative research is needed to establish 
how relevant this European sett ing may be to other world regions, 
and whether it is in fact exemplary, or merely historically contingent 
(Hurrell 2007). The Club of Rome (1993), for example, put diversity 
centre-stage in a pen-portrait that could be applied elsewhere:
Far from having a single identity, Europe is made up of a 
coexistence of particular, varied identities. All of them are, 
during their lifespan, tucked into spaces of varying sizes and 
functions. Certain spaces are defi ned administrative territories 
limited by man-made borders. A great many individual, 
social or economic activities do, however, transgress these 
boundaries. Most people are “citizens” of various “territories,” 
with diff ering rights and duties, and the image of Europe as 
a frame sheltering these diff erences is the profound wish of 
many.
Recent research on European integration shows that multiple 
and complementary identities are no longer problematic, either 
theoretically or in political practice. The more interesting question 
concerns how they are imagined and organized. Surveys show that 
“country fi rst, but Europe too” is the dominant outlook in most EU 
member states, and people do not perceive this as contradictory. The 
real cleavage in mass opinion is between those who identify with their 
nation alone and those who share an att achment to it and to Europe, 
with the latt er group growing faster than the former (see Citrin and 
Sides 2004). It follows that a European polity does not require a 
demos replacing that of the nation-state, but rather multiple demoi 
coexisting with and complementing one another. Multiple identities 
may be nested inside one another, cross-cutt ing transnationally 
between people sharing diff erent politics or identities, or entangled 
in such a way that the various components of an individual’s identity 
are not neatly separated but infl uence, blend, and mesh with one 
another. This third category is especially relevant for thinking about 
how to manage diversity (see Gillespie and Laff an 2006).
Realizing goals of transnational or postnationalist integration 
would require learning the lessons to be drawn from the intense 
debate on identity, diversity, and multiculturalism that has taken 
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place over the past fi ft een to twenty years. Ayelet Shachar (2001) 
discerns three waves in the debate. In the early 1990s a fi rst wave of 
theorists assessed the justice claims of minority groups, arguing for 
recognizing group-based cultural rights under a new multicultural 
citizenship scheme that would, it was claimed, respect both individual 
and group rights. A second wave of writers questioned whether these 
group-based rights could be reconciled with those of the broader 
community. A third wave is tackling, or ought to tackle, outstanding 
issues thrown up in the debate. Critical multiculturalism analyzes 
the shortcomings of the liberal assumptions made by many of these 
theorists, while reconstructivists go beyond the critique of existing 
normative and legal approaches to seek bett er ways of dealing with 
the challenges of accommodating diff erences and respecting rights.
Among the critical approaches are those claiming that “identity” 
and “culture” have been ill-defi ned or reifi ed in these debates, 
rather than seen as resources and outcomes of political confl ict 
or accommodations (see Brubaker and Cooper 2000). If that is 
so, then multiculturalism reproduces the older essentialisms or 
primordialisms that it was meant to transcend, contenting itself 
with the lesser task of providing a vocabulary allowing multiple 
yet discrete cultures to respect and recognize each other, as distinct 
from developing a pluricultural or intercultural alternative to them. 
Amartya Sen (2006), one of the principal authors of the UNDP’s 
report, argues that most multiculturalisms should be dubbed “plural 
monoculturalisms” for this reason. In this perspective plurality is a 
stronger concept than diversity or multiplicity because it is more 
dynamic and less static. Plurality, according to Hannah Arendt 
(1958, 8), “is the condition of human action because we are all the 
same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as 
anyone else who ever lived, lives or will live.”
Veteran social theorist Stuart Hall (2000) has suggested several 
fruitful new approaches to the subject. He questions ethnicity and 
culture as well as race, and criticizes liberal, communitarian, and 
cosmopolitan approaches to multiculturalism. It is not a single 
doctrine, does not characterize one political strategy, and does not 
represent one already achieved state of aff airs. It is bett er thought 
of as an adjective than as a noun. As Hall puts it, “The double 
demand for equality and diff erence appears to outrun our existing 
political vocabularies.” He suggests that recognizing the claims of 
the particular and the universal must involve some novel ways of 
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combining diff erence and identity, drawing together on the same 
terrain those formal incommensurables of political vocabularies, 
liberty, and equality, with diff erence, “the good,” and “the right.” 
Hall does not believe that philosophical solutions alone are possible, 
since the required recognition of particularity and universality is a 
practical political and social matt er, opening up the “heterogeneous 
space of democracy” in which “vernacular modernities” are being 
established.
In 1945 Theodor Adorno, living in the United States aft er fl eeing 
from Nazi Germany, wrote, “The familiar argument of tolerance 
that all people and all races are equal is a boomerang,” and went 
on to say the argument “lays itself open to the simple refutation of 
the senses, and the most compelling anthropological proofs that 
the Jews are not a race will, in the event of a pogrom, scarcely alter 
the fact that the totalitarians know full well whom they do and 
whom they do not intend to murder.” In contrast, an emancipated 
society “would not be a unitary state, but the realization of 
universality in the reconciliation of diff erences” (Adorno 1951, 
102). His argument contains a profound truth, notwithstanding its 
pessimism. Equality as an abstraction was central to modernity, both 
for political liberalism and for commodity capitalism. It ushered in 
homogenization, standardization, democratization, and rights, all 
of which were revolutionary in the face of the particularities and 
status hierarchies of Europe and are still the most active principles 
of modern politics. Yet, interpreted literally, such a regime of rights 
and equality contradicts human experience of individual diff erence 
and is therefore, as Marx (1875, 24) put it, “a right of inequality, like 
every other right.” Yet what human beings have in common is exactly 
their diff erences, their capacity to individuate themselves. The same 
applies to their cultures, insofar as they are also subject to a regime 
of rights. The chapters in this book suggest similar conclusions and 
point to ways in which rights should be pursued with the goal of 
managing autonomy, diversity, and plurality in an increasingly 
postnationalist world.
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